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Preface 
The crisis in Bougainville has become the most serious issue in the 
affairs of the western Pacific. Separatist sentiment has always been 
significant, fuelled by perceived ethnic traits distinguishing 
Bougainvilleans from other Papua New Guineans, exacerbated by 
neglect of the region during most of the colonial period (until the 
development of the mining complex in the 1960s), and promoted by the 
remoteness of the islands from the rest of Papua New Guinea. 
Secession was the greatest problem addressed by the independent state 
of Papua New Guinea in 1975. The resolution - autonomy for the 
North Solomons Province - seemed to work until the late 1 980s when 
younger and more militant people began to represent the landowners in 
negotiations with the mining company, the provincial government, and 
the national government. 
The crisis has Australian dimensions : the Commonwealth 
government cannot be neutral since it provides a declining but still 
significant proportion of Papua New Guinea's  revenue and logistic 
support for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force; the closure of the 
mine and Papua New Guinea's resulting fiscal difficulties will intensify 
Papua New Guinea's financial dependence. Also, many of the relevant 
aid agencies are based in Australia or organize their efforts here. It is 
critically important therefore that Australians'be accurately informed of 
events and conditions in Bougainville. 
Media coverage is at best uneven. The blockade of the island has 
made information scarce, erratic and unreliable; inevitably, information 
is carried by individuals and organizations who are emotionally 
involved in one way or another. Oarity is also obscured by the fact that 
different policies are pursued by competing sections of the Papua New 
Guinea cabinet, and different stances have been adopted by the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army, the Interim Government, and an 
increasing number of smaller organizations in Bougainville. It is this 
dearth of accurate information which provoked us to organize a second 
Bougainville Update Conference. It is our fervent hope that the next 
conference will be the last, and that it will be able to analyse a 
successful and peaceful resolution. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE B OUGAINVILLE C RISIS : 
OPENING ADDRESS TO THE 
BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS 1991 UPDATE 
C ONFERENCE 
The Hon. John Langmore, MP 
The Bougainville crisis is  the most acute and complex conflict in this 
region at present. Innumerable issues are involved: the wellbeing of 
the people of Bougainville , including their living standards, health and 
education; order and justice in community relations on the island, 
including the prevention of brutality from whatever source and 
prosecution of the offenders, whoever they are - the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA), the Papua New Guinea Defence Force or 
whoever; governance of Bougainville, including the nature of relations 
between the Bougainv ille people, the North Solomons provincial 
government and the national government; the rights of landowners; the 
rights of investors; church/state relations; the impact of the closure of 
the mine on the wellbeing of the rest of the people of Papua New 
Guinea and on the viability of the Papua New Guinea economy; the 
nature of Papua New Guinea as a nation state, including the extent of 
regional autonomy; relations between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, including the role of ethics in diplomacy - for example the 
extent to which foreign countries have any role in internal human rights 
issues; and relations between Papua New Guinea and the whole 
international community. 
That list of i ssues is certainly not complete and would be 
controversial, even in the way it is compiled. The fact that so many 
difficult issues are involved in the Bougainville crisis shows that it is 
worth intensive study. It also shows the importance of the application 
of sensitive and creative thought to ways of moving towards a 
resolution of the many problems. So this conference is particularly 
important. 
2 John Langmore, MP 
It is important also because the problems are so little understood 
in Australia and so poorly reported (even the Guardian on 10 May 
reported activities of 'President Ona' without using the description 
'President ' in inverted commas). Of course such misreporting is,  in 
part, because of the embargo. In fact it is one costly consequence of 
Bougainville's isolation. So this conference is an important occasion 
and I congratulate Donald Denoon and Matthew Spriggs for organizing 
it. 
The programme draws in a particularly strong group of people 
with expertise on the issues surrounding the Bougainville crisis. 
Therefore, the discussion will be well informed. I hope it will also be 
productive of ideas which can be used by all the participants in this 
crisis. 
I do not have detailed knowledge of Bougainville and make these 
comments reluctantly. However, as an Australian parliamentarian who 
worked in Papua New Guinea for over a decade and who has strong 
affection for that country, I can raise some questions and· also express 
on behalf of people in government and in the whole community the 
importance of trying to find constructive and sensitive approaches and 
policies for moving towards resolution of the intense conflicts on 
Bougainville. Much of the information I have received during the last 
couple of years has come through the parliamentary sub-committee 
which is studying relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
There are many distinguishable interest groups in the 
Bougainville conflict: traditional landowners in the area of the mine and 
in the areas which are destroyed or polluted through waste disposal; 
other regional groups in Bougainville and on Buka; within those 
groups, traditional leaders, the remnants of the provincial government 
and BRA activists;  the churches; the national government, which is 
itself divided by various interests and orientations; CRA; and external 
governments and institutions concerned about stability and growth such 
as the Australian government, the World Bank and commercial banks 
wanting repayment of debt. 
We are all aware of the theory behind the development of the 
Bougainville copper project. The mine was expected to generate taxable 
income to fund education and health, transport and communications 
infrastructure, agricultural extension and other forms of government 
services which have been regarded as essential for economic 
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development. These benefits were expected to be shared throughout 
Bougainville as well as the rest of Papua New Guinea. The revenue 
generated was expected to gradually replace development assistance, 
allowing Papua New Guinea to become more self-reliant. The project 
was also expected to provide employment and markets for local 
produce and other goods as well as to enable technology transfer and 
the training of Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guineans. 
However, the process of exploration, construction and operation 
involved massive environmental degradation. As well , Bougainvilleans 
had the feeling that they paid all the costs of the mine, but that the rest 
of Papua New Guinea derived most of the benefits. 
It is easy to see why the landowners and others on Bougainville 
may have had a strong sense of injustice. Although Bougainville 
Copper Ltd (BCL) paid more than half a billion kina in company tax 
and K 1 4 1  million in dividends to the national government during the 
fifteen years the mine was in operation, it had paid landowners only 
Kl9 million in compensation for losses and disruption and K3 million 
in royalties. The provincial government had received K55 million in 
royalties (Dorney 1990: 12 1). 
As w�ll as questions about that balance of the division of the 
income between the company, the national government, the provincial 
government and the landowners, there are conflicts within the 
Bougainvillean community. Who should have been entitled to 
compensation? How were growing inequalities between those whose 
incomes were multiplied and those who did not benefit to be 
addressed? How should the structure of representation have been kept 
up to date as the age composition of each group changed and their 
attitudes changed also? Could the integrity of traditional patterns of 
inheritance have been retained as the stakes rose? 
For Australians and the Australian government, the issues are 
clearly very difficult. For example, what should be our response to the 
human rights abuses? The most notorious incident was the alleged 
dumping of bodies, illegally murdered by the security forces, from the 
Australian donated Iroquois helicopters into the sea off Bougainville. A 
curious aspect of this incident has been the media focus on the role of 
the helicopters and the fact of their being donated by Australia. Surely 
the murder of civilians by troops of the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force far outweighs the horror of the disposal of the bodies? Further 
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infonnation of human rights abuses during the reign of the security 
forces came to light after an Amnesty International report on the crisis 
in late 1 990. And of course the spotlight has remained on the violence 
initiated and continued by the BRA. Neither side can claim to come to 
the negotiating table with clean hands . 
An underlying theme in the tale of violence was the seeming 
independence of the security forces . Prior to the blockade they 
appeared to act with impunity, presumably without the blessing of the 
PNG government. This theme has again been raised over the landing 
on Bougainville of government troops from the northern island of 
Buka, apparently without legal authority from the National Executive 
Council - the executive ann of the government. 
Another aspect of the saga was the attempt by the Papua New 
Guinea government at reconciliation. The delicacy of Australia's 
position was highlighted. An Australian presence at the negotiations 
would have been counterproductive. 
The accord signed by Papua New Guinea· and B RA 
representatives on board the New Zealand navy ship, The Endeavour, 
was witnessed by officials from New Zealand and Canada and 
obviously facilitated by New Zealand. Australia was conspicuous by its 
absence. 
A role for Australia was out of the question because Australia 
was perceived by the Bougainvilleans as hostile. This related to our 
wholehearted support for the Papua New Guinea government, and 
opposition to secession for Bougainville. It also derived in part from 
the fact that B CL, an Australian company, was imposed on the 
Bougainvilleans when Papua New Guinea was an Australian territory. 
The 'Endeavour Accord ' ,  having failed, was replaced by the ' Honiara 
Declaration ' .  Again there was very definitely no role for Australia. 
The underlying question of the Papua New Guinea government's 
authority and control demanded recognition. Twice the Papua New 
Guinea government, the BRA and other Bougainvillian authorities had 
agreed on a solution. The onus was on the government to restore 
services. Twice the agreed outcome failed to materialize. 
News began to trickle out of Bougainville on the impact of the 
total blockade on the Bougainvilleans. At first the news came through 
the Catholic and United Churches, who constituted the only authority 
(other than the BRA) on Bougainville. One channel of news was the 
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neighbouring Solomon Islands, and interested Australians received it 
through newsletters from the B ougainville Information Service, 
established in Melbourne. A good deal of word-of-mouth contact also 
spread information. Later there were several illegal visits (through the 
Honiara route) by journalists and others. 
There were two results of this. 
The inevitable suffering of the people suddenly deprived of 
government services was forced on the attention of those who would 
listen. The information was in the form of interviews and pictures seen 
on TV. News of the hardships caused by the medicine, food and fuel 
aspects of the blockade raised a whole new area of human rights issues 
- this time inflicted indirectly by the Papua New Guinea government. 
The message from the NGOs has been clear: Australia must take 
account of the human suffering caused by the deliberate imposition of 
the strongest blockade imposed anywhere in the world. Should 
Australia therefore put pressure on the Papua New Guinea government 
and take all other possible action to immediately supply essential 
medicines, food and services? Or has the effect of this blockade been 
to disillusion many or most Bougainvilleans with the BRA ,  creating a 
situation in which re-establishment of provincial and/or central 
government has become more feasible? 
The other result of the news relayed by journalists visiting 
Bougainville illegally was to invoke the wrath and indignation of the 
Papua New Guinea government. This has hardened the attitude of 
some within the Papua New Guinea government that Bougainville is 
Papua New Guinea's problem , and it can very well do without outside 
interference. As a result of the illegal visits some journalists have been 
banned from entering Papua New Guinea. 
The dilemma for the Parliamentary Sub-Committee is that the 
subject demands some sort of decision. The topic, which is such a vital 
part of the Australia/Papua New Guinea relationship, requires some 
recommendation. 
Possible positions for Australia are: 
1 .  Australia could continue to give complete support to 
the Papua New Guinea government, recognizing that the majority of 
the cabinet want the best for the country as a whole - that they are doing 
their best to find a solution to a very difficult problem - and that to even 
contemplate secession for Bougainville would be to threaten the 
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continuing political (if not economic) viability of Papua New Guinea. If 
Papua New Guinea's future is threatened the security of the region is 
threatened, and this is clearly detrimental to Australia's interests. This 
position would preclude Australia from even talking to Bougainvilleans 
except through the national government, recognizing that any such 
discussions might be seen as giving some sort of de facto recognition 
to an existence for Bougainville as a separate entity from the Papua 
New Guinea state. 
2 .  The most radical approach would be fo r  Australia to 
look at the problem independently from its relationship with Papua 
New Guinea. This would mean talking to the Bougainvilleans about 
their situation and their aspirations , and making judgement about 
appropriate help Australia might give to solve their problems. The basic 
assumption in this approach would be that the human suffering on the 
island outweighs all other considerations in the 'Bougainville troubles ' .  
This approach might involve Australia in encouraging Papua 
New Guinea to allow the Bougainvilleans to express their views on 
secession through the ballot box. It might involve appealing to the UN, 
or encouraging Papua New Guinea to appeal to the UN, for assistance 
in solving the problem. It would imply a judgement that the situation on 
Bougainville had broken down irretrievably, raising the possibility of a 
permanent source of instability and violence in the region - the South 
Pacific's own Northern Ireland. 
3. Australia could continue to give moral support to the 
Papua New Guinea government by applauding its non-negotiable stand 
on Bougainvillean secession. It could at the same time take an ethical 
stand by refusing to accept that it must choose between an unspoken 
acceptance of the suffering of the Bougainville people, and causing 
offence to the Papua New Guinea government. This is the stand urged 
by the NGOs. This position would involve a much more proactive 
approach to the restoration of seIVices (and presumably law and order) 
than Australia has been willing to adopt so far. 
It might, for example, involve the deployment of  another 
engineering corps from the Australian Army (such as the one now 
administering the Public Works Department of the Southern Highlands 
Province). It might involve sending a contingent of police, perhaps in 
conjunction with police from other Commonwealth countries. It might 
involve increased AIDAB funding of those NGOs which provide 
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skilled personnel , such as Australian Volunteers Abroad, to allow a 
m assive increase in the deployment of professional people to restore 
services. It would certainly involve a larger financial commitment. 
Some version of this option is the one I tend to favour. 
There are no doubt many other variations on these themes. I do 
not have either enough information or a clear enough view of the 
situation to be sure that this final option is the best. One factor of which 
I am sure is that Papua New Guineans have a highly developed 
capacity for achieving consensus within their own societies , and that 
thi s capacity could play a large part in achieving resolution of the 
Bougainville conflict. I hope that this conference will throw greater 
light on the issues. The maturity of Australia's foreign policy will be 
judged by our handling of this particular crisis more than by any other 
single issue. I look forward to hearing the discussion. 
CHAPTER2 
B OUGAINVILLE UPDATE: 
AUGUST 1990 TO MAY 1991 
Matthew Spriggs 
The purpose of this update, and the one covering events from the time 
of the 1 99 1  Conference to October 1 99 1  (see chapter 15) ,  is to 
summarize some of the major events and processes during the past year 
of the crisis. Many topics, such as the detailed reasons for failure of the 
Endeavour and Honiara peace agreements , the alleged ' soft cop/tough 
cop' act of Prime Minister Namaliu and Deputy Prime Minister Diro, 
the strategies of Buka leaders in the crisis, and the relationship between 
the BRA leadership and the Bougainville Interim Government, are 
merely flagged rather than analysed. They deserve more detailed 
treatment than is possible here. Sources used include newspaper and 
other media accounts, Interim Government and some Papua New 
Guinea government documents , and word of mouth from witnesses 
and some with an intimate involvement in events. All of these sources 
of course have their limitations. 
Douglas Oliver ( 1 99 1 ) has recently published a summary of 
events up to June 199 1 .  
Aftermath o f  the Endeavour Accord 
The 'Postscript' to the Bougainville Crisis (May and Spriggs 1990) 
summarized events up to the signing of the Endeavour Accord between 
the Papua New Guinea government and Bougainvillean representatives 
on 5 August 1 990 (see Appendix 1 ) .  It ended with the sentence: 
'Assuming the agreement holds, further discussions are to be held later 
in 1990' (Spriggs and May 1990). The agreement did not hold and it is 
worth considering why that was .  
A clue is  given by two newspaper accounts giving quite different 
interpretations of the key provisions concerning the security of 
personnel to be involved in the restoration of services. The Melbourne 
Age on 6 August reported: 'the Papua New Guinea government insists 
the return of public servants must be accompanied by a return of 
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general duties police to the province, but Bougainville leaders say they 
can guarantee the officials ' safety without outside help ' .  The following 
day in the same newspaper, under the headline 'Bougainville will use 
its own police in peace deal ' ,  Marie-Louise O 'Callaghan wrote: 
Instead of PNG constables, a 'police force ' made up of 
Bougainvillean former officers already on the island, will 
be armed to provide security for those sent in to 
recommence health, education and communication 
services cut when Port Moresby imposed an economic 
blockade in April. 
This was a major concession from the government. The report goes on 
to claim that Sir Michael Som are ' is believed to have suggested the 
compromise on police presence when it became apparent that the talks 
were close to collapse on Saturday ' .  He may well have done this but it 
was never explicitly stated in the Accord. 
What was in the Accord, however, (and repeated in another form 
in the Honiara Declaration) was the seemingly innocuous phrase that 
the return of services to Bougainville would be conducted by ' all 
practical steps consistent with the Constitution of Papua New Guinea' .  
Although the agreement also made reference to services being restored 
'without force ' ,  the reference to the constitution could certainly be 
interpreted to allow involvement of police and soldiers in the restoration 
process. This was certainly the Papua New Guinea government's 
inteipretation when it attempted to land soldiers with the supply ships at 
Buka Passage on 31 August to ' assist civilian personnel ' (Post-Courier 
1 3  September 1990). The landing was prevented by the BRA because 
of the presence of patrol boats accompanying the supply vessels and 
the fact that they had not gone to the main port of Kieta to offload 
supplies to be checked and distributed by the BRA. Joe Kabui, leader 
of the Bougainville delegation to the Endeavour talks claimed that such 
a condition was part of the Endeavour Accord. Again, it may have been 
a verbal agreement, and therefore not worth the paper it was written on, 
or a particular interpretation of the clause 'The Government of Papua 
New Guinea will consult regularly with the present Bougainville 
Delegation on the restoration of services ' ,  to which Kabui was 
referring. 'Consult' does not mean 'follow the directions of' , however, 
as Kabui perhaps thought. 
1 0  Matthew Spriggs 
The vagueness of the wording was all in Papua New Guinea's 
favour, allowing the government to claim it had not broken the letter of 
the agreement when it was intent on breaking its spirit. The clearly 
superior negotiating skills of Sir Michael Somare and his colleague 
Bernard N arokobi produced a document useful in presenting a positive 
image of the government in the face of seeming Bougainville 
intransigence but useless, indeed damaging, in promoting the cause of 
peace. Oliver ( 199 1 :248-59) covers the Endeavour negotiations and 
some of the reasons for the failure of the Accord in some detail. 
The landing of Papua New Guinea troops on Buka 
The disagreements over interpretation of the Accord were rendered 
moot when Papua New Guinea landed troops on Buka Island on 2 1  
September. They quickly restored some semblance of government 
control but certainly not ' without force ' as specified in the Accord. 
Over the next several months occasional deaths and injuries were 
sustained by the PNGDF amid reports of high casualties among BRA 
forces, particularly when a ' suicide attack' was mounted by the BRA in 
small boats against Defence Force vessels moored at Buka Passage. 
The justification for the landing of troops on Buka was an urgent 
request signed by 125 individuals from the island for protection against 
increased BRA harassment of leaders and vi�agers. This had occurred 
in the wake of rejection of supplies by the BRA when the government 
attempted to land them on Buka at the end of August. The sight of 
eagerly-awaited supplies being turned away by the .. BRA may have been 
the last straw for many on the island, and fuelled anti-BRA sentiment. 
But why had the initial attempt at restoration of services been directed 
to Buka rather than the capital Arawa, the site of the main hospital and 
other services such as communications facilities? Deliberate 
provocation as the aim of the exercise cannot be ruled out, the 
government determining, no doubt correctly, that support on Buka for 
the BRA was not as strong as in other areas and seeking to bring the 
pot to the boil. 
Whether intentional or not, the effect of the August attempt at 
restoration of services was the same. Anti-BRA feeling on Buka led to 
the formation of the Buka Liberation Front (BLF) as an opposition 
force and the call for PNGDF troops to come to their assistance. BRA 
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threats against and mistreatment of Buka leaders such as Sam Tulo and 
James Togel led them to take uncompromising stands against secession 
and against any serious negotiations with the BRA or Interim 
Government leadership once they were restored to positions of 
influence on the island. 
In October, some Buka leaders signed an agreement with the 
government in the New Ireland capital , dubbed the Kavieng 
Agreement. It is an almost unanalysed document, indeed Oliver ( 199 1 )  
does not even mention it. It is  included here as Appendix 2 .  The 
Kavieng Agreement is a curious document with a series of measures 
urged on the government by the Buka leaders, most of which do not 
seem to have been implemented, and undertakings by the Papua New 
Guinea government to restore services, provide security and consult 
with the B uka delegation·' as the need arises ' .  The parties agreed that 
Sam Tulo, leader of the Buka delegation, would 'be included in any 
talks on the future status of Bougainville ' .  He was not included in 
January's Honiara talks, however, at the apparent insistence of the 
Bougainville delegation. 
A key point which the Buka delegation urged on the national 
government was to 'engage B uka personnel in the provision of security 
to the Island ' ,  a reference to the BLF. This is not mentioned as being 
an undertaking of the government in the document and the legal status 
of the BLF has never been clarified. A Buka Island chief, Michael 
Samo, asked that the minister for Justice, Bernard Narokobi, explain 
the legal status of the BLF as the people on the island were confused: 
We are all now under the impression that BLF is a legally 
recognized body on Buka Island and that they now have 
the full authority to shoot anyone who is suspected of  
being a BRA supporter, or who may  have shown 
disrespect for the government authorities on the island 
(Post-Courier 21 December 1990). 
If this was not chilling enough we have to the words of Thomas Anis, 
chairman of the BLF and former commerce minister in the North 
Solomons provincial government, as quoted in the Post-Courier (7 
January 1 99 1 ): 
We are fighting a civil war which involves anns, violence 
and psychological struggle for power - a warfare which 
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only the fittest will survive. We are not interested in the 
legality of BLF or BRA or any other forces that may exist 
on Bougainville. 
He claimed that the BLF as an ' authorised unauthorised security force' 
was sanctioned by the PNGDF and the government. 
Throughout December and January B uka was indeed in a state of 
civil war, with fighting between the BRA and BLF all over the island 
and the PNGDF seemingly taking little part in proceedings. By January 
it was reported that 7000 people displaced by the fighting were living in 
' care centres ' ,  and many others had fled to Rabaul (Post-Courier 7 
January 1991 ) . The number in care centres later climbed to over 12,600 
(Post-Courier 7 March 199 1 ) . Complaints started to come through of 
indiscriminate killings by BLF members and that many families on 
Buka feared the BLF more than the BRA and Defence Force soldiers: 
'Homes, gardens and valuable property had been destroyed 'for no 
good reason' and old people and mothers and children had been 
frightened by BLF members armed with guns and other dangerous 
weapons ' (Post-Courier 19 December 1990). 
This raises real questions as to what level of support there really 
was on Buka for the return of the PNGDF and more particularly for the 
leaders associated with the BLF. Why did the Defence Force need to 
sanction or at least tum a blind eye to the behaviour of an ill-disciplined 
vigilante force? Can it be that support for the 'government on Buka was 
not as solid as claimed by Prime Minister Namaliu and leaders such as 
Sam Tula? News from Buka has been extremely t�_ghtly controlled, the 
only visit by foreign and national media in those early months being 
carefully orchestrated by the PNGDF. As the Times of PNG 
complained in an editorial : 'A  visit by the media to Buka two weeks 
ago was a guided tour by the Defence Force and it was only for four 
hours. They did not give us much chance to talk to the people and get 
their side of the story ' (Times of PNG 1 6  January 1991 ) .  
The trip was long enough, however, for AB C television to 
record BRA members who had surrendered being jeered by the BLF, 
one of them being punched in the face as he was marched off, and later 
ill-treatment by PNGDF soldiers jabbing the captives with their boots 
as they lay spreadeagled face down in the dirt (ABC News 7 January 
199 1 ) . With a belated self-consciousness the soldiers then prevented 
further filming. Other reports of human rights abuses by the PNGDF 
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and/or the BLF included suspected BRA members arriving in Rabaul 
for detention with ' facial and body injuries ' suffered since their arrest 
(Post-Courier 6 December 1 990), but most startling were revelations 
about the early days of the PNGDF reoccupation contained in ABC 
TV's 'Four Comers ' programme in June. John Kolan, interviewed at 
Buka Passage, told how he was eyewitness to the cold-blooded murder 
of five BRA suspects by troops the day after they landed in September, 
and later to two more BRA suspects being forced to dig their own 
graves before being executed. Brutalization of captured BRA suspects 
was described by Julian Nogos, one of those interned (ABC TV, 
Blood on the Bougainvillea, 24 June 199 1 ) .  
Effects of the blockade on Bougainville 
It was only after the failure of the Endeavour Accord that the 
seriousness of the medical situation on Bougainville was fully realized. 
As has been noted many times, the blockade was total, including a 
blockade on any medical supplies, and was therefore tighter than that 
placed around Saddam Hussein's Iraq. As Russell Rollasson of 
ACFOA commented, 'Nowhere in the world are medicines blockaded. 
How can you possibly accept that? ' (Australian 2 January 1 991 ). In an 
editorial in the same newspaper it was suggested that, ' On humanitarian 
grounds Bougainville's plight should be among the prime concerns on 
our foreign affairs agenda ' (ibid.). 
Working through the Australian government, ACFOA had been 
trying to arrange shipment of vital medical supplies to the island for 
several weeks, but when it seemed that the shipment was about to be 
approved PM Namaliu rejected it claiming he had never even heard of 
the request. This caused embarrassment to the Australian government 
and outrage in Australia and elsewhere. The Melbourne Age, in a 
particularly direct editorial, labelled the decision ' tragically ill-judged' ,  
' a  callous denial of human rights ' and noted that 'PNG cannot be 
surprised if the world is appalled ' (Melbourne Age 3 January 199 1 ) . 
Papua New Guinea's response to mounting international 
pressure was to say that the blockade had been lifted effective 
immediately (widely reported in the media on 4 January 1991) while 
making absolutely no changes to policy or action. In fact no medical 
supplies, including those donated by ACFOA, got into Bougainville 
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officially between the signing of the Endeavour Accord and the first 
shipment of supplies after the signing of the Honiara Declaration, on 2 1  
February 1991 .  
Soon after the Endeavour talks Joe Kabui had written to the 
government to allow independent and neutral organisations such at the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to distribute medical 
supplies and other services. This was rejected by the National Security 
Council who insisted that the armed forces be used to restore services 
(Times of PNG 4 October 1 990). 
Calls to allow in medical supplies from various international 
groups including the Solomon Islands Christian Association (Times of 
PNG 18 October 1990) fell on deaf ears, and a later Solomons Islands 
government request to allow people to travel freely across the border to 
purchase supplies and receive medical attention was also turned down. 
The sympathy felt in the Solomons for the plight of the 
Bougainvilleans, and Papua New Guinea's seeming lack of concern 
further strained relations between the two countries . The Solomons 
from this time on maintained a supervised but open border against 
Papua New Guinea's wishes.  Papua New Guinea has officially 
complained on more than one occasion but with no effect. For the 
Solomons, humanitarian concerns outweigh any deleterious political 
consequences ,  the opposite of what appears to be the Australian 
government position in relation to the issue . .  
Some idea of what the medical situation on Bougainville was like 
was provided by letters and reports from doctors on the island, talking 
of avoidable deaths and stillbirths, increasing rates of malaria and other 
diseases. With the (unofficial) opening of the border with the 
Solomons , a trickle of medical supplies did start arriving on 
Bougainville, but this was certainly not with the blessing of the Papua 
New Guinea government. Reading the medical reports, which were all 
available to the Papua New Guinea authorities, it is hard to find any 
justification for their actions in actively preventing agencies like the Red 
Cross and ACFOA from going in to Bougainville. If, as has been 
claimed, a loyal majority of people on the island were being kept in 
check by the terror-tactics of the BRA, why punish that majority? Even 
leaving aside humanitarian concerns, such a strategy was as likely to 
alienate people as break their will or lead them to tum on the BRA. 
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The Amnesty International report 
The Amnesty International report on human rights violations on 
Bougainville 1 989-90 was released on 27 November (Amnesty 
International 1990). It gave detailed accounts of the deaths of nineteen 
people by extrajudicial execution, or after being tortured in police or 
military custody (see Spriggs, this volume for one case). It also 
detailed over fifty cases of torture or ill-treatment at the hands of 
government forces. 
The Papua New Guinea and Australian governments acted 
defensively over the cases. Jim Griffin, one time Professor of History 
at UPNG, wrote a feature article for the Papua New Guinea press 
belittling the Amnesty Report and trivializing its findings by 
concentrating largely on a single page historical background of what 
was a 4 7-page report. The background contained various wrong dates 
and over-simplified statements, but had no bearing on the various cases 
documented in the rest of the report. 
Griffin casts doubt on the body of the report by his detailed 
analysis of Hs introduction, which, along with gratuitous comments on 
a television interview with an Amnesty representative, takes up over 65 
per cent of the article. The innuendo is clear: ' if their research is so 
shoddy in a field one knows something about, what is it like when one 
knows little or nothing? ' (Times of PNG 29 November 1990). 
One charge commonly made about the Amnesty report was that it 
did not give enough attention to BRA atrocities. Indeed Oliver 
( 1 99 1  :256) went as far as to claim that: 'Their widely publicized 
findings were based on second-hand information, and did not include 
violations committed by the BRA ' .  This is simply untrue. The report 
gave what details were available of BRA abuses before and after the 
withdrawal of the security forces ( 1990:36-40). With the government's 
total blockade still operating at the time the report was compiled it is not 
surprizing that less information was available on BRA abuses. The 
Papua New Guinea government took no action on the report. 
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Renewed military action and a planned 'invasion' 
While the Papua New Guinea government argued that the troops on 
B uka were there to help in the restoration of services and were not 
seiving in an offensive capacity, it is not clear how such a role squares 
with incidents such as the shelling of Kieta and other areas including 
Tubiana Catholic Mission, Rigu High School, and villages along the 
coast of Koromira (Times of PNG 29 November 1 990, 20 December 
1 990). The coastal villages opposite Buka Passage were mortared from 
army camps on Buka and from patrol boats, and schools, villages, and 
a care centre for displaced people at Sorom were attacked by soldiers 
using the Australian-supplied helicopters as firing platforms (Times of 
PNG 1 7  January 1991 ). 
Australia was clearly aware of this further breach of the 
helicopter agreement and protested to Papua New Guinea (Sydney 
Morning Herald 1 6  January 1990). The protest was effective and the 
helicopters were at least temporarily withdrawn. Referring to these 
attacks, Oliver has been prepared to give the Papua New Guinea 
government the benefit of the doubt: 'Given the nature of PNG's 
administrative "flexibility" it is quite possible that the incidents just 
cited were independently ordered by a Cabinet hawk, or even by a 
down-the-line offical acting on his own' ( 199 1:26 1) .  
Whoever ordered the attacks, the effect meant to be achieved by 
this  indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas was presumably to 
dissuade the BRA from launching any attacks on B uka from the 
mainland, demoralize the population ahead of a rumoured ' invasion' ,  
and/or to force the Bougainville side to the negotiating table again. 
According to various reports, a landing on Bougainville by 
Papua New Guinea troops was planned for early January but in cabinet 
Father John Momis threatened to resign if it went ahead. This was no 
idle threat given the shakiness of the government coalition at the time 
and opposition m anoeuvrings for a vote of no confidence when 
parliament next sat. Mom is ' departure could well have brought down 
the government. 
The breathing space gained was just enough. It had been created 
by an initiative from the Bougainvillean side in asking for John Momis 
to be an intermediary in negotiations rather than holding direct talks 
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with the national government (Post-Courier 3 1  December 1 990). In 
early January, however, Acting Prime Minister Ted Diro obviously had 
other plans and spoke out against such a role for Momis while hinting 
at an impending military action as part of his 'carefully plotted strategy' 
(Post-Courier 3 January 1991 ). In the same edition of the newspaper 
Momis accepted his invitation to be a mediator, demonstrating clearly 
the division between hawks and doves in the cabinet. 
At the same time as talks among Bougainvillean leaders began in 
Honiara, it was also reported that the national government was 
planning 'for security forces to gradually move towards Buin, Inus and 
Tinputz on mainland Bougainville in a bid to win support from 
Bougainvilleans . . .  and eventually move into the Kieta area - a BRA 
Stronghold ' (Times of PNG 17 January 1991 ) . Significant in the report 
was that this undertaking· by the government had been decided at the 
Kavieng talks in October. The Kavieng Agreement (see Appendix 2) 
does list a somewhat less explicit undertaking ' to restore all 
government and business services to Buka and the whole of 
Bougainville ' ,  but the information that this was to be achieved by the 
use of the security forces gives some insight into government strategy 
at the time. While preliminary peace talks continued, Diro put the heat 
up again with an announcement that the Defence Forces would move 
into southern Bougainville within weeks, stating: 'The days for talking 
are over. The situation there does not need any more political rhetoric ' 
(Post-Courier 18  January 1991). 
The Honiara Declaration and after 
The signing of the Honiara Declaration (Appendix 3, 4) on January 23 
for a time eclipsed the hard-liners in the cabinet led by Diro, with Sir 
Michael Somare stating after the signing: 'We've decided to leave our 
people, our security forces out, they can operate in other parts of PNG' 
(Melbourne Age 25 January 199 1 ). This was not explicit in the signed 
document, however, which can be interpreted as sanctioning further 
use of the PNGDF. Government plans for reoccupation of north and 
south Bougainville to isolate the BRA heartlands of the centre, 
formulated long before the Kavieng Agreement, clearly envisaged a 
further role for the PNGDF. Peace talks have come and gone but the 
original plan continues to be implemented stage by stage, raising the 
1 8  Matthew Spriggs 
question of how serious the government side is in implementing the 
agreements it signs. One possibility is that Somare and Narokobi have 
acted in good faith but cannot deliver on the agreements when faced by 
a generally hard-line cabinet. 
A somewhat similar problem was clearly faced by the 
Bougainville Interim Government signatories to the Honiara 
Declaration, although their inability to deliver their side of the 
agreement was aired much more publicly when journalists accompanied 
the first voyage to Kieta of the MV Sankamap carrying desperately 
needed medical supplies. 
In a public relations disaster, questions as to who had the power 
on Bougainville, the Interim Government or the BRA leadership, were 
clearly answered in Kieta. A local BRA commander, 23-year-old Chris 
Uma, overruled and publicly insulted Interim Government ministers 
including Joe Kabui over a shipment of food supplies. They had 
accepted this food aid; he rejected it and had it loaded back on the ship. 
Who had the power within the BRA was rendered questionable when 
Uma also confided to journalists that Supreme BRA Commander 
Francis Ona had demanded that the Sankamap be impounded, whereas 
he gave permission against orders for it to leave (Sydney Morning 
Herald 23 February 1991 ). 
Ona's seeming inability to control undisciplined sections of the 
BRA had been seen much earlier soon after the withdrawal of Papua 
New Guinea forces in March 1 990, when extensive looting and 
harassment of individuals had occurred. At that time he had threatened 
to surrender if such behaviour continued. Things did apparently quieten 
down for a while, but later harassment of civilians by ' rascal ' BRA 
elements led to a gun battle in which several of the rascals were killed 
(Sam Kauona, interview on SBS Television, 23 February 1 99 1 ) ,  
presumably 'pour encourager les autres ' . 
The Panguna mine and town had remained intact as had much of 
Arawa and Kieta up to December 1990, but in apparent retaliation for 
government statements on the reopening of the mine and/or as part of a 
'scorched earth' policy ahead of rumoured invasion, or more likely for 
fun, some elements of the BRA torched accommodation blocks, 
houses, the theatre and the supermarket in Panguna, a shopping block 
and the country club in Arawa, and other houses and businesses in 
Kieta and Toniva. This wanton destruction reportedly led Ona to 
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inteivene with another threat to surrender in Buka if the destruction 
continued. 
This lack of control over its own forces has led to doubts that an 
order from the central command of the BRA to surrender arms to a 
multinational supeivisory team (MST), as specified in the Honiara 
Declaration, would be obeyed by all sections of the BRA. This would 
of course put the MST in an impossible situation, creating a real chance 
of confrontation with ' rascal' BRA elements operating independently of 
the central command. 
Australia, expected to be a major player in the MST, clearly had 
these thoughts uppermost and a series of reports were carefully 
' leaked' to Greg Austin of the Sydney Morning Herald by the 
intelligence services, accurately predicting problems that would arise 
with the implementation of the Honiara Declaration. Austin's report 
noted concerns about the wisdom of sending peacekeeping troops into 
a situation 'where the BRA is unable to exercise full control over its 
forces ' .  The report continues: 
The fairly uninformed level of understanding by the BRA 
leadership of the diplomatic and political implications of 
their acts is a cause for concern when considering the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force, a Defence source 
said . There is now no law and order authority on 
Bougainville and little likelihood that one can be 
reasserted in the near future without use of force by the 
central PNG Government ( 'Bougainville peace treaty is 
facing a rocky future ' ,  Greg Austin, Sydney Morning 
Herald 16 February 1991  ). 
The report also noted that there was now some doubt whether 
Australian military forces would be acceptable to the BRA. The 
journalists aboard the S ankamap a few days later and the SBS 
Television crew were able to confirm this suspicion of Australia in 
interviews with BRA Commander Sam Kauona. He also rejected the 
surrender of arms as stipulated in the Honiara Declaration, and later 
opined that the negotiating team at Honiara led by Joseph Kabui did not 
have a mandate to make the agreement it had. He said that the BRA 
would not implement every aspect of the Honiara Declaration 
(Melbourne Age 21 February 199 1). 
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Kauona also threatened the members of the joint Bougainville­
Papua New Guinea Government Task Force set up under the Honiara 
Declaration to coordinate restoration of seIVices that ' security-wise it 
would be very risky for them ' if they did not work towards protecting 
Bougainville's independence. He drew a parallel with the murder of 
John Bika in 1989 by a BRA assassination squad: 'He was killed 
because he wanted to lie to the national government that the people of 
Bougainville wanted state government. But in fact what the people 
wanted was full independence from PNG' (Post-Courier 25 February 
1991). Full marks to the Australian intelligence officers who had earlier 
warned of the 'fairly uninformed level of understanding by the BRA 
leadership of the diplomatic and political implications of their acts ' !  
Despite this the civilian Task Force had started its work and was 
quietly getting on with it. One Task Force member contacted at the time 
of Kauona's threats dismissed them as of little concern and expressed 
optimism at how things were going. The work of the Task Force 
continued unopposed and largely unsung: the ACFOA supplies were 
finally delivered in March; local companies were involved in buying 
and shipping out hundreds of bags of copra and cocoa which had 
accumulated during the blockade; a visit by an ICRC representative was 
undertaken to assess medical needs and a delegation from Australian 
NGOs was also allowed to visit; Buka Passage was opened for inter­
island travel and some services were filtering across to mainland 
villages; PTC planned to install high frequency radios in Arawa and 
Kieta by June; public servants would be based in Arawa by that time, 
and so on. 
Back to square one? 
The event which stopped the momentum towards peace was the 
PNGDF attack of 13  April, initially denied as BRA propaganda, then 
claimed as totally unsanctioned by the government, then admitted as an 
action which had been planned fo r  some time but whose 
commencement Colonel Leo Nuia  had failed to communicate to the 
government, and then the confusion blamed on faulty communications 
equipment. 
A further attack occurred while PM N amaliu was overseas and 
during Diro's last weekend as deputy prime minister before his 
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suspension over corruption charges. Despite government denials of 
duplicity it is quite possible that they were in on it from the start, as 
was charged by rebel leaders and by Johnson Maladina, an opposition 
MP. In parliament Maladina claimed that Diro and Defence Minister 
Ben Sabumei had approved the military operation and quoted 
instruction number 1 55-9 1 as the relevant documentary proof (Post­
Courier 8 May 199 1). 
The reason it was possible for the PNGDF to carry out such an 
attack was that one of the key provisions of the Honiara Declaration 
had not been implemented, that concerning the MST. The momentum 
for that had been broken by Kauona's comments on Australian 
involvement and the surrender of weapons, Australia's insistence that 
the BRA first surrender their weapons to police before the arrival of the 
MST, and the fact that over one month after the signing of the Honiara 
Declaration official requests had still not been received by the nations 
nominated to take part. Those who favoured a military solution to the 
crisis would certainly not have been happy with the idea of the MST 
and were doubtless lobbying against it in cabinet and elsewhere. 
Australia's insistence on a 'no risk' role for Australian personnel 
in the MST suggests ambivalence on its part as to international 
involvement on Bougainville. Senator Evans must have known when 
he said it that the idea of the BRA handing in weapons to police prior to 
the arrival of the MST would be completely unacceptable to the BRA 
and also in contravention of the relevant passage in the Honiara 
Declaration (Canberra Times 23 February 1 99 1 ) .  Australia's 
peacekeeping involvement in Namibia had certainly not required a 'no 
risk' situation as a condition of participation. Was the situation there 
any less dangerous? 
Another key point of the Honiara Declaration was the 
establishment of an Interim Legal Authority on the island, and progress 
on this too got bogged down. Quite clearly Joe Kabui and his 
delegation at Honiara believed that their Interim Government on 
Bougainville would become the Interim Legal Authority with oversight 
over the restoration programme (Australian 4 February 1991). Whether 
this was a genuine confusion with the government envisaging some of 
their own nominees as being part of the Interim Legal Authority or 
whether Momis was simply unable to persuade cabinet to approve the 
Interim Government as the ILA is not clear. The matter was quietly 
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dropped in the ' too-hard basket' , and an agreed body to oversee the 
restoration process was never set up. 
The amnesty proposal contained in the Honiara Declaration was 
more certainly one where the Papua New Guinea government was 
unable to deliver. Rumours of wide-spread unrest in the nation's 
prisons if the BRA were granted amnesty and criticism by respected 
figures such as Sir John Guise and Bishop David Hand led the 
government to quietly drop the idea. Trials of suspected BRA members 
arrested on Nissan and Buka went ahead and prison sentences were 
handed out. On the other hand there is no evidence that the BRA 
honoured their obligation under the Honiara Declaration to release any 
detainees or prisoners they might hold. 
Nuia' s war 
Such was the situation in April when Colonel Nuia ordered a seaborne 
attack on a BRA base at Kobuan near Kieta, stormed ashore at Mabiri, 
drove south towards Arawa and blew up the strategic bridge at 
Manetai , effectively cutting the island in half, and landed troops on the 
northern tip of Bougainville. Leaflets he had dropped from planes over 
Arawa and other areas made the surprising claim that his actions were 
in line with the Honiara Declaration ( 'Wok bilong Security Force em 
long halivim pipol long kisim gavman sevis e.m Kabui na PNG gavman 
i bin stretim tingting pinis long Honiara ' ). The reference to Kabui led 
enraged BRA members suspecting treachery to pay his house a visit. 
Not finding him there they apparently left with several of his household 
appliances. Such is the faith they had in the Interim Government! 
Even though the Papua New Guinea government denied that 
Nuia's raid had been sanctioned, it was admitted that plans had been in 
train for such actions. The Defence Force head , Brigadier General 
Rochus Lokinap, stated that villagers in north and central Bougainville 
had wanted various bridges blown up so that they could receive 
government services without interference from the BRA. Soldiers in 
Port Moresby confirmed talk of a landing but said that it would be 
' some weeks away ' (Post-Courier 1 6  April 1 99 1 ). PM Namaliu 
confirmed that the government had been aware for some time of 
impending military action because of BRA interference in the 
restoration of services (Post-Courier 1 9  April 1991 ). 
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All this sounds reasonable until one remembers the reaction to 
news of the raid by the minister in charge of the Task Force responsible 
for the restoration of services, Father John Momis. He was quoted as 
saying that the ' incursion was totally illegal . . .  totally irresponsible' 
and ' nothing but an unnecessary provocation ' ,  noting that it was 
against the principles of the Honiara Declaration, 'could jeopardize our 
peace efforts on the island ' ,  and describing his own government as 
' directly responsible for the imposition of suffering . . .  it's a 
government of broken promises ' (Post-Courier 17 April 199 1). 
While leaders in northern Bougainville wanted government 
services restored, it is not at all clear that they requested or expected the 
restoration to be carried out by the PNGDF. The establishment of a 
beach-head in northern Bougainville created in effect two rival Task 
Forces, one civilian which continued to operate in most of the island in 
accordance with the Honiara Declaration and the other military, 
operating in the north, sanctioned by cabinet (or at least sections of it) 
and clearly linked to the leaders who had come out on top in Buka, 
particularly Sam Tulo. 
Meanwhile on Buka 
In the main, the Honiara Declaration did not apply to Buka, already 
subject to the Kavieng Agreement, although Somare did suggest that 
'eventually ' the PNGDF would withdraw to be replaced by the MST 
(Melbourne Age 25 January 1991) .  The 'dirty war' continued there 
with various BRA ambushes, including one which nearly killed 
Administrator Sam Tulo, and pitched battles between BRA and BLF. 
Estimates of how many active BRA fighters remained on Buka varied, 
' 30 or more ' in March (Post-Courier 8 March 1991 )  and supposedly 
only 6 hardcore members a month later (Post-Courier 4 April 1 991 ) ,  
led by Linus Kabutoa and Moses Jeraha ('Lieutenant Tiger') ,  the latter 
associated with the Hahalis Welfare Society according to the earlier 
Post-Courier account. 
These figures cannot be the whole story, however, with 200 
PNGDF still stationed on Buka after the landing on northern 
Bougainville, calls by B uka leaders for the establishment of a reserve 
police force (to give an official look to BLF activities?) , a call from the 
Buka Council of Chiefs for a dusk to dawn curfew, and for restrictions 
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on parents visiting their sons at the ' rehabilitation centre ' at Buka 
Passage where suspected BRA had been detained without trial, some 
for many months . All this to combat six men? In early May BRA 
leader on Buka, Kabutoa, said he had called off all military action and 
pledged himself to peace. He remained in the bush, however. 
The government efforts at restoration of services were certainly 
conducted from their beginning with an eye to influencing people in 
north Bougainville. Medical services were quickly re-established and 
nearly all the schools on the island were ready to open at the beginning 
of the 1991 school session. These are the two government services 
which most impinged on the lives of people in the villages. The East 
New Britain 'Mama Appeal ' for basic supplies of cooking utensils and 
clothes raised money from all over Papua New Guinea and was 
strongly encouraged by Prime Minister N amaliu. The message behind 
the appeal was to show people on Buka that people in the rest of Papua 
New Guinea cared and wanted them to remain a part of the nation. This 
was underlined by a visit of forty Tolai women to Buka to distribute the 
aid. 
Some aspects of government services were not quickly restored, 
however. Shipping remained irregular, shops had difficulty in getting 
enough supplies, promised roadworks were delayed, the Papua New 
Guinea Banking Corporation seemed to wait forever for a safe to be 
delivered from Alotau, and the only communications (not for use by the 
general public) were high-frequency radios installed by the Post and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC). While some of these delays 
can be put down to bureaucratic bungling and disorganization, the tight 
control over communications seems to have been a government policy 
decision to restrict infonnation on the situation there from coming out. 
Two task forces, two strategies 
The PNGDF efforts at winning hearts and minds in north Bougainville 
were initially high profile, with suitable photos of soldiers rebuilding 
schools planted in appropriate newspapers. Members of the civilian 
Task Force privately expressed anger that while they were pressing 
ahead with great effort and little money, the army was getting all the 
credit. Given that one accusation Nuia had made in his letter-drop over 
Arawa was that medical aid delivered to Kieta by the civilian Task 
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Force was not reaching the north or south, i t  is not clear how it was 
thought that blowing up a bridge on the one road to the north would 
alleviate the situation. Australian NGOs later denied that there was any 
evidence that the BRA had actively prevented medicines from being 
delivered. The Task Force battled on, delivering the first supplies 
directly to southern Bougainville in late April, with a further delivery in 
early May. 
North Bougainville became contested ground between the 
PNGDF and the Task Force with the latter's planned visit delayed by 
the PNGDF and their Buka supporters. Buka leaders were allowing 
themselves to be co-opted in this power struggle, labelling the Task 
Force ' slack and slow' (Post-Courier 7 May 1991). 
Another issue on which they agreed with the PNGDF and 
Defence Minister Sabumei's position was on the MST. The 
government remained deeply split on the issue of the MST. Sabumei 
(and Colonel Nuia) said it was unneccessary, a view echoed by the 
Buka chiefs ,  while Momis remained committed to it. Belatedly the 
BRA leadership had affinned their support for the Honiara Declaration 
and the MST, and a second visit by a representative of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat charged with planning the deployment of 
the MST received a wann welcome on Bougainville in May. Three 
months earlier such endorsement might have made a difference. Prime 
Minister Namaliu seemed more persuaded by the rosy picture being 
painted by Sabumei of dwindling BRA support and hearts and minds 
being won. Sabumei's position was that the MST would help legitimize 
the BRA's claim to independence. 
The willingness of the BRA to support the Honiara Declaration 
and the co-operation, or at least non-interference, of BRA forces in the 
restoration of services in northern Bougainville led Momis to again plan 
for an Interim Legal Authority, made up of four districts - south, 
central, north, and Buka and the Atolls - which would be represented 
on the Authority (Post-Courier 7 May 199 1 ). With the government 
now in control of parts of the north and of Buka and the Atolls the plan 
could be interpreted as a means of ' stacking ' the Authority against 
Interim Government and BRA supporters who presumably would have 
representation only in two out of four districts. 
The medical situation on the eve of the Conference is covered in 
this volume by Michael Ogio and Lissa Evans and needs no further 
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comment here. The other issue covered at length in the media at this 
time was ultimately little more than a sideshow: the efforts by Sir 
Michael Somare to get CRA to sell the copper mine to an American 
millionnaire Jay Pritzker. This enthusiasm of Sir Michael eventually 
came to nought and his belief that such a sale would herald a 
breakthrough in the crisis was generally considered naive. For once the 
Interim Government and the management of BCL were in agreement, 
both expressing the view that there were major political issues to be 
addressed before anyone would be able to reopen the mine. 
C o nclusion 
An examination of events between the signing of the Endeavour Accord 
in August 1 990 and the middle of May 1 99 1  could lead to the 
conclusion that the Papua New Guinea government did not negotiate 
with the rebels in good faith and used the withholding of medical 
supplies as a weapon against the civilian population. This first charge is 
perhaps unfair, while the second must be sustained. The negotiators on 
the Papua New Guinea side faced a major problem which made it 
impossible for them to deliver their side of the agreements. This was 
the Cabinet itself, a sometimes very loose coalition of forces, with 
allegiances shifting between the hardliners led by Deputy Prime 
Minister Diro and Defence Minister Sabume� and the moderates led by 
John Momis. The prime minister himself, concerned to hold together 
his government, has not identified consistently with one view or the 
other. 
The media have exaggerated the capacity of the PNGDF for 
independent action outside the control of the central government. It 
seems more likely that the Defence Forces have always acted with the 
knowledge and under the orders of at least some members of the 
cabinet. It is indeed in the government's interests to distance itself from 
actions such as Nuia's raid on Bougainville, while benefitting from the 
results . Human rights abuses too cannot be sheeted home to a 
government seemingly not fully in control of troops on the ground. 
Government ministers can approve visits by journalists and others to 
Buka, confident that such visits will be prevented by the PNGDF 
officers in Rabaul. 
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The hardliners in the cabinet had their job made extremely easy 
by the diplomatic and political inexperience of BRA leaders. Is there a 
president of any country in the world who refuses to show his face to 
the camera on interview? The public humiliation of Interim 
Government ministers by near-teenage gunmen suggests 'Lord of the 
Flies ' rather than the People's Army. And if there is an effective 
civilian administration operating on Bougainville they have been 
keeping it remarkably quiet. Immediately after Honiara,  Interim 
Government Chairman Kabui could be portrayed more as the monkey 
than the organ-grinder. In that case, as Somare pointed out, why talk to 
him? By May some realization of the lost opportunity for peace was 
clearly dawning among the BRA leadership and a more reasonable line 
was emerging at last. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ENDEAVOUR ACCORD ON DIALOGUE AND 
RETURN OF SERVICES TO BOUGAINVILLE 
A delegation of the National Government, led by the Right Honourable 
Sir Michael Somare GCMG MP held broad-ranging talks with a 
delegation of Bougainville, led by Mr Joseph Kabui, from the 29th 
July to 5th August 1990 outside of Kieta Harbour, aboard Her 
Majesty's New Zealand Ship, Endeavour. 
International observers from Canada, Vanuatu and New Zealand were 
present at the talks. 
The two delegations welcomed the opportunity for face-to-face 
dialogue, and agreed that this process should continue. 
They agreed that the long term political status of Bougainville is to be 
addressed as part of the continuing dialogue. 
Meanwhile all political declarations with respect to that future status are 
deferred. 
The National Government delegation confirmed that at the earliest 
opportunity it would take all practical steps consistent with the 
constitution of Papua New Guinea to bring about the return of services 
to Bougainville. 
Such restoration of services would be done without force. But should 
personnel responsible for restoring services be interfered with, the 
Government of Papua New Guinea reserves the right to withdraw 
services where such interference occurs. 
The return of services, particularly health, education and 
communications are accepted as a matter of urgent priority. 
The two delegations agreed that in order for services to be restored on 
Bougainville, the security of personnel must be fully safeguarded. 
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The Government of Papua New Guinea will consult regularly with the 
present Bougainville delegation on the restoration of services. 
The two delegations agreed on the desirability of the full participation 
of Bougainvilleans in future security arrangements on Bougainville. 
The two delegations thanked the Government of New Zealand and the 
Royal New Zealand Navy for their generous assistance in making a 
venue and support facilities available for the talks. 
The two delegations also thanked the observers for their cooperation. 
Further meetings of the two delegations to review implementation of 
arrangements for the restoration of services will be held. The next such 
meeting will be held within eight weeks. 
Michael Somare 
Leader 
National Government 
Delegation 
Signed on Board HMNZS ENDEAVOUR 
5 August 1 990 
Joseph Kabui 
Leader 
Bougainville 
Delegation 
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APPENDIX 2 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN 
BUKA COMMUNITY LEADERS 
AND THE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DELEGATION 
WHEREAS,  on the 16th March 1 990, following an agreement with the 
illegal BRA leadership, the National Government withdrew all Security 
Forces on Bougainville; and 
WHEREAS, the Buka people have suffered atrocities and inhuman 
treatment at the hands of the outlawed BRA; and 
AS A RESULT, the Buka people, out of desperation, sought the 
assistance of the Security Forces on 1 8/9/90 for safety and restoration 
of all government services; 
AND WHEREAS, the government on 2 1/9/90 acceded to the people's 
request; 
NOW the National Government has asked certain prominent leaders of 
Buka to have urgent consultations on the provision of government 
services and security to Buka and elsewhere in Bougainville. 
1 .  A MEETING has now been held between a delegation of the 
National Government led by Sir Michael Somare and certain 
community leaders of the Buka, led by Mr Sam Tulo, fonner National 
Parliament Member on the 3rd and 4th October, 1990 at the Malagan 
Lodge, Kavieng. 
2 .  The Buka leaders briefed the National Government delegation 
of the current situation in Buka. 
3 .  The Buka leaders totally rejected secession, but urged the 
National Government to grant more autonomy to the Province through 
the existing Constitutional framework. 
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4 .  The Buka leaders i n  equal vigour rejected the BRA's ' reign of 
terror and fear ' ,  and strongly welcomed the presence of the National 
Government and the Security Forces. 
5 .  The Buka leaders highly commended the exemplary conduct of 
the Security Forces and urged their continued presence on Buka Island. 
6 .  The B uka leaders further urged the government, among other 
things to:-
(a) appoint an additional member of Parliament to 
represent Buka in this crisis period; 
(b) establish an interim administration to run the affairs of 
Buka; 
(c) provide seivices to Buka immediately, making primary 
use of Buka personnel as a temporary measure; 
(d) undertake a programme of reconciliation, restoration of 
services and compensation to the victims of the crisis; 
(e) rehabilitate and gainfully employ youths; 
(f) consider giving amnesty or immunity to the members 
of the BRA who freely surrender to the government; 
and 
(g) engage Buka personnel in the provision of security to 
the Island. 
7 .  The National Government delegation highly commended the 
Buka leaders and the Buka people as a whole for their finn stand. 
8 .  The National Government delegation undertakes, within the 
legal, and constitutional powers and within the constraints of its 
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financial resources to do all it can to restore all government and 
business services to B uka and the whole of Bougainville. 
9 .  The National Government delegation undertakes to continue to 
provide security to the people of Buka as a part of its constitutional 
obligations. 
1 0. The parties agree that all goods and services going to Buka 
shall be co-ordinated through the nonnal governmental channels. 
1 1 .  The National Government delegation undertakes to consult the 
Buka delegation leaders in the process of restoration of goods and 
services , and to hold talks with them from time to time, as the need 
arises. 
12 .  This Memorandum of Understanding does not prevent the 
continued dialogue and negotiations initiated under August 5th, 
Endeavour Accord except that the parties agree that Mr Sam Tulo shall 
be included in any talks on the future status of Bougainville. 
Signed on the 5th of October 1 990 at Malagan Lodge, Kavieng, New 
Ireland Province. 
Hon. Fr. John Momis MP 
Minister for Provincial Affairs 
Hon. Bernard Narokobi MP 
Attorney General 
Sam Tulo 
Leader of Delegation 
James Togel 
Deputy Leader of Delegation 
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APPENDIX 3 
HONIARA DECLARATION ON PEACE, 
RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION 
ON BOUGAINVILLE 
3 3  
1 . Further to the Endeavour Accord signed on 5 August, 1 990 
concerning dialogue and return of services to Bougainville, a 
meeting comprising representatives from the Papua New 
Guinea National Government led by the Right Honourable Sir 
Michael Somare and Mr Joseph Kabui from Bougainville was 
held in Honiara from 22 - 23 January, 1991 at the initiative and 
auspices of the Solomon Islands Government and the Solomon 
Islands Christian Association (SICA) to review and formulate a 
common strategy and programmes for the implementation of 
restoration of services to enhance Peace, Reconciliation and 
Rehabilitation on Bougainville. 
2 .  Other Ministers included on the National Government side 
were Honourable Bernard N arokobi , Honourable Benais 
Sabumei , and Honourable Fr. John Momis ,  on the 
Bougainville side were Mr Ken Savia, B ishop John Zale, 
Pastor Jeffrey Paul , Mr Patrick Itta, Mr James Sinko, Mr 
Philip Takaung, Mr Raphael Bele, MP and Mr Peter Kungka, 
MP. 
3 .  Observers from the Solomon Islands Government and the 
South Pacific Council of Churches (SPCC) and Solomon 
Islands Christian Association (SICA) were also present at the 
Talks. 
4 .  The two delegations expressed their sincere appreciation to the 
Government and people of the Solomon Islands for their 
generous hospitality and excellent facilities for the meeting. 
They also thanked the Chairman of SICA, B ishop Leslie 
Boseto for his role as Moderator for these talks. 
5 .  The two delegations welcomed the opportunity for their 
continuing face-to-face dialogue; and committed to searching 
for a lasting peaceful solution of the Bougainville crisis, 
Declared on the following principles and arrangements :-
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Principl es 
6 .  We desire peace and reconciliation with each other and with 
our Heavenly Father. 
We take a joint responsibility to restrain from the use of 
weapons and anns to help us to create an environment of peace 
and hannony as well as a pre-condition to justice and peace. 
We agree to defer discussions on the future political status of 
Bougainville and have funher agreed to embark upon a joint 
programme of peace, Reconciliation, and Rehabilitation, within 
the current constitutional framework of the Nation of Papua 
New Guinea. 
We reject violence and seek meaningful consultation as a 
means of solving the crisis, and deeply mourn the loss of lives 
and destruction of propenies, and trust in the common 
fatherhood of God and resolve to find lasting justice, peace and 
security on the island of Bougainville. 
We recognise the importance of establi shing legal and 
representative authority in Bougainville to assist in returning 
the Island to nonnalcy. 
We recognise the constitutional role of the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force. 
We agree to accept external assistance including a Multinational 
Supervisory Team (MST) to contribute to the implementation 
of this Programme under the framework detennined in this 
Declaration. 
We commit ourselves to the welfare and security of all 
individuals and organi sations who participate in this 
Programme. 
We endorse maximum Bougainvillean involvement in the 
implementation of this Programme. 
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Definition of 'Pro2ramme' 
7 .  The 'Programme '  i n  this Declaration means the Package of 
phased arrangements for the restoration of services on 
Bougainville including:-
Phase I 
(i) Peace and Reconciliation; 
(ii) Lifting of the Blockade. 
(iii) Establishment of Task Force. 
(iv) Establishment of Interim Legal Authority. 
Phase II 
(i) Restoration of Setvices; 
(ii) Rehabilitation Programme including maintenance and 
reconstruction; and other associated activities 
determined by the Legal Authority in Bougainville in 
accordance with this Declaration; 
(iii) Future negotiations. 
Task Force and Membership 
8 .  In order to facilitate the execution of this Programme, we agree 
to hereby establish a Task Force which shall consist of 
representatives appointed by the National Minister for 
Provincial Affairs, in consultation with an Interim Legal 
Authority. 
Terms of Reference 
9 .  We agree that the tenns of reference for the Task Force shall 
include: 
(i) Planning, Co-ordination and implementation of this 
Programme; 
(ii) Monitoring and supeivision of this Programme; 
(iii) Investigate and determine the scope and components 
of the projects under this Programme; 
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(iv) Investigate, mobilise and secure all financial avenues 
at its disposal to finance this Programme; 
(v) Develop a detailed timetable to implement this 
Programme which must be submitted to the Minister 
of Provincial Affairs for final approval as soon as 
practicable following their appointments. 
(vi) The Task Force shall report to the Legal Authority in 
Bougainville; 
(vii) Furnish monthly reports or otherwise as directed by 
the Legal Authority in Bougainville; and 
(viii) Undertake other responsibilities as directed by the 
Legal Authority in Bougainville to implement this 
Programme. 
Obih:atjons and Responsjbil itjes 
1 0. Parties agreed to take the following actions: 
National Government 
i) 
Bougainville Side 
i) Disarms the BRA, BLF; and its 
associated m ilitant activities, 
including the surrender and 
destruction of arms under the 
supervision of the Multinational 
Supervisory Team. 
ii) Grant amnesty and immunity ii) Release of all detainees held as a 
fro m  prose c u t ions  to the consequence of the conflict. 
members of BRA, and BLF in 
accordance with legal and 
constitutional requirements of 
Papua New Guinea 
iii)  Organise a Multinational iii) Guarantee the safety and welfare 
Supervisory Team to participate o f  the me mbers o f  the 
in  this Programme Multinational Supervisory Team. 
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iv) Commit and disburse funds to 
the Programme under its normal 
budgetary allocations. 
v) Allow and fac ilitate non­
Govemmental agencies, including 
C h urches and C o m m u n i ty 
Groups to contribute towards the 
successful implementation of this 
programme. 
iv) Assist the Task Force and the 
Legal Authority in Bougainville 
to expand [sic] funds towards 
effective implementation of 
projects under this Programme. 
v) Receive and facilitate non­
Govemmental agencies, including 
Churches and Community groups 
to contribute toward s  the 
successful implementation of this 
programme. 
Provide conditi o n s  an d vi) Resume all Government services vi)  
including public and statutory environment conducive for the 
restoration of services under this 
programme. 
administration , law and order and 
justice. 
Pro1:ramme Schedule 
1 1 . We agree that the following Time Schedule shall be adopted to 
implement thi s Programme from the signing of thi s 
])eclaration:-
(i) One ( 1 )  week to one ( 1 )  month - establishment of the 
Task Force and the assembling of the MST. 
(ii) Between one ( 1 )  month to 6 months project 
identification and resource mobilisation. 
(iii) Eighteen ( 1 8) to thirty-six (36) months completion of 
Programme, abolition of the Task Force, return to 
normalcy. 
3 8  Matthew Spriggs 
Reyjew and Consultations 
1 2 .  We agree that this Declaration shall be reviewed at least on a six 
(6) monthly inteival until the conclusion of the Programme in 
accordance with the Programme Schedule. 
1 3 .  Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraph, the national Minister 
for Provincial Affairs may request a review either 
independently or on advice of the Legal Authority or the Task 
Force. 
14 .  The Programme under this Declaration does not for the time 
being include the programme of restoration of services 
undertaken by the National Government on Buka and adjacent 
islands. 
1 5 .  The National Minister for Provincial Affairs shall determine 
and reconcile the relationship between these two programmes 
on advice from the Legal Authority in Bougainville. 
Dispute Settlement 
1 6 . We agree to resolve any dispute including conflict or 
misunderstanding arising from the Programme under this  
Declaration through consultation and dialogue. 
1 7 .  Where resolution o f  disputes cannot be reached, each party 
may recommend Arbitrators for approval by the other. When 
appointed, the Arbitrators shall work towards resolving any 
such conflict and misunderstandings. 
Termi nation 
1 8 . The Declaration shall be tenninated upon completion of this 
Programme or by one Party when acts of sabotage or similar 
action inconsistent with the spirit and letter of this Declaration 
taken by the other. 
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Declared at Honiara this 23rd day of January 1 99 1 .  
Sir Michael Somare GCMG CH MP 
Leader of the PNG Delegation 
Witness 
Bernard N arokobi MP 
Witness 
Fr. John Momis, MP 
Witness 
Benais Sabumei, MBE MP 
Joseph Kabui 
Leader of the Bougainville 
Delegation 
Witness 
James Sinko 
Witness 
Bishop Zale 
Witness 
Patrick Itta 
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APPENDIX 4 
Solomon Kitano Men dana Hotel 
P.O. Box 3 84 MENDANA A VENUE HONIARA SOLOMON 
ISLANDS 
Cables: 'Mendana' Telex: HQ663 1 5  Telephone: 2007 1 Fax:23942 
25th January 1 99 1  
The Hon. Sir Michael Somare G CMG C H  MP 
Leader of the Papua New Guinea Delegation 
Foreign Minister 
WAIGANI 
Dear Sir Michael, 
RE - CONSTRUCTIONAL ERROR - OBLIGATION NUMBER ONE 
( 1 )  B OUGAINVILLE SIDE 
I wish to point out Sir Michael, that there appears to be a constructional 
error in Clause 9 ( 1 )  (Obligations and Responsibilities) on the 
Bougainville side. 
You will note Sir, that during the process of making final changes 
agreeable to both sides we decided that the original wordings of 
' disbands destruction or arms under supervision to the MST' should be 
changed to ' disarms the BRA BLF and its associated militant activities 
i nclu ding the surrende r  of arms under the superv i sion o f  the 
Multinational Superv isory Team ' ;  so that the word ' and destruction' are 
deleted from the final text. 
Unfortunately after the final text was s igned (unchecked) we 
discovered that the original wording appears with only the word 
' disband ' changed to ' disarm '  and as it is ,  the final text is at variance 
with our Agreement and as such does not reflect that spirit. 
I am not implying this was an intentional error, but that this was a 
typographical error. My delegation is kindly asking that the words ' and 
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destruction' be deleted so that the paragraph should read 'DISARMS 
BRA, BLF AND ITS ASSOCIATED MILITANT ACTIVITIES 
INCLUDING THE SURRENDER OF ARMS UNDER THE 
SUPERVISION OF THE MULTINATIONAL SUPERVIS ORY 
TEAM'. 
Please reply by fax. 
Yours sincerely, 
J.C. KABUi 
LEADER OF BOUGAINVILLE DELEGATION 
cc: Papua New Guinea Delegation Members 
Bougainville Delegation Members 
Solomon Islands Government 
Bishop Leslie Boseto 
Chairman of the Meeting 
Father J .L. Momis MP 
Taskforce Co-ordinator 
CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF THE BOUGAINVILLE 
C RISIS 
ON THE WOMEN OF BUKA 
Pauline Onsa 
On a subject such as the North Solomons crisis, or  any kind of warfare 
for that matter, papers are never enough to describe the resulting pain 
and suffering, nor their long term impact on the society as a whole. For 
this reason, I want to speak to you from the heart, and share with you 
some of my personal experiences of the Bougainville crisis. I want 
especially to focus on two areas: my lived experience of the crisis as a 
woman, a wife and a mother on Buka Island, and how this crisis has 
affected Buka women generally. 
I come from B uka Island - the second largest island after the 
copper-rich island of Bougainville in the North Solomons . We are a 
matrilineal society, with women having high political status and veto 
power over how land is used and distributed, and how children are 
brought up. Until the crisis, we always believed that we were a happy 
and peace-loving people bonded together by our shared values of 
caring, sharing and co-operating with each other in all that we did. We 
took pride in seeing ourselves as a class apart from the rest, because of 
our deep respect for authority and our sense of belonging to an orderly 
and prosperous law-abiding community. 
For the people of Buka and North Solomons generally, the 
Bougainville crisis is thus a first-time experience of large-scale violence 
since 1 945 . Most of us did not expect it to develop to the extent that it 
did. When the BRA first arrived on Buka to gain support and take in 
new recruits, the crisis spread rapidly. This was later made worse by 
the arrival of the Defence Force on Bougainville. The people began to 
split their support between the BRA and the Defence Force. 
However, as the crisis intensified , most of our people soon 
found that they no longer had the freedom to choose which side they 
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supported. The barrel of the gun was now the new power over human 
reason and freedom of choice. 
Those who suffered most during the crisis were the women, 
children and old people. Women could no longer decide when to tend 
to their food gardens, cash crops or their children, husbands , parents 
and relatives . They could no longer pay respect to their dead in the 
graveyards , including offspring and family kin, for fear of being 
harassed or shot at by either BRA or Defence Force soldiers. 
Children's  laughter, village gossip, youth activities and bamboo 
band music so characteristic of Buka life were replaced with fear, 
mistrust, suspicion and disunity amongst my people. The old and the 
sick died slowly, while pregnant mothers either lost their babies or died 
in childbirth. The restriction of movement by BRA gun power was the 
order of the day. 
When my husband, other women's  husbands or relatives were 
taken in by the BRA for questioning, we wouldn't know where they 
were taken to . That was the worst, not knowing whether our husbands 
or sons would be returned to us. Even today some of our women still 
don't know whether their husbands are dead or alive. 
Ieta village, located near the township of Buka, was the first 
village to be burned by the BRA, in mid 1 990. The houses there were 
all permanent structures built largely from cash crop income. The 
burning of Ieta came as a surprise to the villagers, some of whom were 
asleep in their houses at the time. Children and adults fled everywhere 
with only the clothes they wore. These clothes were their only 
possessions for the many weeks of hiding that followed. 
A young mother who tried to carry her crippled father gave up 
half-way and stopped only to embrace him for the last time. The father 
crawled behind some trees to hide from the BRA and died of 
pneumonia that night in the cold rain. Another mother who fled along 
the beach track with four children ranging from four to six years 
collapsed about a mile from the village. A five year old saved her by 
pouring spring water from the beach into her mouth. These children 
became her only companions for many weeks while her own children 
were lost among the other villagers. 
These are just two examples of the mass suffering my people 
have had to live with during the two years of the Bougainville crisis. 
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Other villages were also burned during the crisis ,  both on Buka and on 
Bougainville. 
To date, mothers are still mourning the loss of their children, 
their husbands, parents and other family kin,  and the destruction of 
their homes. We now have many orphans and young widows, some of 
whom are unable to locate the bodies of their loved ones. There are 
rape victims too, and others who were maimed in the crisis. Medical 
problems such as TB , tropical ulcers, leprosy and other diseases which 
spread during the crisis arc still prevalent. Many schools on 
Bougainville island are still closed, as are other essential services of the 
political, social and economic infrastructure. 
We must not forget that when we talk of a reconstruction 
programme, such as is currently underway on Buka, we do not only 
mean rebuilding houses or schools which were burned down, and 
whatever else was destroyed during the crisis. We also have to engage 
in the task of reconstructing people, human lives, to be good citizens of 
Bougainville. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE HEAL TH AND S OC IAL 
SITUATION ON BOUGAINVILLE 
Lissa Evans 
I was a member of a six person delegation to visit Port Moresby and 
Bougainville in the latter half of March 199 1 .  This visit was the result 
of pressure from concerned Australian non government organisations 
(NGOs) in October 1990 via the umbrella aid body, ACFOA, to the 
Australian and Papua New Guinean governments , to allow an 
assessment of the health situation on the island. Delays in receiving 
approval from the Papua New Guinea government and in making 
contact with those in control of Bougainville meant that the team could 
not visit until March 199 1 ,  and even then it was not clear whether 
access to Bougainville would be granted. However, after several 
discussions with Father John Momis and the Bougainville Task Force, 
and with additional funding from the Australian government, the team 
took a charter flight from Rabaul to Arawa on 20 March. 
As we were driven around Arawa and Kieta it was evident that 
much of the town and port area had been destroyed, including shops 
belonging to traders who had fled; Bougainville Copper Limited 
houses, the Country Club and even the University Centre offices . 
Apart from this , life appeared to be normal although there were not 
many cars on the road and we were told most town residents had 
returned to their villages or fled the island. We saw only two or three 
shops operating with limited supplies for sale and few customers 
although some enterprising person in Buin was making icey poles ! 
Informal measurements showed that people's nutritional health seemed 
to have improved because they had returned to dependence on locally­
grown produce from their gardens. 
However, after two years' experience working for Community 
Aid Abroad's Disasters Response Desk, with a focus on the Asia­
Pacific region, it is my firm opinion that the total lack of medical 
supplies to Bougainville between May 1 990 and February 1 99 1  has 
created an emergency situation. Bougainvillean doctors who have 
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remained on Bougainville throughout the conflict estimate that over 
3,000 people have died as a direct consequence of the blockade and that 
many thousands more are suffering unnecessarily because of a lack of 
medicines, soaps , detergents and dressings. The island's 300 bed 
hospital was shut down in June 1990 and there has been no surgery 
perfonned since last September. Those in need of surgical care must go 
to the Solomons Islands (putting serious pressure on the health system 
there) or rely on traditional practices . An estimated 3,000 children 
remain unvaccinated against easily preventable diseases. The incidence 
of malaria has increased markedly. 
Since January 1990 malaria has killed 200 people, representing a 
1 82 per cent increase over 1 989. Many of these are children and 
pregnant women. When we arrived in Arawa we were asked if the 
charter flight could return to Rabaul carrying a pregnant lady in a coma 
and suffering from malaria. We heard that she died two days later in 
hospital. The incidence of tuberculosis and leprosy has also increased, 
particularly amongst the 1 0  to 20 year age group. Because of the 
protracted course of supervised therapy required (a maximum of six 
months for TB and two years for leprosy) , these diseases are going 
virtually unchecked. Yaws and tropical ulcers are increasingly in 
evidence because of a lack of penicillin, soaps and detergent. In the 
past year 70-80 per cent of outpatients have been children under five 
years of whom 50 per cent are suffering from gastroenteritis, while 
over 70 per cent of deaths are due to respiratory-related diseases. In 
addition those people with drug dependencies for illnesses such as 
diabetes and asthma are dying from lack of medication. 
Before the conflict twenty-three health centres operated on the 
island, most of which have reopened as limited supplies of medicine 
became available with the first ex-PNG delivery in February 199 1 .  The 
delegation split into three groups . Dr Trevor Garland remained in 
Arawa with Dr Charles Loubai to look at facilities in the private clinic 
operated by Bougainville Copper Limited and the Arawa General 
Hospital. One team went north, nearly as far as Tinputz, and the other 
south, turning inland before reaching Buin. An aid post at Paghui was 
visited which served about 1 ,000 people in twenty-five villages within 
up to six hours walk from the post. Four volunteers , with 
qualifications ranging from hospital administrator to community 
nursing sister, and a nurse in obstetrics worked at the clinic.  These 
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people all expressed their frustration at trying to restore people's health 
with very small amounts of drugs and medicines. People's morale was 
not good after making long trips to aid posts in the belief that supplies 
had become available, only to find they had got there too late. 
Members of the team who went north visited health centres at 
three locations : Wakunai, Kekesu and Teorouki. The centre at Teorouki 
was closed due to lack of medicines despite several requests to Dr 
Loubai for supplies. The Wakunai health centre had two thirty-bed 
wards and was being run by one nursing sister and a volunteer. 
Although it could not admit patients, two children were there, one with 
malaria and the other with gastroenteritis. The outpatients' clinic 
opened only three days a week because of the lack of supplies. The 
majority of people presenting are suffering from malaria. Malaria­
related pregnancy complications were cited as the cause of at least eight 
child deaths in the past 12  months. Several women had died during the 
latter stages of pregnancy , allegedly due to malaria. The Kekesu health 
sub-centre was under severe pressure because the nearby Teorouki 
health centre was closed. As a result, about forty-five outpatients were 
being seen by two nursing aides on each of the three days the centre 
was open. The most common problems were malaria and yaws. Two 
still-births from malaria had been reported in the past week and the 
nurses complained of a lack of basic supplies such as suture needles 
and material, and soap and disinfectants, as well as medicines. People 
using the clinic were asked to bring food and cocoa because staff were 
unable to attend to their gardens and there is a limited trade in cocoa still 
operating. Dr Garland's discussions with Dr Loubai revealed there was 
a poor water supply in many of the rural health clinics and tanks would 
be required to ensure a degree of reliability in water supply. 
As we proceeded to talk with Interim Government 
representatives, BRA members , the expatriates who have remained, 
and local people it became evident that this is a very complex and tense 
situation. People have been severely traumatized by the fighting, and 
especially by the presence of riot police and troops. In addition, the 
lack of law and order has allowed disenchanted youth and clan 
members to roam at will damaging property and threatening and 
attacking local people. Although the place appeared calm, people were 
clearly still apprehensive about returning to work, especially nurses and 
teachers, and most parents were afraid to send their children off to 
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schools, many of which had been damaged during the unrest. This 
destruction had been carried out by youth who were not formal 
members of the BRA but BRA supporters with home-made weapons or 
slingshots; we were told that much of the violent activity on the island 
is attributable to this group. One driver told the team that it was not 
uncommon to be confronted on the side of the road by anned youths 1 0  
to 1 2  years old intent o n  robbery. We were frequently told o f  the need 
to get the BRA to confront the activities of the 'rascal' BRA. 
The issue of disillusioned youth (made all the worse because 
schools have been shut for over a year) is of great concern to Father 
John Momis and I quote from CHERAB's report to AIDAB : 
The pain in the eyes of the people when talking about 
what they have been through was intense. The hatred 
against Papua New Guineans expressed by some people 
was frightening. The disruption which has occurred in 
some areas has created feelings which may take se.veral 
generations to subdue. Even the youth in schools visibly 
express the pain of the crisis and protest sentiments are 
clearly vi sible. The trauma resulting from the abuses 
which have taken place has had a severe effect on many 
people. Some communities need assistance to come back 
together, to be able to talk to each othe� again about what 
they have been through (CHERAB 199 1) .  
Clothing was also found to be in short supply, especially in rural 
areas where people did not have access to shops and homes abandoned 
by those fleeing the conflict. The team was told of cases where people 
had had to dig up corpses to obtain clothing. 
The feeling on the island is a sort of tense calm as people wait to 
see what happens next, especially with regard to the resumption of 
medical supplies and restoration of basic services. An air of uncertainty 
is due largely to the lack of communication services: there are no 
newsletters or newspapers, no telephone or commonly available radio 
communication, and no official mail deliveries . There is also a 
reluctance by many on the island to own and use a radio transmitter for 
fear it may be thought that they are collaborating with PNG. 
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Australia ' s  involvement 
Many Bougainvilleans claim that Australia has a direct responsibility in 
resolving this conflict because they helped to create it by opening the 
copper mine in April 1972 against the wishes of landowners, and later 
ignored Bougainville's plea for independence in 1975. Throughout this 
conflict the Australian government has supported the Papua New 
Guinea government's claim that this is an internal matter. Australia also 
stood by Papua New Guinea against allegations, in an Amnesty 
International report released in November 1 990, of human rights 
abuses committed by Papua New Guinea troops . Unlike the 
governments of New Zealand, Canada, Vanuatu and the Solomon 
Islands, the Australian government has never played a direct role in 
facilitating talks between the two groups. Although offers of assistance 
in restoration of services to the island have been made, these are totally 
dependent on the approval of the Papua New Guinea government. For 
example, we were told that Australia's offer to install a telephone link 
with Bougainville was rejected by the Papua New Guinea government 
on the basis that such a link might then be used to contact international 
terrorist organizations. 
Australia is now also viewed with suspicion by people on the 
island, particularly members of the BRA, because of the use of 
Australian-donated Iroquois helicopters by the Defence Force 
(PNGDF) to strafe villages and to dump the bodies of innocent 
civilians out at sea. There are also allegations that Australian Defence 
Force personnel were advised of the latest unannounced (and 
unauthorized) deployment of troops on northern Bougainville in April 
199 1  a week before it occurred. This situation is of great concern in the 
light of Senator Ray's recent statement announcing a relaxation in tenns 
and conditions relating to Australia's $50 million annual direct military 
assistance to Papua New Guinea. 
This conflict has always been a political not a military issue and 
the only acceptable long-term solution must be reached through 
discussions and negotiations . The Honiara Declaration, signed on 23 
January, provided for the establishment of a PNG-appointed 
Bougainvillean Task Force to oversee and implement the restoration of 
services to the island. However, this group, headed by Father John 
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Momis, Minister for Provincial Affairs and a Bougainvillean, is facing 
serious difficulties in carrying out their appointed task. No additional 
funds have been allocated to the North Solomons provincial budget to 
cover the cost of repairing and restoring services. This annual budget 
of K2 million represents the only funds available for Bougainville and 
the operations of the Task Force. Much of the allocation is presently 
being spent on rebuilding in Buka. Since no separate fund for 
Bougainville has been established, normal cumbersome government 
funding mechanisms apply whereby funds are released quarterly; but 
large amounts of cash are needed 'up-front' in order to purchase the 
supplies and equipment necessary to reinstate electrical, water and 
medical services. 
The Task Force is under severe pressure from the Papua New 
Guinea government and the people of Bougainville to restore basic 
services as soon as possible. But it faces many obstacles in meeting 
these expectations . An Australian Parliamentary Delegation which 
visited Port Moresby and Rabaul in February 199 1 observed that there 
is  no common view in the Papua New Guinea cabinet that a peaceful 
resolution to this conflict was desirable. Many people, including the 
PNGDF, would like to see the Task Force fail in order to ensure the 
way is open for a 're-occupation' by troops to carry out restoration, as 
is being done on Buka Island. To date, the only practical response 
provided by the Australian government has been to fund two visits by 
Australian NGO representatives to initially determine the needs and a 
response and now to ensure that both parties will support such a 
response. 
Australians must continue to keep this issue in the public eye in light of 
the effective smothering of infonnation on the situation throughout the 
blockade. Pressure must be put on the Australian government to play a 
much stronger role in ensuring a peaceful and negotiated solution to 
this problem and not allowing the 'hardline ' elements in Papua New 
Guinea to hold sway. 
This is clearly an emergency situation and requires an immediate 
and effective response to ensure people's rights to medicine and basic 
services are provided for throughout the island. 
CHAPTER S 
REASSESSING THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS, 
1991 
Ethan Weisman * 
The gold and copper mine of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) at 
Panguna remains shut and the conflict between Bougainvilleans and the 
central government continues. Having reviewed the effects of the 
closure on North Solomons Province and the nation one year ago 
(Weisman 1990a) , I will take this opportunity to reassess the prospects 
for the reopening of BCL, the economic outlook for North Solomons 
Province and the national economic situation. The review shows that 
the North Solomons economy has been enfeebled by the mine closure 
and economic prospects are poor in the short run even if a political 
solution is forthcoming. Moreover, the role played by the North 
Solomons Province in the national economy continues to diminish over 
time. 
Economic impacts on Bougainville Island 
Although it  is difficult to assess the extent of the destruction and turmoil 
on Bougainville Island accurately, it clearly appears that the island's 
infrastructure has been decimated. In addition to the loss of lives and 
sustained injuries, communications, social services (especially health 
and education), law and order, and other basic services have suffered 
from the conflict. The deterioration of infrastructure was accelerated by 
Deputy Prime Minister Ted Diro's May 1 990 announcement of an 
economic blockade against North Solomons Province. In the 
Endeavour Accord the national government agreed to restore 
communications and health and education services in exchange for 
* 
Gratitude is due to Brian Brogan and Graeme Dorrance for useful comments and 
suggestions, but the views expressed are solely the author's. 
5 2  Ethan Weisman 
deferral of Bougainvillean political aspirations. The collapsed 
Endeavour Accord was followed by the 23 January 199 1  Honiara 
Declaration peace accord, after which some modicum of medicines and 
garden supplies reached the island. The central government was asked 
to sell copra and cocoa produce to be loaded on the supply boat's return 
trip. 
Since these peace efforts, conditions on the island have appeared 
to stabilize. The central government's blockade of Bougainville was 
lifted only in March 199 1 .  Nevertheless, much of the infrastructure has 
been destroyed and communications remain strained. According to one 
report (Canberra Times 28 March 199 1 )  the economy has regressed to 
barter trade. The report also cited the complete lack of electricity, fuel, 
radio communication, tap water, soap, and basic medical supplies such 
as bandages. Health services reportedly consist of three doctors and a 
few nurses attempting to keep hospitals open. Road decay and lack of 
electricity and medicines make this latter task extremely difficult. 
Reopening Bougainville Copper Limited 
On 1 March 1991  the Australian Associated Press reported (Canberra 
Times 1 March 199 1 )  that 'CRA Ltd has rejected overtures from the 
PNG government to sell its majority stake in BCL. But CRA has not 
ruled out selling its 53.6 per cent stake if the price is right and if the sale 
is central to resolving the secessionist crisis . . .  CRA rejected as 
inadequate last year a proposal from Chicago-based investor Jay 
Pritzker' . 
It is in the interest of the majority shareholder of BCL to maintain 
that the mine is viable. The Australia-based CRA would recover some 
of its losses and would sustain good relations with the central 
government by keeping the hopes of reopening BCL alive. It must be 
remembered that CRA has other mineral interests in Papua New Guinea 
(at the Mt Kare alluvial gold deposit and the Hidden Valley gold 
project). Although an expert assessment of the condition of the mine's 
plant and equipment has not taken place, one can hazard some guesses 
about its general condition. An independent assessment must place 
serious doubts on the economic viability of reopening the Panguna 
mine even if political problems were resolved. The mine pit probably 
contains a significant amount of water, which would have to be 
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pumped out before any serious mining restarted. Perhaps more 
important is the fact that, as elsewhere on the island , much of the 
infrastructure and capital equipment has been destroyed or has 
deteriorated due to lack of maintenance. Any mining operation at the 
Panguna site would virtually have to start over. It must also be 
remembered that projected mine productivity was forecast to decline to 
roughly half of its 1988 level. 
Other mines on Bougainville? 
Of potential interest is the establishment of new mining projects on the 
island. Preliminary studies suggest that some other areas of the island 
contain geological conditions worthy of exploration. On the other hand 
political conditions remain unstable and at present there is a distinct lack 
of investor confidence. The BCL experience would caution any new 
investors to study and learn from previous events. It is not clear that 
island residents would allow, let alone seek, further mineral exploration 
or excavation. Even if these matters could be resolved in favour of 
development of other mines on Bougainville, finding a workforce will 
remain problematic. An important part of the B CL workforce came 
from outside Bougainville. It is doubtful whether Papua New Guineans 
from outside the North Solomons would be willing to work there 
again, given the violent treatment of outsiders in recent years. The lack 
of a manual workforce poses other problems discussed below. 
Bougainvil lean non-mining economic potential 
While BCL was in operation neighbouring areas cultivated cocoa on a 
plantation scale . Roughly 45 per cent of the nation's cocoa was grown 
on Bougainville. Workers from other parts of Papua New Guinea were 
attracted by the lucrative pay offered by the mine. Many found work on 
the cocoa plantations . In fact it has been suggested by Dorrance 
(Parsons and Vincent 1 99 1 )  that relative plantation wages were 
depressed by the abundant workforce attracted to North Solomons 
Province by the wage rates paid at the mine. Indefinite closure of the 
Panguna mine and the ensuing violence has led to the virtual 
abandonment of Bougainville by non-Bougainvilleans . The political 
tunnoil has also encouraged skilled Bougainvilleans to seek more stable 
and profitable positions outside North Solomons Province. To 
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revitalize the plantation economy on Bougainville will require the 
peaceful resolution of the outstanding political questions and a 
significantly increased package of remuneration for the workforce. In 
other words, commercial agriculture on Bougainville will be more 
expensive than in the past. 
Indefinite closure of the mine also signifies the stagnation of the 
activities which previously thrived on sales to the mine and its staff. A 
number of small businesses which relied on the mine for the bulk of 
their sales will not be recreated. 
These points imply that the local economy on Bougainville will 
have to look to new areas for sustainable growth and development. 
Agriculture provides the most promise. Small-scale crops, horticulture, 
spices and non-traditional cash crops may prove to be the answer to 
B ougainville's new comparative advantage in the aftermath of the 
decimation of capital and infrastructure caused by the Bougainville 
crisis. The success of this strategy will depend on events in the rest of 
Papua New Guinea. A brief assessment of likely events in the national 
economy must precede an analysis of their impacts on Bougainville. 
National economic situation 
Most noticeable, and in contrast with last year's perspective, the 
national economy is influenced less and less by events on Bougainville. 
This is not to say that the need for a peaceful political solution should 
receive a lower priority. However, Papua New Guinea, with the able 
assistance of the donor community, has appeared to overcome the 
immediate economic crisis which followed the closure of the B CL 
mine. 
Realization of BCL's indefinite closure was reflected in the 199 1 
national budget. The government devalued the kina by 10 per cent, and 
announced efforts to increase the tax base and improve collection, 
replacement of the National Investment Development Authority (NIDA) 
with an Investment Promotion Authority, reductions in real wages, 
tighter monetary policy, retrenchments in government employment, and 
liberalized trade policies. In the wake of these announcements the 
international donor community, under the World-Bank-led Consultative 
Group for Papua New Guinea, announced a $US7 1 0  million package 
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principally for balance o f  payments support and structural adjustment. 
Although confidence in the kina was not lost, the effects of the 
Bougainville crisis led to a real GDP decline of about 4 to 5 per cent, 
approximately minus 7 per cent in real per capita tenns (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1) .  
Table 1 :  Growth in GDP (Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1990) 
Year Real GDP Growth Growth per capita 
(1983 Kina) % % 
1983 2 145.4 
1984 2 1 1 7.4 - 1 . 3 -4. 3  
1985 2200.7 3 .9 0.9 
1986 2289. 3 4.0 1 .0 
1987 2372.0 3.6 0.6 
1988 2442. 1 3.0 0.0 
1989 2406. 1 - 1 .5 -4 .5 
199o(e) 2309.9 -4.0 -7.0 
1983-90 1 . 1  - 1 .9 
(Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea Quarterly Economic Bulletin 
December 1990) 
The devaluation has been successful in marginally improving the 
country's competitive position; under 7 per cent annual inflation was 
recorded by the end of 1990 (Bank of Papua New Guinea Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin December 1990). However the government's 
detennination to follow through with its plans for structural adjustment 
may be beginning to wane. By March 1990 the restrictive credit policy 
was dropped. The planned cut in government spending did not 
eventuate as retrenchments left the government short of skilled 
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workers. As in the previous exercise i n  retrenchment, many voluntarily 
retired workers (after agreeing to lucrative separation payments) ,  had to 
be rehired as expensive consultants. Under pressure the government 
has lifted restraint on wages effective 1 January 1 99 1 .  Nominal 
government expenditure was reduced mostly for maintenance works 
and net lending and investments (to statutory authorities). Government 
expenditure in the form of transfers to bankrupt commodity boards 
subsidized producers suffering from low export prices. The Investment 
Promotion Authority still may smooth the process for direct foreign 
investment. 
However, hanging over this improvement is the deteriorating law 
and order situation, which continues to detract from Papua New 
Guinea's attractiveness for non-mineral investment. A serious 
unemployment problem exists , particularly for unskilled labour. Raised 
expectations about the general economic situation, due partially to high­
paying jobs in the minerals sector, mean that unemployed unskilled 
workers (especially young males in urban environments) may continue 
to take out their frustration in extra-legal ways . Solving the law and 
order and the associated unemployment problems must remain a major 
concern of the government. Finally, trade liberalization only signified a 
switch from f. o.b. (free on board)-based tariffs to c . i . f. (cost, 
insurance and freight)-based tariffs in combination with a decline in the 
basic duty from 9 to 8 per cent. A number of tariffs on inputs are slated 
to be reduced to zero. Heavily protected sectors, such as sugar, will not 
be subject to increased competition for several years. Moreover, tariff 
changes still require legislation before they can be implemented. In 
short the macroeconomic record remains stable but persistent 
implementation and the depth of structural reform remain to be proven. 
Papua New Guinea will still have to contend with the potential 
problems associated with 'booming sector' effects. A number of oil and 
gold mining projects are under way or are preparing for construction 
phases. Presently, the Ok Tedi gold and copper mine, the Porgera gold 
mine, the Mount Kare alluvial gold deposit and the Misima gold mine 
are producing and exporting minerals . The Hidden Valley gold and 
silver project also may begin to produce in the near future. More 
serious gold exploitation may commence if the Lihir gold project begins 
operations. Low gold prices and technical aspects could delay the 
commencment of the Lihir project for a number of years. More 
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important in economic terms are the potential effects of the Kutubu oil 
project in the Southern Highlands . Oil is projected to flow around the 
end of 1 992. Proven reserves exceed 200 million barrels and 
production should reach approximately 1 30,000 barrels per day. It is 
quite possible that these estimates are highly conservative. Finally, if 
the world market price of gas becomes profitable for exporters, Papua 
New Guinea's Hides gas field provides about 860-950 billion cubic feet 
of proven reserves. 
An NCDS/IN A paper (Parsons and Vincent 199 1 )  reveals that 
the result of these projects implies a massive boost to net exports 
beginning around 1 993. If the tax regime remains relatively stable this 
should imply a corresponding massive increase in government revenue 
starting in 1 994. These prognostications are based on the assumption 
that serious problems due to landowner unrest, central government 
reactions (or lack of actions) as well as company responses fail to cause 
costly delays. Filer ( 1990 and in this volume) makes some interesting 
points on this topic. 
The result could easily lead to booming sector effects . 1 To the 
extent that the booming minerals sector attracts labour away from other 
activites and injects both labour and capital or improves efficiency, 
resource movement effects occur. That is, resources will be absorbed 
by the minerals sector and withdrawn from other parts of the economy, 
including the agricultural sector. The attraction of skilled labour away 
from other activities, including government service, will be especially 
strong during construction phases of the mineral and oil developments. 
These effects will have implications for the national economy and 
economic circumstances on Bougainville. 
On the other hand, spending effects will also occur. Again to the 
extent that the new projects spend funds on non-traded domestic goods 
and services, the price of these items will increase. Since Papua New 
Guinea is a small open economy and therefore acts as a price taker on 
international markets, the price of tractable goods and services remains 
unaltered by domestic economic activity. In other words,  the real 
exchange rate will tend to appreciate. To put this point another way, 
Weisman ( 1990b) illustrates the effects of aid as a booming sector in Papua 
New Guinea by using a computable general equilibium model. The paper also 
contains a brief theoretical outline of booming sector effects. 
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balance of payments surpluses, caused by rapid expansion o f  mineral 
and oil exports, puts pressure on the kina to appreciate. Under either 
theoretical scenario real exchange rate appreciation will tend to penalize 
non-mineral export sectors . The agrarian sector will tend to shrink 
under booming sector effects. 
Booming sector effects on Bougainville 
The potential for serious economic problems from booming sector 
effects cannot be dismissed. The following delineates the implications 
of these effects on the local economy of Bougainville. 
First, the assumption of political stability and a peaceful 
resolution to the present conflict underlies the thoughts that follow. 
Secondly, it is also essential that the central government work with the 
residents of Bougainville 'to quickly restore infrastructure on the island. 
Finally, it is assumed that the development of agriculture serves as the 
pillar of economic strength on Bougainville . This last assumption 
implies that no new mining projects or exploration begin in the short-to­
medium-term.  The following scenario depends heavily on these 
assumptions. 
The relevant booming sector effects for Bougainville can be 
summarized as an 'overvalued ' exchange rate and as spending effects 
which tend to bid up the scarcity value of skilled labour. With the 
Bougainville economy more reliant upon agricultural development and 
booming sector effects penalizing this sector on a nation-wide basis , 
prospects for economic recovery in the North Solomons Province 
remain weak. 
Some possible government responses to a boom 
The government has a wide variety of policy choices in the face of a 
potential mineral and oil development boom. These options are spelled 
out clearly in the NCDS/INA paper entitled ' High Stakes' (Parsons and 
Vincent 1 99 1 ). Some of these alternatives, which are not mutually 
exclusive, include sterilization of government revenue through loan 
repayments or investment overseas, and increased public investment 
spending. 
The Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund (MRSF) has been the 
conduit through which the central government has sterilized the tax, 
60  Ethan Weisman 
dividend and other receipts flowing from the BCL mine. Presumably 
future government revenue will also be filtered through this fund. It 
might be time to consider holding these funds overseas,  to sterilize the 
funds and to earn a higher yield than the Bank of Papua New Guinea 
pays for holdings in the :MRSF. Another way to sterilize the funds is to 
repay outstanding loans, diminishing a current debt service liability. 
Overseas public debt outstanding has reached historically high levels, 
peaking to K1015 .3  million in the third quarter of 1990. Government 
external debt rose from 28 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 32 per cent in 
1 990. The expansion was due to the stabilization and structural 
adjustment programme instituted by the government following the 
indefinite closure of B CL. All of the fresh money was from 
concessional rather than commercial sources. Commercial debt incurred 
in the early 1 980s still burdens the government with substantial 
servicing payments which will last until 1992 . Retiring some of this 
debt makes sense only under conditions where additional government 
spending on efficient projects faced serious constraints and the growth 
in revenue is likely to be shortlived. It would be prudent for the 
government of Papua New Guinea to make present plans based on the 
oil and mineral projects that are known to be going ahead. The country 
has already learned the lesson in the early 1 980s of spending money 
before it has been generated. 
The government could offset some of the bias against the 
agricultural sector by investing prudently in high-yield infrastructure 
which supports agricultural activities. Increased public investment 
spending must also address inadequate education, health and social 
services. However, these increased expenditures may require skilled 
labour inputs, exacerbating the shortage of skilled labour in the short 
run, especially during the construction phases of the minerals and oil 
developments. Imports of critical skills from overseas could help to 
shore up this scarcity. Another way to avoid bidding up the price of 
skilled labour is to phase in public construction projects after the 
construction portion of mineral and oil developments have approached 
their conclusion. In addition, the government could attempt to increase 
high-yield public expenditure in areas that require skilled labour not 
sought by the minerals projects. 
The government must also consider the possible decline in future 
flows of overseas aid. As the oil and mining projects contribute 
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increasingly to government revenue, donor agencies and governments 
will perceive the diminished need to provide grants and concessional 
loans. Australia, which still provides a substantial amount of budget 
support, is considering augmenting project aid and decreasing budget 
support in line with bilateral agreement on this topic. The net effect will 
be lower amounts of bilateral aid flows. This has been sought by the 
Papua New Guinea government as it seeks to demonstrate increasing 
economic autonomy. Australia, on the other hand, will continue to 
provide friendly assistance to i ts closest neighbour. These 
considerations must be incorporated into Papua New Guinea's plans 
for budgeting revenue and expenditure in the coming years. It must also 
be a consideration in the medium- and long-term planning for economic 
development. 
In short, the boom created by the development of large scale 
mining and oil operations will require the government to make careful 
plans to optimize the benefits for the nation. These plans must be 
reviewed constantly to adjust to the changing facts concerning the 
mineral developments (especially concerning the size and timing of 
resulting government revenues) . Rolling projections and policy 
adjustments based on fast changing circumstances provide the 
government with its major challenge for the next ten years .  
Successfully meeting this challenge with appropriate policies will allow 
Papua New Guineans to look back on the economic situation in 1 990 as 
a measure of the enormous strides made toward economic 
development. Lack of success would mean that the general population 
of Papua New Guinea would fail to benefit from the economic activity 
generated by mining and oil activities. 
CHAPTER 6 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO THE 
BOUGAINVILLE C RISIS 
Andrew Elek 
During 1 9 89 and 1990, Papua New Guinea had to adjust to a fall in 
export earnings and budget revenues of unusual proportions . The 
closure of the Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL)' mine from May 
1 989 was accompanied by a sharp decline in export crop prices for 
coffee, cocoa, copra and palm oil. The loss of export earnings was 
aggravated further in 1990 by the disruption of agricultural commodity 
exports from the North Solomons Province. 
These combined setbacks ended a period of solid growth from 
19 84 to 1 988.  GDP had grown by an annual average of 4.4 per cent in 
real terms during that period, but fell by an estimated 1 .5 per cent in 
1 989. At the beginning of 1990, Papua New Guinea not only faced a 
pe riod of further economic decline, but the damage to Papua New 
Guinea's export earning capacity threatened to lead to a serious balance 
of payments crisis. Estimates by the B ank of Papua New Guinea at 
that time suggested that, in the absence of offsetting adjustments , 
reserves would have declined by an unsustainable K270 million during 
1 990 from an opening balance of K342 million in January 1990. A 
decline of even half this magnitude would have undermined confidence 
in Papua New Guinea's economic management, its exchange rate, as 
well as destroying investor confidence, leading to long-term economic 
damage. 
Looking back at 1990, an economic crisis has been successfully 
avoided at a national level. The North Solomons economy has been 
greatly impoverished by the combined loss of agricultural income and 
earnings directly or indirectly linked to the BCL operations. It will take 
a long time for the provincial economy to recover from these blows. 
The adverse consequences of what has happened in the province 
have also been felt at the national level. There was a further fall in 
Papua New Guinea's GDP in 1 990, currently estimated to have been 
around 4 per cent. But the economy has not been blown permanently 
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off course and a recovery commenced in  the early months of 199 1 .  
The Bougainville crisis has not set back other mining and petroleum 
projects. The boost to activity generated by their construction and 
subsequent production is likely to lead to rapid growth in the economy 
during the rest of the 1990s. 
This paper reviews the process of economic adjustment at the 
national level, including some lessons from the adjustment experience, 
raising some policy issues for the rest of the decade. 
The adjustment process 
In its last full year of operation, the BCL mine accounted for 8 per cent 
of GDP, 35 per cent of export receipts and 12  per cent of government 
revenue. Its closure in 1 �89 was accompanied by a very sharp fall in 
agricultural commodity prices; Papua New Guinea's terms of trade fell 
by over 15  per cent in 1989. 
Shocks of this magnitude required considerable economic 
adjustments and the Papua New Guinea government reacted promptly 
and decisively to the situation in early 1990, announcing a package of 
macro-economic policy adjustments including: 
a net reduction of around K75 million from a budget of . 
Kl ,000 million, to be achieved partly by cutting the size of 
the public seivice; 
tight monetary policies, including lower lending targets and 
higher interest rates; 
wage restraint; and 
a 10 per cent devaluation of the kina. 
These measures were designed to lower the level of demand in 
the economy, in order to help reduce the demand for imports broadly in 
line with the sharp reduction in the economy's capacity to export. The 
cut in public expenditure was intended to achieve a direct reduction in 
demand, while tighter monetary policies were to act indirectly by 
reducing investment demand. The combination of devaluation and 
wage restraint, leading to a fall in real wages, was designed to achieve 
several objectives. In the short term, there would be lower consumer 
demand due to the lower purchasing power of wages while lower 
labour costs would help sustain employment even as economic activity 
declined. Moreover, the decline in real wages was also expected to 
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contribute to a sustained longer-term improvement in Papua New 
Guinea's competitiveness. 
The reduction in domestic demand due to these policy measures 
was accompanied by an automatic process of adjustment in the private 
sector. For example, BCL's loss of exports was offset partly by a 
reduction in the demand for imported inputs (such as fuel oil) which 
were estimated to be just over K 1 00 million in a full year of 
production. 
The purchasing power of the rest of the private sector was also 
reduced due to the loss of domestic sales which would have been made 
to BCL, the loss of income from cash crops due to lower prices , and 
the disruption of exports from the North Solomons. While the first­
round effects of these losses in purchasing power were mainly felt in 
that province, subsequent rounds of lost sales depressed activity and 
demand throughout the Papua New Guinea economy. 
The combined effect of these reductions in public and private 
sector demand had a swift and significant effect on the balance of 
payment situation, as shown in Table 1 .  The current account deficit, 
which had widened in 1 989 ,  was reduced substantially in 1 990. 
Foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen from K3 80 million in 
May 1 989 to around K320 million in early 1990 recovered strongly 
from April 1 990. Reserves continued to rise, reaching over K430 
million by late 1 990; the closing balance for 1990 was just under K3 80 
million, sufficient to cover 4.4 months' value of imports. 
Table 1 also shows that the value of exports dropped sharply 
from a 1988  peak of K1256 million, to Kl 1 32 million for 1 989. The 
more detailed breakdown of exports in Table 2 indicates that the decline 
in 1 989 exports was due to the loss of exports from the mineral sector 
following the closure of BCL in mid-year. Although agricultural 
export prices fell sharply in 1989, these were more than offset by an 
increased volume of agricultural commodity exports. 
Agricultural and forestry exports dropped sharply in 1 990, but 
these declines were almost wholly offset by a recovery in mineral 
exports. Although there were no further exports from BCL, increased 
output from Ok Tedi and the commencement of exports from the 
Porgera and Misima gold mines resulted in a net increase of over K70 
million in mineral exports. Accordingly, the decline in exports from 
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Table 1 :  Balance of Payments 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
Merchandise Exports (a) 
M�r�handis� lmt!Qrts 
Balance of Trade 
Invisible Credits 
Invisibl� Debits 
Net Invisible 
Net Private Transfer 
Official Transfers 
Net transfers 
Balance on Current Account 
CAPITAL · ACCOUNT 
Official Capital Flows 
Private Capital Flows 
Non-Official Monetary 
S�Qtor TransaQtiQns 
Balance on Capital Account 
Revaluation 
Net errors, omissions 
OVERALL BALANCE 
(K million) 
1 9 88 
1 ,276 
-1 1292 
77 
208 
-646 
-438 
- 108 
1 88 
80 
-28 1  
-25 
202 
26 
203 
0 
24 
-54 
Int�mfiliQnfil R�s�IY�s (�nd Qf �ar) 326 
1 9 89  
1 , 1 32 
- 1 1 1�2 
-20 
214 
-580 
-366 
- 1 1 2  
1 86 
74 
-3 1 2  
-19 
228 
1 
210 
0 
50 
-52 
342 
6 5  
1 9 90(p)  
1 , 1 1 1  
- l lQ�Q 
6 1  
298 
-585 
-287 
- 102 
215  
1 13 
- 1 13  
84 
150 
-22 
212 
34 
- 103 
30 
318 
(a) Exports include immigrants effects and differ slightly from total · 
exports in Table 2. 
(p) Preliminary 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic B ulletin, 
December 1990. 
°' 
°' 
Table 2: Exports Classified by Commodity Group 
(K million, f.o.b.) 
Agri- Forest Marine Mineral Total Re- Total 
cultur- Pro- Pro- Domestic export Exports 
al ducts ducts Export 
Logs Total Gold Copper Total 
(b) (c) 
1984 380.6 69.9 8 1 .7 10.0 1 83.3 135 .5 326.8 799. 1 22.9 822.0 
1985 330.2 58 .4 67.3 1 2. 1 3 1 8. 8  1 64.2 489.9 899.4 26.7 926.2 
1986 33 1 .9 68 .0 74 .7 7.9 398 .5 156.0 561 .2 975.7 25 . 1  1000.8 
1987 268.9 103 .0 1 10.9 1 1 .0 422.9 28 1 .9 7 14.9 1 1 05.7 17 .5 1 123 .5 
1988 255.2 90.5 97.5 7.5 405. 1 446.9 861 .5 122 1 .7 34.4 1 256. 1 
1989 270. 1 90.0 96.2 . 8 . 1 3 1 6.9 344.9 676. 1 1050.5 6 1 . 1  1 1 1 1 .6 
1 990 1 89.9 62.0 69.9 8 .2 384.2 349.2 748.5 10 16 .5 72.5 1089.0 
(a) Export values up to 1989 are reconciled with the National Statistical Office. 
1990 data are collected from Commodity Board sources, mining companies and commercial banks by the Bank of 
Papua New Guinea. 
(b) Other forest products include timber, plywood, woodchip. i (c) Includes silver. 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1990. CD � 
[!l 
� 
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1989 to 1990 was only K2 1 million, compared to the massive (K144 
million) drop in the preceding year. 
While exports steadied in 1990, imports fell sharply due to the 
effects of lower demand associated with the loss of private sector 
purchasing power and cutbacks in government expenditure. Imports 
fell by over K 100 million, or by over 9 per cent between 1 989 and 
1 990. Net private capital flows to Papua New Guinea dropped by 
almost K80 million during 1 990, but this fall was off set by an increase 
in net official flows, including a drawing of K54 million from the 
International Monetary Fund's Contingency and Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CCFF). 
Inflation accelerated during 1990; the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) rose by almost 9 per cent from the end 1 989 to end 1 990, 
compared to an average annual rate of increase of 4.6 per cent during 
the previous two years. The rise in inflation was attributable largely to 
the 10 per cent devaluation of the kina in January 1990 which led to an 
increase in the kina prices of imports to Papua New Guinea. The 
upward movement in petroleum prices due to the Gulf crisis also 
contributed to inflation during the latter part of the year. On the other 
hand, inflationary pressures were reduced by the subdued level of 
economic activity as well as by wage restraint. 
Under the Minimum Wages Board (MWB) determination of 
1989, adjustment of wages to prices are limited to a maximum of 6 per 
cent per year. In addition, the government negotiated an agreement 
with public service employees in early 1990 providing for even tighter 
wage restraint. Under this agreement, public servants on the lowest 
salary scales were to receive the increments determined by the MWB , 
but there were to be tighter limits on those on higher salary scales . A 
sliding scale was agreed so that the highest levels of the public service 
would receive increases of 2 per cent per year less than those 
determined by the MWB . On this basis, given that most public 
servants are paid at above minimum wage rates, the average increase 
for public servants during 1 990 is estimated at 4.5 per cent, compared 
to 6 per cent for the private sector. 
In view of the 9 per cent rise in the CPI, there was an economy­
wide decline of between 3.5 and 4 per cent in real labour costs during 
1 990. Accordingly, the 10  per cent devaluation combined with the 
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restraint of nominal wages and salaries led to a modest improvement in 
Papua New Guinea's competitiveness. 
The agricultural export sector has suffered considerably due to 
lower world prices during the past two years. The balances which had 
been accumulated in commodity price stabilization funds helped to 
cushion the price falls by paying bounties to producers. However, 
these balances have now been exhausted (in mid 1989 in the case of 
cocoa and early 199 1  for coffee); a reduced level of bounty support to 
growers is being financed by loans from the budget to the commodity 
price stabilization funds in order to reduce or avoid bankruptcies among 
plantations and bolster smallholder incomes. 
The devaluation also provided some relief to agricultural 
producers. Their kina receipts have been increased by 10 per cent at 
any given level of world prices. This gain has been offset only in part 
by the increases in costs resulting from the devaluation owing to the 
combination of tight demand management and tight wage restraint 
during 1 990. As explained in more detail in Elek ( 199 1 ),  this meant 
that the cost increases stemming from the 10  per cent devaluation will 
have been limited to between 5 and 6 per cent for the plantation sector. 
On this basis, plantations would have become more profitable at 
any given level of world prices. For example, if a cocoa plantation's 
profit margin had been 10 per cent before the devaluation, then the 
profit margin would have increased to 14 per cent by the end of 1990, 
if world prices for cocoa had stayed the same during the period. 
However, a fall in world prices of only 3.6 per cent is sufficient to 
offset the effect of a 10  per cent devaluation on profitability. In the 
environment of sharply falling world prices, Papua New Guinea 
agricultural producers will not have perceived the gain from the 
devaluation during 1990, even though it has led to a modest pennanent 
improvement in their competitiveness. 
The foregoing summary of economic developments during 1989 
and 1 990 suggests that the pain of adjustment associated with a fall of 
GDP in the order of 5 per cent over two years has been spread widely, 
albeit not evenly. 
The hardest impact has been on the North Solomons Province 
itself where income derived directly and indirectly from BCL was 
foregone, agricultural exports disrupted and government services 
suspended. BCL itself has lost the expected stream of profits from the 
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mine for the foreseeable future and the national government has lost the 
stream of income that would otherwise have flowed from BCL to the 
Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund. 
The decline in commodity prices hurt all producers of export 
crops since the effect of the price falls could only be partially offset by 
bounties from the commodity stabilization funds and the modest net 
gains in profitability from the devaluation. 
The cutbacks in government expenditure hurt those whose 
services were cut as well as those parts of the private sector whose 
activity levels depend on public sector demand. Private sector activity 
was also reduced due to the lower demand from BCL, the North 
Solomons generally, and by the lower demand associated with reduced 
agricultural incomes. However, the impact on private sector profits 
was mitigated to some extent by a decline in real labour costs during 
1 990 since the acceleration of inflation following the devaluation was 
not fully reflected in wage increases. 
The 1990 devaluation reduced the earning power of all wages, 
particularly during the first part of 1990; an adjustment to a 5.5 per cent 
increase in the CPI during the first half of 1 990 was not made until 
September 1 990 and was limited to 3 per cent for minimum wage 
earners and below that for public servants above the minimum wage. 
This was followed by a further modest decline in the purchasing power 
of wages and salaries during the rest of 1990. The fact that wage and 
salary earners bore some of the pain of adjustment contrasts with the 
experience of the early 1980s when the Papua New Guinea economy 
was also hurt by a sharp reduction in the terms of trade. At that time, 
all sections of the economy were adversely affected, except wage and 
salary earners who were protected by indexation arrangements. 
Lessons from the adjustment 
Pemaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the experience 
of 1989 and 1990 is that the Papua New Guinea economy is capable of 
withstanding major adverse shocks without losing its fundamental 
balance. 
Indeed, the 1 990 experience indicates there was an 
overadjustment to the loss of export capacity, since the trade balance 
improved during 1990. The current account of the balance of payments 
70  Andrew Elek 
narrowed considerably and international reserves actually rose during 
1990, regaining the level recorded when the B CL mine closed in mid 
1989. This suggests that the incremental reduction of demand brought 
about by the macro-economic measures of January 1990 was more than 
was needed to counteract the damage to the economy by the mine 
closure and lower agricultural prices. A less severe policy adjustment 
to demand would have proved sufficient when combined with the 
automatic reduction in demand associated with the loss of purchasing 
power in the economy. It may have been possible to end 1 990 with a 
lower level of international reserves, but having suffered a smaller 
decline in GDP. 
However, this can only be said with hindsight. At the time the 
macro-economic policy decisions were taken in January 1990, foreign 
exchange reserves had fallen substantially and looked like falling 
considerably further. In order to forestall a potentially dangerous loss 
of confidence in the economy and the currency, it was important to 
demonstrate convincingly that the government could react adequately to 
adverse changes in economic circumstances. The ri sks of 
indecisiveness, which could have led to serious capital flight and the 
possible deferment or cancellation of expected mineral projects, were 
very high: these risks outweighed the possible risks of cutting 
domestic demand by too much. So, while the extent of tightening of 
fiscal and monetary policy now appears to .have been excessive, the 
decisions were probably unavoidable at the time. 
The events of 1989 and 1990 indicate that, at the national level, 
the Papua New Guinea private sector's balance of payments is largely 
self-balancing in the context of prudent monetary policy, as noted in 
analysis by Palmer ( 1 979) and Guest ( 1 990). When the private 
sector's purchasing power is cut back, as it was in 1989 and 1990, its 
expenditures have to be cut back correspondingly, as long as there is 
no loosening of credit available to offset its reduced earnings. If this 
tendency towards self-balancing is recognized, then it is sufficient for 
the government to reduce its demand to adjust only to match its own 
loss of revenue; it is not necessary to reduce the net budget deficit 
below what it was expected to be before the adverse shocks which 
caused a shortfall in revenue. The effects of credit ceilings on demand 
growth are indirect and somewhat uncertain; however the experience 
of 1 990 suggests that it would be sufficient to ensure that monetary 
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policy is not loosened to offset the loss of private sector purchasing 
power, rather than setting lower credit growth targets in response to the 
loss of export capacity. 
Both monetary policy and fiscal policy were, in fact, loosened 
during 1 990, once the extent of the fall in private sector demand 
became apparent. At the beginning of 1 990, the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea set a target of zero growth in non-mining private sector credit at 
K935 million. In March, the credit ceiling was relaxed to allow a 4-5 
per cent growth of non-mining private sector credit as the foreign 
exchange situation stabilized and the demand for credit eased . 
Commercial banks' lending policy also became more cautious,  due to 
the need to write off debt which had been advanced to customers in the 
North Solomons Province. The actual increase in private sector credit 
over 1990 as a whole was just 1 per cent, well below the revised credit 
targets set by the Bank of Papua New Guinea. 
Fiscal policy was also relaxed during the year. A committee 
chaired by the prime minister allocated the planned reductions in 
expenditure by about K75 million compared to the original budget for 
1 990. A programme to retrench up to 3,000 public servants was also 
undertaken. · Up to around September, the revised expenditure targets 
were expected to be met. However, there was a considerable volume 
of unplanned expenditure above these targets in the last quarter of the 
year, so that only a net K33 million of the intended cuts were 
implemented (see Table 3) .  Moreover, additional spending 
commitments in the order of K30 million were entered into during the 
later part of 1990 which will require offsetting adjustments in the 1 99 1  
budget. New unplanned recruitment also largely offset the 
retrenchment of public servants earlier in the year. 
Taxation revenues also fell short of expectations due to the 
greater than expected reduction in private sector activity. 
Consequently, the overall budget deficit for 1990 was estimated at 
K62.7 million, compared to the K3 .4 million targeted in the revised 
budget of early 1 990. 
As noted above, a cut in Government expenditure smaller than 
the planned K75 million would have been sufficient, together with 
other developments in the economy, to stabilize foreign exchange 
reserves. The additional outlays in late 1 990 have not led to any short­
tenn macro-economic problems; however, the unplanned way in which 
.....J 
TABLE 3 :  Fiscal  Operations of the C entral Government (K'Million) N 
1 9 8 8  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 0  1 2  mths 
B u d - ge t  B udge t to Dec 
r e v i s e d  1 990 (p) 
5 6 6 . 1  6 8 9 . 2  7 0 5  . 1  6 4 5  . 5  5 9 9 . 4  
Personal Tax 1 5 6 . 8  1 72 .7 1 93 .0 1 80 .0  1 8 6 .2  
Company Tax 1 29 . 1 1 8 0 . 2  9 2 . 0  9 2 . 0  94 .9 
Other Direct Tax 40.2 3 7 . 3  5 1 .0 3 9 .9 3 5 .2 
Import Duties 1 57 .2 204 . 8  255 .0 223 .0 1 89 .9 
Excise Duties 6 6 .9 8 1 . 8 8 6 .3 80 .0  80 .4 
Export Tax 1 6 .3 1 1 . 9  27 .7  30 .5  1 2 . 6  
Other Indirect Tax 0 .2  0 .5  0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 2  
NON-TAX RECEIPTS 1 27 .5 1 1 6 . 1  1 5 8 .4 146 .5  1 646.5 
Dividends (a) 60 . 1  47 .3  60 .7  5 5 .0 62 .4 
Interest Receipts/Fees 1 4 .0 8 . 9 1 6 .9 1 2 .0 2 1 .4 
Other Internal Revenue (b) 5 3 .4 5 9 . 9  80 .0 7 9 . 5 80.7 
Foreign Grants (c) 1 8 9 . 9  1 8 7  . 5  1 8 2 .  7 2 1 3  . 1  2 2 2 . 5  
Total Receipts 8 8 4 . 1  9 9 2 . 8  1 0 4 6 . 2  1 0 0 5 . 1  9 8 6 . 4  
EXPENDITURE 
Departmental (b) 3 92 . 1  43 8 .2 458 .3 433 .5 479 .9 
Capital Works 5 5 .9 5 6 . 2  79 .4 5 5 .9 84 .6  
Maintenance Works 4 1 .4 47 .9  34 .0 3 9 .0 3 2 .7 
Provincial Governments ( d) 24 1 .5 27 6 .5 293 .2 277 .5 273 .5  
Net Lending & Investments (e) 43 .3 4 5 . 3  4 1 . 5 2 8 . 7  1 5 .8 
Interest Payments 84 .9 9 1 . 0 9 6 . 6  1 06 . 8 1 09 .7 
- Foreign 5 6 . 1  5 1 . 6 55 .0 60 .5  63 . 1  � 
- Domestic 2 8 . 8  39 .4 4 1 . 6 4 6 .3 4 6 . 6  � CD 
Other Grant & Expenditure (f) 5 5 .2 64.9 7 9 .3 67 . 1  79 .0  � 
Unallocated Ex�nditure 3 .9 - 1 7  . 1  
� 
Total  Expenditure 
D EFICIT (-)/SURPLUS (+) 
9 1 4 . 3 
- 3 0 . 2  
1 0 2 3 . 9  
- 3 1 . 1  
1 0 8 2 . 3  1 0 0 8 . S  1 0 4 9 . 1 
FINANCING 
Net Overseas Borrowing 
Internal. Agencies (net loans) 
Commercial (net loans) (g) 
Net Domestic Borrowings 
Net Proceeds Inscribed Stock 
Net Proceeds Treasury Bills 
Borrowings from BPNG 
Uses of Cash Balances (h) 
Other Domestic 
MRSF (net Drawdown) 
TOTAL FINANCING 
TRAN SACTIONS 
- 1 6 . 1  
67 .5 
-83 .6 
46 .3  
1 1 .0 
1 9 .0 
26 .0  
26 .4 
- 1 .4 
-34 .7 
3 0 . 2  
1 . 3 
70.0 
-68 .7  
29 . 8  
14 . 1 
5 . 7  
44. 0  
2 . 5  
- 1 .4 
-35 . 1  
3 1 . 1  
- 3 6 . 1  - 3 . 4  
3 7 . 1  
1 1 4 .9  
-77 . 8  
- 1 .0 
-48 .5 
-2.0 
49.5 
3 6 . 1 
9 . 9  
95 .5 
-85 .6 
-6 .5 
-4 1 .2 
-2.0 
3 6 .7 
3 . 4 
(a) Mainly dividend payment from the Bank of Papua New Guinea (includes sales of Equity). 
- 6 2 .  7 
- 1 6 .8 
1 02 . 1  
- 1 1 8 .9 
7 9 .5 
47 .7  
- 8 .0 
1 1 . 9  
- 1 6 .5 
44.4 
6 2 . 7  
(b) Includes net appropriations-in-aid (AIA) up until 1989. From 1990 onwards there is no AIA. 
(c) Mostly the Australia Aid Payment. 
(d) Covers all grants and transfers from the National Government. 
(e) Principal repayments to Government from loans to statutory authorities etc not shown in 
receipts but netted out in expenditure category 'Net Lending and Investments ' .  
(f) Mainly grants to statutory institutions and general overheads. 
(g) Includes Private Treaty Loans on Australian Register. 
(h) Includes change in deposits of all the Government's trust fund accounts (excluding MRSF). 
(p) Provisional 
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1990. 
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they took place is a worrying sign of loss of control over public 
expenditure. Discipline over spending decisions continues to be 
important, even after the passing of the initial crisis. A different lesson 
from the 1 990 experience is that it is not possible to rely simply on 
additional external assistance to sustain foreign exchange reserves in a 
short-term crisis.  The major damage to the Papua New Guinea 
economy from BCL's closure and lower commodity prices meant that 
Papua New Guinea was eligible for balance of payments support, by 
drawing on IMF standby facilities or CCFF and Stabex funds from the 
European Community to compensate for short-term loss of export 
income, or from fast-disbursing programme loans such as a Structural 
Adjustment Loan from the World Bank or programme aid from bilateral 
donors. However, most of such assistance only becomes available after 
the IMF and other aid agencies are satisfied the government has taken 
responsible and decisive steps to adjust domestic macro-economic 
policies. As noted above, the Papua New Guinea government did take 
such measures in January 1 990. While advice from the World Bank 
and the IMF was available, the adjustment package was designed by 
Papua New Guinea policy makers rather than imposed by any outside 
agency. 
Once the Papua New Guinea government announced and began 
to implement its adjustment measures, donor response was favourable. 
An agreement on a standby facility with the IMF was reached in April 
1 990, to support Papua New Guinea's macro-economic strategy in 
addition to a K54 million drawing from the IMF CCFF. At the donor 
consortium meeting in May 199 1 ,  there were additional commitments 
of assistance from most donors, but the time lag involved in drawing 
on these commitments meant that they played little part in counteracting 
the short-tenn crisis of early 1990. 
The CCFF from the IMF became available only in May 1990, 
after the reserves situation had stabilized. Since reserves have risen 
subsequently, there have been no drawings from the IMF standby­
facility. The K50 million Structural Adjustment Loan from the World 
Bank was agreed in principle by May 1 990, but the first drawing of 
K25 million was not made until late 1990. As shown in Table 3, there 
was an increase in foreign grants in 1990, to K222.5 million compared 
to K1 87.5 million in 1989. This increase included a supplementary 
grant from the EC. However, once allowance is made for the 1 0  per 
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cent devaluation o f  the kina, the grants available i n  foreign exchange 
terms increased by only 8 per cent from their 1989 level. The net loans 
from international agencies during 1990 were below the level expected 
in the original 1990 budget. 
Accordingly, the actual drawdown of additional assistance in 
1990 was quite small; the Papua New Guinea economy was essentially 
adjusted from within, rather than ' rescued ' by outside agencies. 
However, the potential availability of the IMF standby facility, to 
bolster foreign exchange reserves if necessary, did help sustain 
confidence in Papua New Guinea's capacity to meet i ts foreign 
exchange obligations and reduced the risk of capital flight, thus easing 
the domestic adjustment task. Moreover, the additional commitments 
of support elicited by the crisis and the Government's prompt reaction 
to it, will be useful in augmenting Papua New Guinea's resources as 
they are gradually drawn upon in the coming years. 
The experience of the past two years has also illustrated the 
importance of Papua New Guinea's stabilization mechanisms; the 
existence of the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund (MRSF) meant 
that budgetary resources were not immediately reduced by the loss of 
payments to government from BCL, equivalent to about 1 6  per cent of 
recent total ·revenues. Mineral prices were relatively high in the late 
1 980s, boosting BCL's profitability. A substantial part of the 
correspondingly increased public revenue was accumulated in the 
MRSF, rather than spent immediately. The fund's balance rose from 
K65 million at the end of 1987 to KlOO million by end 1 988 . The 
balance rose further to K 1 35 million by end 1 989, despite the 
interruption to operations in May 1 989, since tax revenues for 1 989 
related to 1988 performance. The accumulation of savings in those 
years meant that K50 million mineral-related income could be drawn 
into the budget, during 1990, leaving K90 million in the MRSF at the 
end of the year. In the absence of such a stabilization mechanism, the 
government would have had to have faced up to a fall in mineral sector 
revenues from Kl 1 0  million in 1 989 to zero in 1 990. 
The agricultural commodity price stabilization funds also played 
a helpful role in smoothing the otherwise precipitous fall in prices to 
producers, before they were exhausted. Recent experience shows that 
the balances which had been accumulated in these funds were certainly 
not excessive (as suggested by Jarrett and Anderson ( 1989) and by 
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Jolly et al. ( 1990)) . The problem was that the formulae for setting 
bounties should have been reviewed in the light of price trends through 
the 1 980s. A formula which limited the share of accumulated funds 
which could be released in any one year (as suggested by Jolly et al. 
( 1990)) would have prevented the funds from being exhausted as 
rapidly as they were, reducing the need for loans from the budget to 
avoid an unmanageable fall in producer incomes from 1989 to 1990. 
The 1990 experience also showed that devaluation combined 
with wage restraint can achieve a useful gain in competitiveness, albeit 
at the cost of higher inflation. As discussed in more detail in Elek 
(1991), the exchange rate change added about 5 per cent to the increase 
in the CPI during 1990, but led to a lowering of real wage costs by 3.5 
to 4 per cent. However, this does not mean that the experience could be 
repeated in 199 1 .  The agreement on additional wage restraint with 
public servants was allowed to lapse from early 1991 , so that all wages 
will be fully indexed up to a maximum of 6 per cent per year. Under 
these circumstances, further significant reductions in real labour costs 
could only be achieved by locking Papua New Guinea into a very high 
rate of inflation. 
The MWB arrangements will be revised from the beginning of 
1 992. The Board will begin its deliberations in late 199 1 ,  at the same 
time as the economy is likely to regain its momentum. It will not be 
easy to reach agreement on arrangements which can hold nominal wage 
increases substantially below the rate of inflation. In such 
circumstances, there would be a considerable risk that any further 
devaluation would lead to accelerating inflation, rather than sustained 
improvements in competitiveness. The recent relaxation of wage 
restraint, and the unplanned increase in public expenditures in late 
1 99 1 ,  indicate that restraints which can be imposed in a crisis 
atmosphere are difficult to sustain once the economy stabilizes and 
growth resumes. 
The expected resumption of economic growth during the first 
half of 1991  also indicates that the national economy as a whole has 
become considerably less dependent on any single natural resource 
based project. This will certainly be an important factor underlying 
future negotiations between central government, provincial government 
and landowners - not only regarding the future of the North Solomons 
Economic Adjustment to the Bougainville Crisis 7 7  
and BCL, but also regarding the sharing of  benefits from other major 
projects. 
Medium-term prospects 
The balance of payments is expected to be manageable during 1 99 1 .  
Non-mineral exports are expected to stabilize since world agricultural 
commodity prices are not expected to fall further and there may be a 
gradual resumption of exports of cocoa and copra from the North 
Solomons. Mineral exports will increase considerably as 199 1 will be 
the first full year of production from the Porgera mine, whose 
performance has exceeded expectations to date. There will be a 
substantial increase in imports associated with continuing construction 
of the Kutubu oil project.. However, these increased imports will be 
financed almost entirely by additional inflows of foreign capital . 
General imports will continue to be below trend due to the depressed 
level of economic activity in the non-mining sector. 
The cumulative fall in GDP during 1989 and 1990 of around 5-6 
per cent was about twice as great as originally estimated. Therefore, 
domestic tax revenues were running below expectations during the last 
part of 1 990 and early 1 991 . In view of additional expenditure 
commitments made in early 1 99 1 ,  the government faces a difficult 
fiscal situation for 1 99 1 .  However, the revenue situation should 
improve considerably in 1992 as the level of activity recovers, largely 
due to intensive construction activity in the mineral sector. There are 
early indications, from April 199 1 ,  of a recovery in tax collections and 
the economy should recover to its 1989 level by the end of this year. 
The prospects for GDP growth from 1 992 onward now look 
quite promising as the Porgera mine reaches its full volume of 
production and oil production from Kutubu commences and 
production continues at Ok Tedi and Misima. There are also some 
prospects for further oil and mineral developments later in the decade. 
These projects will lead to substantially increased exports and 
government revenues by the mid 1 990s, but they will not, in 
themselves, provide significant employment opportunities for the 
rapidly growing workforce. 
The challenge facing the Papua New Guinea government is to 
use the opportunity provided by these expected additional resources to 
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broaden the base of economic growth, as well as to reduce further 
Papua New Guinea's dependence on aid. The medium-term economic 
outlook depends largely on how the additional resources are spent by 
the government and on the indirect effects of such additional 
expenditure on the non-mining sectors of the economy. Most of Papua 
New Guinea's population live in rural areas and improvements in their 
living standards depend on their progressively greater and more 
productive involvement in agriculture. A low level of education and a 
poorly developed transport network are important obstacles to rural 
development. Weaknesses in health care and in agricultural research 
and extension efforts also hinder improvements in productivity. 
The importance of improving physical and social infrastructure is 
illustrated by the different levels of engagement in agriculture in 
different parts of Papua New Guinea. Areas such as East New Britain 
and the North Solomons before the 1 989 crisis had the greatest 
engagement in agriculture and relatively high incomes compared to the 
rest of the country. An important prerequisite to more effective 
involvement of other areas in productive agricultural activities leading 
to higher incomes will be to improve standards of education, health and 
transport links nationwide. 
If the additional public resources which are expected to be 
generated by the major resource-based projects are invested in 
improving the coverage and quality of rural infrastructure, then the 
foundations of broader-based growth can be greatly improved during 
the 1 990s. Agricultural production capacity can be boosted by 
improving the skill base, health standards and access to markets . The 
consequent increases in agricultural incomes will then generate demand 
for manufacturing and service sector activities, making them gradually 
less dependent on servicing the public sector and mineral projects. 
Such a positive sequence will eventuate only if the additional 
revenues are invested in improving infrastructure. If additional 
revenues are simply used to increase the size of administration, or to 
boost public service salaries,  or to build prestige projects , then the 
opportunity provided by additional revenues could be largely wasted. 
There have been examples of considerable waste in several developing 
countries which have experienced a mineral boom and some of the 
temptations will be difficult to avoid. 
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Allowing public sector salaries to increase in  real tenns as  new 
revenues become available would have a doubly negative effect There 
would be fewer resources available for invesunent. Moreover, since 
the Government is the largest employer, higher public salaries would 
spill over to all other sectors, making the non-mining sector, agriculture 
and manufacturing less competitive. Conversely, if there is wage 
restraint in the public sector, there will be a lower risk of upward 
pressure on the wage and cost structure in the rest of the economy. 
In addition to ensuring that additional government resources are 
channelled into investment in better physical and social infrastructure, 
Papua New Guinea policy makers face a further challenge. There is a 
risk that the additional demand placed on the economy by expanded 
public expenditure in the 1990s could raise the costs facing the non­
mining sectors of the economy. If that happened, it would weaken 
considerably the supply response of the rural population to 
improvements in rural infrastructure. There would be less incentive to 
take advantage of their improved productive potential. 
The prospects for enhancing the capacity for faster agricultural 
development, while avoiding serious adverse effects on the price and 
cost structure, depend considerably on the rate at which additional 
public sector demand is injected into the economy. If government 
revenues increased by KlOO million per year from 1 993 to 1 995, and 
the government spent all of this additional revenue on improving 
infrastructure as soon as the revenue became available, then it would be 
difficult to avoid substantial increases in prices; the capacity of the 
economy to supply additional construction and other services and 
products would be considerably overstretched. 
The experience of most developing countries which gain access 
to sizeable additional resources in a short period indicates the risk of 
cost and price distortions is very high. But there are policy options for 
minimizing such adverse effects in Papua New Guinea. 
One important policy option is to avoid sudden large increases of 
demand by phasing in increases in public sector expenditure gradually, 
allowing time for the private sector to increase its capacity to meet the 
expected growth in demand. Papua New Guinea already has a 
mechanism which can achieve this. 
Additional income to the government from mineral projects flows 
into the :MR.SF, rather than directly to the budget. The government can 
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allow the MRSF to accumulate some of the initial large increases in 
income expected in the coming years ,  while increasing public 
expenditure at a rate which allows suppliers time to build up supply 
capacity to meet the expected growth in demand. To make this 
possible, the government will need to make careful predictions of the 
likely growth in revenue flowing to the MRSF and sound judgements 
about the pace at which this should be used to boost budget 
expenditures. Sound planning of the nature and sequence of increased 
expenditures will be needed so that the private sector can be made 
aware of the size, composition and timing of the additional demand 
which will be created. 
The upward pressure on prices generated by increased demand 
can also be reduced by ensuring maximum scope for competition in 
responding to demand growth. The potential for price increases can be 
limited by ensuring that existing domestic suppliers face competition 
from imports or from potential new entrants. For example, ensuring 
that international as well as domestically-based finns can bid for public 
construction contracts will help limit increases in construction costs. 
More broadly, exposing domestic suppliers of all goods and 
services to competition from imports will be important in minimizing 
inflationary effects of growing demand. For products which can be 
directly supplied from imports, there should be no price inflation, 
provided artificial barriers to trade are avoided. However, for almost 
all goods and services, costs depend to some extent on the price of 
goods and services which can only be supplied from domestic sources 
(non-tradeables). These include land, labour, electric power, water 
supplies, freight handling. Excess demand for these can raise costs 
and prices considerably and it will be very difficult to avoid bottlenecks 
leading to upward price pressures. 
Additional demand for unskilled labour will not cause a problem 
as there is no shortage of such labour in Papua New Guinea. On the 
other hand, skilled labour is in extremely short supply. Even if skilled 
salary levels rose sharply, the supply of domestic skills could not be 
increased quickly in the short tenn. At the same time, a rapid rise in 
salary levels for skilled workers would increase the political pressure 
for raising unskilled wages , even though such labour is relatively 
abundant. To ease skills constraints and to improve the ability of the 
economy to respond to rising demand, it will be important to allow 
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firms and government agencies to import skilled workers from 
overseas. 
Faster growth of public expenditure will also increase demand 
for residential and industrial land. Such land is in short supply in 
Papua New Guinea due to political, regulatory and sociological 
constraints and escalating prices of urban land could raise the cost 
structure for all other industries . With careful planning, it should be 
possible to increase the capacity to supply power, water, sewerage and 
communications facilities in line with expected demand. However, 
lead times are long and it will be difficult to avoid costly shortages of 
these essential facilities during the next few years. 
For all of these reasons , the danger of inflationary pressures 
raising costs for the non-mining sector of Papua New Guinea will be 
considerable as additional mineral resources become available. It will 
be impossible to avoid such pressures entirely, but a careful phasing of 
public expenditure growth and ensuring competition wherever possible 
can help minimize these side effects. 
If such policies are adopted and additional resources are invested 
in essential infrastructure, the benefits of the additional resources can 
outweigh the adverse side-effects, building the foundations for 
broader-based growth by the end of the 1990s. 
Conclusion 
The economy of Bougainville has been very seriously damaged by 
recent events. Agricultural output is  likely to begin to recover as 
communications links are restored, but the provincial economy will not 
be able to recover to anything like its previous state without the 
resumption of mining operations at Panguna - a prospect which is 
currently not in sight. 
There has also been damage at the national level, with a 5-6 per 
cent cumulative fall in GDP in 1989 and 1990. However, the national 
economy has proven more resilient. A balance of payments crisis has 
been avoided by a combination of prompt macro-economic policy 
adjustments and the automatic self-adjustment of domestic demand to 
the reduced purchasing power of Papua New Guinea's export 
industries. 
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The experience of 1989 and 1990 has confirmed the capacity of 
Papua New Guinea's economic policy makers to react decisively to 
changing circumstances: if anything, the policy adjustments were in 
excess of what was required to stabilize the balance of payments. The 
experience has also shown that restraint of public expenditure and of 
real wages are very hard to sustain, except in an atmosphere of crisis. 
Economic growth appears set to recommence, possibly at a rate 
exceeding 5 per cent per year from 1 99 1 ,  due to the expansion of 
activity in the rest of the mining and petroleum sector. While a 
reopening of the Panguna mine would be a welcome boost, Papua New 
Guinea's economic growth prospects no longer depend heavily on that 
project. Provided that production continues at Ok Tedi and Misima and 
the Porgera gold and Kutubu oil projects are completed as expected, the 
main challenge for Papua New Guinea's economic management during 
the 1990s will be to deploy additional resources from these projects to 
broaden the base of economic growth. The medium-term economic 
outlook depends on how effectively additional public resources can be 
invested in to improve physical and social infrastructure, while limiting 
the potential adverse effects of increased public expenditure on Papua 
New Guinea's cost structure. 
CHAPTER 7 
BOUGAINVILLE - THE FUTURE FOR 
THE MINING OPERATION 
D.S. Carruthers 
It is  my contention that Papua New Guinea has been struggling with a 
crisis on Bougainville which is more severe than anything Australia has 
had to contend with in its 200 years of history, with the exception of 
the Pacific War - and in that situation Australian territory was barely 
involved, whereas in the case of the Bougainville crisis Papua New 
Guinea territory has been very much involved. The severity of the 
problems which this has created for the government of Papua New 
Guinea is something that I think Australians in particular should 
appreciate. 
In such a situation it is natural that there has been much looking 
backwards, much hand wringing and much agonizing over what 
happened and why. I think the time has come now to look forward. 
There are major issues of politics and relationships within 
Bougainville and between Bougainvilleans and the rest of Papua New 
Guinea to be resolved. For the future stability, integrity and economic 
security of the nation, these are the matters which must have highest 
priority. When this process of resolution has advanced to a certain 
stage, no doubt the future of the Panguna mine will become a major 
issue. In this regard, there will be two fundamental questions to be 
answered: 
- do people want the mining operation to be re-established? 
- if so, under what conditions? 
The two questions are likely, of course, to become inextricably 
intertwined; but before they are, I would like to deal with each 
separately. 
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Do people want mining? 
Before the first question can be satisfactorily answered, it seems to me 
that there must be a mechanism by which people's views can be 
gathered and expressed. This presumably will involve some process of 
selection of representative leaders who might hope to reach a consensus 
view. Such a process and outcome will in any case presumably be 
required for many of the province's problems to be addressed. 
The emphasis will be on Bougainvilleans being able to agree 
among themselves what they want. This will mean people being able to 
make a free choice, which many of them have not been able to do over 
the last eighteen months. This in turn will mean that the guns, and the 
threat of future use of guns, will need to be put away. 
When people are addressing the first question, they will to some 
extent be asking themselves what level of economic activity, 
infrastructure and services they want. Before the crisis the North 
Solomons was the most prosperous province next to the National 
Capital District. While much of the economic activity was concentrated 
in the area most influenced by the mine, nevertheless there was a better 
than average road and communications system, better than average 
education and health facilities, and a provincial government system that 
worked much better than most. These things .cost money, and it will be 
difficult to re-establish and maintain the earlier standards achieved 
without income from mining. 
Some people have been quoted as saying that they would prefer 
to return to a more traditional way of life, and to do without the social 
disruption that came in the wake of the mining activity. They should, 
however, realize that a more traditional existence places limitations on 
what can be afforded by way of transport, communications, education, 
health and job opportunities. Throughout Papua New Guinea these are 
the things that most people seem to be saying they want and expect 
from the system of nationhood. The provision of these facilities, and 
the economic activity which is necessary to fund them, are disruptive of 
traditional lifestyle, so to a degree a choice has to be made. 
These are some of the issues which will need to be debated and 
clarified once people are free to do so, and once a mechanism for doing 
so has been restored. Early in the debate about whether people want 
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mining operations to resume, we expect the question ' under what 
conditions? ' to be�ome prominent. 
Under what conditions? 
There will be a number of issues within this question. It seems to me 
that the most fundamental or important will be: 
political governance 
ownership and control 
cost of re-establishing production 
method of operation 
taxation regime 
division of the income. 
Pol itical governance . 
In relation to political governance, I am assuming that North 
Solomons will remain part of Papua New Guinea, and that mining will 
still be a responsibility of the national government. I am also assuming 
that the Bougainville Copper Agreement, under which the mining 
company has operated to date , will be replaced by a mining 
development contract of the kind which governs the activities of 
recently established mining operations. These are the only assumptions 
the company can sensibly make at this stage. Companies can operate 
only under the mandate and control of properly constituted 
governments. The question of the political governance of Bougainville 
must be decided by Papua New Guineans. The company can only be a 
by-stander in this issue. If the assumption about which government 
will be in charge is incorrect, it will be a different ball game, but most 
of the other issues within the question 'under what conditions? ' will 
still be relevant. 
It should also be noted at this time that no single district is likely 
to run the whole island. Since the withdrawal of national government 
presence last year, the Kieta district has tended to call the shots, 
unfortunately rather literally. The people nominally in charge, however, 
have been unable to establish a satisfactory system of administration, or 
a satisfactory means by which people generally could express their 
views, or to prevent the widespread destruction of facilities which 
could be of value to the province. Presumably people in other districts 
will want more say in how things are done in the future. 
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Ownership and control 
Views have been expressed by some that it would be undesirable for 
CRA to retain its interest in and control of BCL, and that a simple 
solution to the issue about division of income would be to divide 
CRA's interest u p  between Bougainvilleans and a new 
investor/manager. These views appear to have their origin in a belief 
that the problem in Bougainville was caused by insensitive management 
on CRA's part. 
I will not go into a lengthy defense of CRA's position (which 
would in any case start with CRA offering the administration, on behalf 
of a future Papua New Guinea government, a 20 per cent interest in the 
company on more favourable terms than CRA would earn its own 
interest - a voluntary offer which has never been matched anywhere 
before or since). I shall simply say that many people who were in a 
position to observe events in Bougainville over the period 1 964 to 1989 
have a different understanding of the problem. Of course there were 
things that the company could have done better, but who ever gets a 
one hundred per cent score? A better question is what were the relative 
performances of all those with a part and a stake in matters concerning 
the mining operation? 
Besides, criticism of the company has come mainly from people 
who have never built or developed anything; and some of them have 
demonstrated, in fact, that their principal talent is destruction. 
CRA has made its position clear. Its intention is to continue with 
its interest in BCL and see profitable operations restored. If, however, 
divestment of the CRA interest becomes necessary for a political 
solution in Bougainville to be achieved , then it will be prepared to 
divest, provided that it is satisfactorily compensated for the loss of its 
investment, and that the public shareholders are not disadvantaged. 
The most important issue about ownership and control will be 
competence. Obviously there are other mining companies which would 
be competent to run Bougainville Copper. But if the ownership is 
rearranged in such a way that a competent operator cannot exercise 
effective control, then efficient operation is unlikely to be possible, and 
the mine, instead of being a producer of wealth, is likely to become a 
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consumer o f  wealth, as has happened in so many other developing 
countries. 
Cost of re-establishing production 
Considerable damage has been done to company facilities by militants. 
The full extent of the damage is not yet known, but we have heard of 
widespread destruction of accommodation, office and service 
buildings. B CL has estimated that the cost of re-establishing production 
is likely to be in the range K.250-350 million if operations recommence 
in 1992, provided that there is no major damage to production facilities 
(as distinct from accommodation and offices). This money will be 
required for recruitment and training of the workforce, restoration of 
facilities, recommissio�ing or replacement of mine assets, and 
re-establishment of working capital. 
If and when safe access to the facilities can be regained, the first 
thing will be to carry out a more reliable estimate of the cost of 
restoration. Whatever the final estimate, the money will not be easy to 
raise. The perception of investors will be that the political risks in 
Bougainville will, at least for some time, be much greater than they are 
elsewhere iri Papua New Guinea. This is a direct legacy of the activities 
of the militants, and it remains to be seen whether the money can be 
raised at all. 
Method of operation 
Panguna is a low grade orebody. We estimate that there remains to be 
mined and processed some 700 million tonnes averaging 0.40 per 
cent copper, 0.47 grams/tonne gold, together with some even lower­
grade material. By comparison, when the operation was originally 
established, it was done on the basis of a defined ore reserve of more 
than 900 million tonnes averaging 0.4 8 per cent copper, 
0.54 grams/tonne gold, and production in the first seven years 
averaged 0.66 per cent copper, 0 .89 grams/tonne gold - i .e.  two 
thirds higher than the grades that now remain to be mined. 
Clearly, with the low grade of the remaining ore, and the huge 
cost of reestablishing production, there will need to be changes in the 
method of operation . Previously BCL employed up to 4000 people. It 
will no longer be able to do so. We estimate that the operation could be 
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run by perhaps 2500 people. Substantial towns were built at Arawa and 
Panguna to house the workforce. The company will not be able to 
provide the degree of support for both Arawa and Panguna that it did 
before - a more modest establishment will be required. Later mining 
operations are to some extent using a fly-in/fly-out system to minimize 
the amount of infrastructure that needs to be built at the mine site. BCL 
will have to consider such an approach in order to minimize the cost of 
reestablishing the operation. Interestingly, such a system could also 
minimize the impact of expatriates and non-Bougainvillean nationals, 
which became a bone of contention with Bougainvilleans, so it may 
serve two purposes. 
The old BCL was a benevolent employer, as most of our 
ex-employees have since discovered. It may have to be less benevolent 
in the future, no matter who is the operator. A potential danger to the 
viability of a future operation will be the expectations of local people 
about special deals on business opportunities and employment. It has 
become a well-established principle in recent mining development 
contracts that preference will be given in these areas to local and 
provincial inhabitants. This is accepted; but an important qualification is 
competitiveness. To the extent that the principle of preference is 
interpreted as some sort of free ride or subsidy for local people, the 
efficiency and therefore viability of any operation will be adversely 
affected. 
Taxation regime 
The taxation regime which applies to a re-established operation will 
clearly be a major detenninant of whether it will be economic to resume 
production. This will be a matter for negotiation with the authorities. It 
needs to be understood, however, that there has already been 
substantial destruction of wealth. The flow of money cannot simply 
resume where it left off. It will probably take of the order of four years 
or more after the start of restoration work, before any surplus will be 
generated that could be taxed. 
The contribution of B CL to the Papua New Guinea economy 
went on long after the closure of the mine. Between May 1 989, when 
the mine closed , and March 1 990, by which time nearly all of our 
employees had been retrenched, BCL paid K105 million in taxes on 
1 98 8  income, and another K85 million in wages, termination 
payments, national superannuation, and for locally-purchased contracts 
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and supplies. It i s  little wonder, then, that the full effects of the closure 
of the mine on the Papua New Guinea economy were not felt until 
towards the middle of last year. The company met all of its 
commitments to government, employees and suppliers, but was almost 
bankrupted in the process. This is in contrast to some other employers, 
who simply abandoned their employees on Bougainville. 
On any resumption of operations, benefits will start to flow again 
to the economy through employment and purchasing, but it will be 
some years before anything will be available for taxes. 
Division of the income 
This brings us to probably the most contentious issue - how will the 
income from a resumed operation be divided? It was an issue during 
most of the first seventeen years of operation, and was a central issue 
in the emergence of the crisis in 1988.  
As has been well publicized, the relative shares of the surplus 
generated by the mining operation from 1972 to 1989 were:-
National government 
Provincial government 
Landholders 
Non-government shareholders 
Total 
Per cent 
6 1 .5 
4.3 
1 .4 
3-ll 
100.0 
There is no objective measure of what would constitute a 'better' 
sharing of the income. Certainly by most standards around the world 
the total share going to the two governments must be considered 
extremely generous. Whether the sharing between the two governments 
was equitable is a matter for Papua New Guineans. It is  worth 
remembering, however, that when the Bougainville Copper 
arrangements were put in place, Panguna was the only large-scale 
resource project in the country. With other projects now operating and 
being brought on stream, it may be easier for the national government 
to contemplate a larger share remaining with the provincial government. 
Clearly the landholders will want more, since this was one of the 
issues over which the crisis erupted. It was, however, not the only 
issue. Another was internal disagreements about how the compensation 
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already being paid should be distributed among themselves. It will be 
critical to any future operation that the landholders settle their own 
internal differences. In the past when the company had a reasonably 
united group to negotiate with, it generally responded to landholder 
demands . But when landholders were disunited and competing among 
themselves, the company found it very difficult to understand what it 
should be doing, and this certainly characterized the situation in 1988. 
Finally , there are the non-government shareholders . It  is 
deceptively simple for people to think in terms of the company being 
the great provider and paying everyone else what they want. Whether 
the mine ever reopens will depend, among other things,  on the 
perception of the shareholders about what return they are likely to 
receive on their investment. It would be counterproductive if the 
various competing demands made it uneconomic to resume operations 
at all. 
Everyone involved , or likely to be involved, should clearly 
understand this point. On the one hand, landholders, the people of 
Bougainville, and the governments will need to be satisfied about what 
they would get out of a resumption of operations before production 
could resume. On the other hand , resumption of operations also 
requires a positive investment decision. Whoever the potential investors 
are, before they put up the money, they need to be confident, not only 
about the return they would get, but also that any arrangements made 
will endure. 
C onclusion 
Whether mining operations resume on Bougainville will be for a 
number of parties to decide - not least Bougainvilleans. If the people of 
the island, or more particularly of the immediate mine area, do not want 
mining to resume, then it is difficult to envisage how it could. Without 
mining operations, however, the task of restoring infrastructure, 
services and economic activity in the North Solomons will be very 
much more difficult, and the province will have to be content with a 
lower level of income and government revenue than before. It will be 
of paramount importance, therefore, that Bougainvilleans sort out 
among themselves what sort of future they want. It also needs to be 
realized that much wealth has been destroyed, and that a resumed 
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mining operation will not be able to provide for all stakeholders on the 
same scale as it did before. That having been said, however, we still 
believe that it will be better from everyone's point of view for the 
operations to be restored. For this to happen, everyone involved will 
need to be pulling in the same direction. 
CHAPTER S 
THE NON-REVIEW OF THE 
BOUGAINVILLE C OPPER AGREEMENT 
Terence Wesley-Smith 
The renegotiated Bougainville Copper Agreement requires the parties to 
meet every seven years to consider whether the agreement is 'operating 
fairly to each of them ',  and to discuss any apparent problems. I The 
first review commenced more-or-less on schedule in 1 98 1 ,  but soon 
fell into disarray. The 1 988 review never even got under way. As 
James Griffin ( 1990a:62) notes, the failure of the review process 'has 
never been satisfactorily explained' ,  although elsewhere he offers some 
interpretive comments of his own (Griffin 1990b: 1 1 - 12). This paper 
will provide a more thorough discussion of the circumstances 
surrounding the reviews. 2 
· 
The non-review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement has 
assumed a certain significance in the debate about the origins of the 
current Bougainville crisis. For example, Griffin has described the 
reviews as lost opportunities 'to forestall grave discontent' (Griffin 
1990a:62). Representatives of the two parties to the agreement, the 
national government and Bougainville Copper Limited, as well as of 
the North Solomons Provincial Government, seem to agree that things 
might have been different if the reviews had been completed -- and have 
been quick to blame each other for frustrating the process (Griffin 
1 990a; Hannett 1989; Momis 1 989). 
The evidence suggests, however, that the 198 1  review could not 
have forestalled the 'grave discontent ' that moved some N asioi 
landowners to violence in late 1988,  simply because their specific 
1 
2 
The Bougainville Copper Agreement was signed on 6 June 1 967 and revised 
on 21 November 1974. Both agreements were approved and implemented by 
acts of parliament, viz the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act 
1967, and the Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act 1974. 
This paper is based in part on research conducted in the North Solomons 
Province in 1 984. 
The Non-Review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement 93 
concerns were not high on anybody's agenda. Indeed, agreement on 
the central issue in the talks, further mining on Bougainville, could 
only have increased the disquiet about environmental degradation, 
social disruption, and economic exploitation that appears to have 
triggered the current crisis (see Connell 1990) . By 1988,  landowner 
dissatisfaction with existing conditions had intensified . It is not at all 
clear how this might have been reconciled with renewed attempts to 
expand mining in the province. This analysis of the non-review of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement will identify the major issues 
associated with mining in Bougainville in the 1980s, as well as some 
political and economic tensions that have contributed to the present 
crisis. 
Into the 1980s with Bougainvil le Copper Limited 
The principals of Bougainville Copper Limited, and i ts parent 
company, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, strongly resisted the 1974 
renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement.3 Nevertheless, 
by the end of the 1970s the company was well established as an 
efficient, low-cost copper and gold producer, financially sound, and 
consistently producing adequate returns for its shareholders. 
In September 1980, the company's general manager produced a 
list of sixteen items for discussion in the scheduled 1 98 1 review of the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement (P. Quodling to Secretary, Department 
of Minerals and Energy 23 September 1980). Most were peripheral in 
nature, involving the provision of mine-related infrastructure and 
services, and marginal changes to the system or taxation. However, 
three issues were of central concern to the company at the beginning of 
the new decade. By far the most important was further exploration in 
the province. 
In April 197 1 ,  the colonial administration gazetted a Notice of 
Commencement banning further mineral exploration in Bougainville 
' for the purpose of protecting native customary rights in relation to 
3 They had good reason to do so, since the new tax arrangements meant a 
diversion to the national government of some K65 million in 1 974 alone, 
and a projected loss of several hundred million kina in potential profits over 
the life of the mine (Gamaut 198 1 : 1 93-97; Mikesell 1974: 1 27-32). 
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land' .4 In addition, Clause 4 of the renegotiated Bougainville Copper 
Agreement prevents the company from developing the Mainoki and 
Karato areas ' until such time as the Government in its absolute 
discretion' decides that work can proceed there. These areas contained 
the most promising known mineralizations within range of the existing 
mine infrastructure, and state officials wanted to have the option of 
setting new tenns for the development of a second mine. 
These restrictions did not seriously threaten Bougainville 
Copper's financial performance for some years after production 
commenced in 1972. The highest grade ore inside the special mining 
lease was deliberately extracted first, and ore grades tended to decline 
as mining moved outwards from the centre of the pit, and deeper into 
the ground. The effects of declining ore grades (and ore that was 
getting harder and taking longer to crush) were successfully offset by 
progressively increasing the volume of ore processed. But by the early 
1980s the technical and economic limits of applying this strategy to a 
wasting asset were apparent.5 The need to locate and ·exploit new 
reserves of ore became even more urgent when the ratio of gold to 
copper in the recovered ore fell unexpectedly in 1980.6 It is therefore 
not surprising that in 198 1  the company wished to discuss the terms 
under which the exploration of Mainoki-Karato might proceed. 
The company was also concerned about the effects of rising 
operating costs on profitability. In particular, officials were actively 
seeking ways to reduce energy costs, which accounted for some 25 per 
cent of the total (Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 1981).  
4 
5 
6 
Of course, by that time sufficient land had been made available to the 
company (with scant regard to 'native customary rights') to allow the mine to 
go into production almost exactly a year later (Bedford and Mamak 1977). 
Ore crushing capacity effectively set the technical upper limits on 
throughput rates. The mine opened in 1972 with nine ball mills in the fine 
crushing plant, and closed in 1989 shortly after the fifteenth ball mill was 
commissioned. Additional ball mills required significant capital 
expenditures, which had to be amortized over shorter and shorter periods as 
the orebody approached exhaustion. 
Because of its price performance relative to that of copper, gold became an 
increasingly important source of revenue during the 1970s . B y  1980 it was 
contributing more than 40 per cent of concentrate sales (Bougainville 
Copper Annual Reports). 
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The obvious way to do thi s  was by substituting cheap hydroelectricity 
for the power produced by the company's oilfired generators at 
Loloho. Indeed, a suitable site for such a facility had been identified on 
the Laluai River in southeast Bougainville as early as 1 966.  
Nevertheless, the company did not raise the issue of hydropower 
directly in its sixteen-point agenda for the 1981 review, instead making 
a rather vague reference to the need for energy conservation. This 
reflected the fact that several state agencies had taken an active interest 
in the Laluai project, and the company was quite willing to let them take 
the lead - and bear the associated risks (Papua New Guinea 1 984 ). 7 
The third issue of particular concern to the company was the role 
of the North Solomons Provincial Government, which was 
aggressively exploring ways to increase its share of revenue from the 
existing mine, and to participate in further mining. Indeed, provincial 
and company officials had been discussing issues of mutual concern, 
including further exploration, for some time. In March 1 98 1  the 
company proposed , among other things, that the two form an 
'exploration partnership' to investigate the Mainoki-Karato anomalies 
(P. Quodling to L. Hannen 4 March 198 1 ).8 
These. negotiations reflected a pragmatic need to keep on good 
terms with the provincial government. In particular, management 
believed that provincial government support was a necessary condition 
for the early resumption of exploration in the province, and for the 
development of Laluai. It was in this context, then, that Bougainville 
Copper Limited sought to involve the provincial government in the 
1 9 8 1 review, and requested clarification of  the company's 
responsibilities at the national and provincial level (P. Quodling to 
Secretary, Department of Minerals and Energy 1 August 1 980, 23 
September 1980). 
7 
8 
It is interesting to note that the B ougainville Copper Agreement clearly puts 
the onus on the company to develop such a facility. 
This was intended to be a vehicle to 'establish an exploration precedent', and 
provide a means for the provincial government to obtain the equity holding 
in Bougainville Copper Limited that it sought. 
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The national government 's  response 
The essential features of Papua New Guinea's minerals development 
policy were well established by the end of the 1970s. Large-scale 
mining projects were to be welcomed primarily for their potential 
contribution to government revenues, and this contribution was to be 
maximized through the application of a sophisticated, profit-based tax 
regime. 
The state reserved the right to intervene in order to maximize the 
linkages between a mining enclave and the local economy, or to 
minimize negative social and environmental impacts. However, there 
were few such interventions in Bougainville after 197 4 and, as an 
official of the Department of Minerals and Energy put it in 1983,  
'Mining has . . .  mainly taken place with the goal of maximizing profits' 
(Papua New Guinea 1983 :2). 
Senior officials in the state bureaucracy shared Bougainville 
Copper Limited's concern about the threat to profitability (and to tax 
revenue) posed by the combination of declining ore grades and rising 
operating costs at the Panguna mine. They were also sympathetic to the 
company's proposed solutions to the problems. In 1 979, the 
Department of Minerals and Energy prepared an information paper for 
cabinet 'to highlight the need for the liftiQg of the moratorium on 
mineral exploration on B ougainville and Buka Islands ' .  It 
recommended that Bougainville Copper Limited be pennitted to resume 
exploration activities within its prospecting authorities, and that the 
mineral potential of the rest of the province be investigated by the 
Papua New Guinea Geological Survey. In addition, the paper proposed 
a full and immediate investigation of the feasibility of the Laluai hydro 
project (Papua New Guinea 1979). 
This basic community of interests with the mining company, as 
well as the increasing demands of the Ok Tedi mining project, may help 
to explain why the national government apparently did not give the 
1981  review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement a high priority. It 
was not until September 198 1 ,  a full year after the company's agenda 
was revealed, that the national government produced a list of its 
additional concerns (N. Agonia to P. Quodling 8 September 198 1) .  
Predictably, no radical departures from existing arrangements were 
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foreshadowed. Most of the items involved fine-tuning the tax regime, 
and improving government's ability to monitor company activities. 9 
Potentially more significant, although not unexpected, was the 
formal introduction of the Laluai hydro project to the agenda. 
Government also expressed concern about the environmental 
implications of proposed new tailings leaching technologies, 10 and 
required the company to fund 'a  prefeasibility study into the possibility 
of a copper smelter in Papua New Guinea' .  Officials apparently felt 
obliged to raise the smelter issue at this juncture because the company 
was seeking approval to negotiate new long-term sales contracts. 
However, it was not an issue that seems to have generated any 
enthusiasm. 1 1  
The evidence suggests that, left to their own devices, state and 
mining company officials. would have quickly settled their differences 
regarding taxation and the provision of services , and drawn up new 
agreements to develop further minerals and energy resources on 
Bougainville. But their freedom to do so was encumbered by the 
presence of other interested parties, particularly the North Solomons 
Provincial Government. 
9 In the light of Father Momis's 1987 accusations of transfer pricing, it is 
interesting to note that Department of Finance officials had detected an 
increase in the amount Bougainville Copper was paying to affiliated 
companies for administrative and management services . However, the 
amount involved K3.223 million in 1980 compared to a previous high of 
Kl .9 million, was still relatively small (Papua New Guinea 198 1 : 1 1 ). 
1 O Government decided not to raise existing environmental problems.  lndee� 
one official responded to the suggestion of a tailings pipeline that would 
bypass the heavily polluted Jaba river system with the question 'as the area 
is already a mess, what is gained?' (Papua New Guinea 198 1) .  
1 1  Previous studies had raised serious questions about the economic feasibility 
and environmental impact of a smelter (Mikesell 1975 : 1 28-1 30; Pratt 
1981 ) .  Most important, Bougainville Copper Limited had made it quite clear 
that it considered the existing system of long-term contracts with overseas 
smelters the most profitable option, an argument that the government would 
have found extremely difficult to resist 
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The role of the North Solomons Provincial Government 
The politics that culminated in the secessionist crisis of 1 975-76 were 
largely about the distribution of state resources. 1 2 The first 
opportunity to continue the struggle with the national government was 
the scheduled 1978 review of the Bougainville Agreement, the accord 
which had ended the crisis. However, the review did not get underway 
until late 1979, and was effectively abandoned after the collapse of the 
Somare government in March 1 980, and the electoral defeat of the first 
provincial premier, Alexis Sarei ,  shortly thereafter. The next 
opportunity came later in 1980 when, despite the urgings of the mining 
company, the national government decided not to allow the provincial 
government to participate on its own behalf in the upcoming review of 
the Bougainville Copper Agreement. It proposed instead to establish a 
'joint position' with provincial government on mining issues prior to 
the review proper. 
The new provincial premier, Leo Bannett, was particularly keen 
to rejoin the battle with the national government. He had fought 
unsuccessfully for additional financial concessions in the 1974 
renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper Agreement, and again in the 
negotiations with national government that resulted in the Bougainville 
Agreement of 1976. More importantly, Bannett was involved in some 
significant changes in the structure of the provincial economy. 
When the mining company first arrived in Bougainville in the 
1 960s, the 'modern' economy was small and tightly controlled by 
expatriates. Most Bougainvilleans participated only as contract 
labourers for foreign businesses, or as smallholders producing cash 
crops in conjunction with subsistence agriculture. These activities were 
based in, and posed little threat to, the 'traditional ' village economy. 
1 2  The renegotiated Bougainville Copper Agreement reinforced centripetal 
tendencies by directing almost all of the newly-won tax revenues to the 
national government. Although the national government subsequently 
agreed to the permanent transfer of mining royalties, and guaranteed an 
unconditional annual grant, the agreement itself gave the province only the 
Bougainville Non-Renewable Resource Fund, worth some K90,000 per 
annum, and control of the mining company's business advisory service 
(Ballard 198 1 : 1 14). 
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They could be accomplished without fundamental changes to existing 
social and economic relations. Mining, on the other hand, precipitated 
more radical fonns of change in Bougainville. In particular, it gave a 
significant number of Bougainvilleans the opportunity to participate 
fully in the new economy and, for the first time, raised the possibility 
of a thoroughgoing transfonnation of Melanesian economy and society 
(Wesley-Smith and Ogan 1 992). Hannett was among those who 
quickly took advantage of the new possibilities. 
Of the numerous local business ventures spawned by the mine, 
by far the most important was the Bougainville Development 
Corporation, a quasi-state enterprise established by Hannett and others 
in 1 975 . 13 The company concentrated initially on penetrating the 
industries servicing the mining project, and by the early 1 980s was a 
multimillion kina operation involved in a wide variety of peripheral 
activities. 14 Furthennore, it was detennined to move out of the shadow 
of foreign mining capital and into self-sustaining economic activities. In 
1 98 1 ,  the Bougainville Development Corporation, with Premier 
Hannett as chainnan, was poised to take 'a major qualitative leap' into 
plantation agriculture , hydropower generation, and mining 
(Macwilliams 1985:3) . 15 
These economic circumstances were reflected in the provincial 
government's position on the 1 98 1  review of the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement. There was the familiar attempt to capture a greater share of 
mining revenues for the province. Most significant in this respect were 
1 3 Bougainville Copper Limited actively encouraged the development of local 
businesses through its Business Advisory Service and the Panguna 
Development Foundation. 
1 4 The company's interests included laundry; engineering; printing; catering 
and canteen services; liquor; hardware and timber retailing; vehicle repairs; 
polyurethane manufacturing; property rentals ;  and airline operations . Its 
most significant service venture was a limestone mining operation at 
Manetai that was largely financed by an overseas loan of $US6 .5 million 
(Bougainville Development Corporation Annual Reports). 
1 5  The company acquired the Sabah Plantation in a joint venture with Angco Pty 
Ltd in 1983, and built the Cocoa Inspection Depot at Buin in the same year. 
In 1984, it entered into a joint venture arrangement with S. and W. Berisford, 
a British company, to purchase two significant properties, Numa Numa and 
Bonis plantations. 
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demands for direct control of a proportion of tax revenues, an increase 
in the mineral royalties rate from 1 .25 per cent to 5 per cent, and 
increased contributions to the Bougainville Non-Renewable Resources 
Fund . 1 6  In addition, however, the Hannett government sought 
increased involvement in activities that had largely been the preserve of 
outsiders. It demanded 'major' equity participation in Bougainville 
Copper Limited , the Laluai hydro project, and any new mining 
ventures in the province. 
Provincial officials decided to use their de facto control over the 
exploration moratorium as the lever to extract these concessions . From 
the beginning, the provincial government made clear that its support for 
further mining was contingent on all of these demands being met (L. 
Hannett to N. Agonia, telex, 7 January 198 1). 
Negotiat ions 
The major disagreements in  the 198 1 review talks were clearly between 
the provincial and national governments. There were few substantial 
differences between the positions of the national government and 
Bougainville Copper Limited and, while the mining company appeared 
eager to accommodate provincial demands, national government 
officials were inclined to dismiss these demands out of hand. An 
official in the Department of Minerals and Energy later described 
provincial claims as ' radical by most standards ' ,  and provincial 
officials variously as stupid, irrational, and poor at negotiating (Papua 
New Guinea 1983 : 1 3). Premier Hannen was equally scathing about the 
'un-enlightened bureaucrats ' in the Department of Minerals and Energy 
(L. Hannett to J. Chan 15 September 198 1 ). 
Hannett described the 'dismal negative response' of the national 
government as reminiscent of the colonial era, ' where we were 
1 6  The provincial government was advised by an overseas expert (who had 
participated in the 1974 renegotiation) that royalties had been left at a rate 
that was low by world standards largely because the proceeds were expected to 
go to the provincial government. The royalty proposal would have increased 
the provincial budget by up to 80 per cent. The Non-Renewable Resources 
Fund had been established with an annual levy on produced copper. 
Provincial officials wanted the fund expanded to include the other minerals 
produced at the mine. 
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hovering through fog and filthy air o f  . . .  [a] master-slave relationship '  
(L. Hannett to J .  Chan 15 September 1981) .  Certainly, the operators of 
the postcolonial state have shown little more enthusiasm than their 
colonial predecessors for the sort of aggressive business activity being 
pursued by Hannett and the Bougainville Development Corporation . 17  
This largely reflects a perceived need to protect the privileged position 
of large foreign enteiprises, whose tax contributions help sustain the 
state bureaucracy . 18 The 'un-enlightened bureaucrats ' opposed the 
Hannett initiative, not only because it would deprive them of existing 
resources, but because it might create a less favourable climate for 
foreign investment in Papua New Guinea. 
Nevertheless, national government officials recognized the 
credibility of the moratorium lever being applied by the provincial 
government, and in August 198 1 announced a 'powerful ' package of 
incentives designed to win support for further mining. Subject to the 
immediate resumption of exploration, the national government agreed 
to the requested restructuring of the Non-Renewable Resources Fund, 
and to hand over some 580,000 of its Bougainville Copper shares . l9 
It also agreed to allow the provincial government to negotiate with 
Bougainville Copper Limited for up to 5 per cent equity in any new 
mining venture, and to take up to 20 per cent equity in the Laluai hydro 
project 'on a commercial basis ' .  Provincial demands for increased 
mineral royalties and a share of taxes were rejected outright. Instead, 
the national government proposed a special four-year 'development 
agreement ' that would provide additional funding for specific 
development projects and services in the province (N. Agonia to L. 
Hannett 28 August 1981 ). 
1 7  
1 8  
A more recent example of this protective attitude came in 1990 when the 
bureaucrats opposed a strong bid by a local company, Monticello Enterprises 
Proprietary, to build and operate the oil pipeline for the Kutubu project in the 
Southern Highlands (Times of PNG 19  July 1990). 
It may also reflect a longstanding fear of the social and political disruption 
that would accompany the rapid spread of capitalist relations of production in 
Papua New Guinea. 
1 9 This bundle of shares had been earmarked for the province in an earlier round 
of negotiations. 
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Rather than winning support for further minerals exploration, 
this offer provoked a thinly-veiled threat to disrupt the existing mining 
operation at Panguna. Premier Hannett told Prime Minister Chan that: 
If the un-enlightened bureaucrats . . .  want a showdown 
and flexing of muscles to demonstrate who is the boss 
around here - that can be organized, but reason and 
respect for the office of Provincial Government forbids 
us to adopt that approach. But if we had to take that 
approach there won't be any turning back . . . .  If we do 
take that line of action we would have to go the whole 
hog and force [the] Papua New Guinea economy to crawl 
on its belly (L. Hannett to J. Chan 15  September 198 1) .  
Some two weeks later a ' flexing of muscles ' was apparent as seven 
community governments and a Bougainville pressure group, the 
Mungkas Association, blocked access to the mine and forced 
operations to cease for four days. 
Within three weeks of the mine blockade the national 
government's 'final position' of August 198 1  had been supplemented 
by a Four Part Extra Funds Offer, with an increase in the value of the 
proposed development agreement as the most significant component 
(W. Korowi to L. Hannett 23 November 1 98 1 ). However, the new 
package still fell far short of meeting provincial demands. In early 
1 982, provincial officials indicated that they were prepared to concede 
their tax and royalty demands if the development agreement was 
expanded to yield an equivalent amount of revenue (M. Ogio to W. 
Korowi 16 February 1982) . 20 
In May 1 982, the National Executive Council dismissed these 
terms and called a halt to discussions until ' acceptable preconditions ' 
for fresh talks could be established. No further progress was made 
before the general elections of June 1 982, which put the Chan 
government out of office. This effectively terminated the discussions 
associated with the 1 9 8 1  review of the Bougainville Copper 
Agreement. Indeed, Bougainville Copper Limited had withdrawn from 
the talks shortly after the October 198 1 blockade of the mine in the vain 
20 The new offer represented only about 10 per cent of the target amount. 
The Non-Review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement 1 03 
hope that the national and provincial governments could settle their 
differences (Papua New Guinea 1 983 : 1 1 ). 
Circumventing the bureaucrats 
Hannett's accusation that the National Executive Council acted merely 
as a 'political rubber stamp' during most of the 198 1 review debacle 
may have some merit (L. Hannett to J. Chan 15 September 198 1 ). A 
Department of Minerals and Energy official noted in 1983 that while 
' some policy guidance ' in these matters tends to come from political 
leaders , ' the enunciation of policy options rests largely with the 
Departments ' (Papua New Guinea 1 983 :20) . It was only when 
negotiations with the provincial government reached a critical impasse 
towards the end of 1 98 1  t�at national political leaders appeared to take 
an active interest in the review process. However, they were not much 
more sympathetic to Hannett's cause than the bureaucrats had been. 
Hannett's attempts to appeal directly to national political leaders 
met with little success, despite the fact that the regional member for 
Bougainville, Father John Momis, was a senior member of cabinet. 
Mom is claims that he did intervene on Hannett's behalf, expressing 
'grave concern' to Prime Minister Chan in September 1 9 8 1  about 
deteriorating relations between the two governments (J. Momis to L. 
Hannett 25 September 198 1 ) . However, the available evidence 
suggests that the intervention was not particularly vigorous. In his 
follow-up letter to Chan, Momis merely urged cabinet to make a 
' serious effort to work out the role that Provinces play in  major 
resource development proj ects ' (J . Mom is to J. Chan 
25 September 1 98 1) .  
Momis had no reason to go much beyond token support for 
Hannett in 198 1 .  The two were bitter political opponents , and at the 
time Momis 's Melanesian Alliance party was busy mobilizing popular 
opposition to Hannett and his particular style of development. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Momis ' s  intervention, however 
vigorous, would have made much difference. The leadership of the 
coalition government was deeply divided, with Momis constantly at 
odds with Chan and, more particularly, with Deputy Prime Minister 
lambakey Okuk. Indeed, it was Okuk who appeared to wield the most 
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power in cabinet - and he was an outspoken critic of provincial 
government (King 1982). 
Hannett's initiative failed largely because he did not have the 
means to press his case. The strategy of withholding support for 
further exploration had only limited utility, because the provincial 
government was itself heavily dependent upon the continuation of 
mining revenues. Furthennore, because of his close association with 
the Bougainville Development Corporation, Hannett had a more 
immediate interest in the future of mining than most other provincial 
leaders. National government officials and politicians were prepared to 
make certain concessions in order to avoid conflict and to hasten a 
resolution. But they never had any reason to make the sort of 
concessions demanded by the provincial government. 
Landowners and politics 
All paities to the 198 1 review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement 
recognized that significant modifications to the mining plan were 
impossible without the concurrence of affected landowners. It seems to 
have been assumed by both the national government and the mining 
company that the provincial government could somehow deliver that 
support. Indeed, the provincial government's whole bargaining 
position was based on its purported ability to trade access to further 
resources for financial and other concessions . However, provincial 
officials themselves were careful to point out that they could not 
'guarantee the peoples ' consent' for further mining at Mainoki-Karato, 
or anywhere else in the province (L. Hannett telex to N. Agonia 7 
January 1 9 8 1 ) .  The evidence suggests that this caution was 
appropriate. 
At a meeting with provincial government officials early in 1 98 1 ,  
landowners i n  the Panguna, Mainoki and Karato areas indicated that 
their support for further exploration and mining would be forthcoming 
only if a long list of demands was met. These included a 30 per cent 
share of any mining revenues, the provision of roads,  electricity, 
schools, and health seivices, and the complete exclusion of ' redskins ' 
from the area (North Solomons Provincial Government 1 98 1 ) . 
Although the mining company expressed willingness ' in principle ' to 
accept 'some developmental and social service responsibilities ' ,  there is 
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no evidence that these ideas received further attention before 
negotiations collapsed towards the end of 198 1 (P. Quodling to L. 
Hannen 25 November 1 980). 
The situation at Laluai was equally uncertain. Landowners had 
regularly disrupted attempts to evaluate the scheme in the 1970s. By the 
early 1980s, intensive liaison efforts had begun to yield results, but 
some local landowners obviously remained skeptical . 21 Indeed, one 
educated resident of the Kongara stated bluntly in 1 984 that 'we don't 
want development through hydroelectric in our area. We have been 
saying this all along and are saying it again now' (Eyal 1984). 
Furthermore, local opposition to large-scale development 
projects was becoming increasingly politicized in the early 1980s. 
Father Momis 's  Melanesian Alliance party espoused a populist 
development ideology that advocated small-scale, village-based 
projects , and emphasized 'Melanesian ways ' .  According to Griffin 
with Kawona ( 1989 : 232-233), Hannett's election as premier in 1980 
spurred the party 'to more intensive organization ' in the province, 
resulting in opposition to 'virtually any ' initiative proposed by Hannett 
or by the Bougainville Development Corporation. Certainly, projects 
such as the Laluai hydro scheme and the Manetai limestone works were 
regularly attacked by Melanesian Alliance leaders, who usually cast 
their  criticisms in terms of landowners ' rights . 22 These efforts 
apparently yielded results, and voters strongly supported Melanesian 
Alliance candidates in the 1982 elections for national parliament, before 
ousting Hannen from office in the provincial elections of 1984 (Griffin 
with Kawona 1989: 232-234). 
The provincial government was allowed to participate in the 1 98 1  
review talks only because its support was believed necessary for 
further resource exploitation in Bougainville. However, affected 
landowners, whose support was equally critical, played no direct part 
2 1  According to the now notorious Francis Ona in early 1984, 'Government has 
no right to carry out the Laluai Hydro and Manetai Limestone projects 
without proper consultation with the traditional village landowners' (Ona 
and Siama 1984). 
2 2  For example, future premier Joseph Kabui argued in 1983 that rural people 
must 'reap direct benefits' from largescale projects, rather than the 'crumbs ' 
being offered to them by the provincial government (Kabui 1984 ). 
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in the review. This raises questions about the utility of any agreement 
that the national government, the provincial government, and the 
mining company might have reached in the context of the 1981  review. 
Towards the 1988 review 
The abandoned talks between the national and provincial governments 
on mining-related issues resumed in late 1983 under quite different 
circumstances. National officials signalled a new hardline attitude 
towards provincial demands, and all offers put forward during the 
review talks were withdrawn.23 Issues were to be treated separately 
and on their own merits , instead of as part of a package. The 
development agreement approach was abandoned, and requests for 
additional funding were to be processed through normal national 
planning and budgeting channels (B . Jones memo to L. Hannett 
1 3  December 1 983).  
The provincial government had little option but to accept these 
negotiating conditions. With the Ok Tedi mine about to go into 
production, and other promising gold prospects being discovered 
elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, the relative importance of the 
Bougainville mine to the national government had started to decline. 
Furthennore, copper prices had been falling steadily since the middle of 
1 980, considerably reducing the attraction of a second copper mine on 
Bougainville. On the other hand, a study commissioned by the 
provincial government and published in 1982 had highlighted the 
negative consequences of mine closure for the provincial economy 
(North Solomons Provincial Government 1 982). By late 1 983 ,  the 
provincial government was as keen as the national government and the 
mining company to investigate which, if any, of Bougainville's mineral 
resources could be developed next. 
These new circumstances allowed rapid progress to be made on 
several issues left over from the 198 1  review. In 1 984 the first of a 
series of feasibility studies was conducted at Laluai ,24 and 
23 This was despite strengthening ties between Hannett and Pangu Pati, the 
dominant partner in the new coalition government. 
24 The studies were commissioned by a Development Trust, formed by several 
national and provincial government agencies, Bougainville Development 
Corporation, and Bougainville Copper Limited. 
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arrangements made for an airborne survey of the province's mineral 
resources. 25 However, the momentum was effectively lost with the 
return to power in mid 1 984 of a Melanesian Alliance-dominated 
provincial government under the leadership first of Alexis Sarei and, 
after 1 987, of Joseph Kabui. 
The gap between business and politics quickly widened after the 
change of government in Bougainville. Melanesian Alliance leaders 
came to power suspicious of large-scale development projects, and their 
antipathy towards Hannett and the Bougainville Development 
Corporation increased after a dubious share issue early in 1 985 
effectively removed the corporation from provincial government 
control .  26 Relations with Bougainville Copper Limited also 
deteriorated. In 1 986,  the company renewed its efforts to get the 
exploration moratorium . lifted, claiming that the Panguna orebody 
would be exhausted 'before the year 2000 ' .27 When these appeals 
failed to make an impression on the provincial government, company 
officials had little option but to bide their time until the 1988 review of 
the Bougainville Copper Agreement (Bougainville Copper Limited 
Annual Reports 1986, 1988) . 
Mining issues presented Melanesian Alliance leaders with a 
dilemma. On the one hand, large-scale mining was the quintessential 
affront to their ideology of development. The industry was foreign 
owned and controlled, operated entirely according to alien principles 
and values, and was extremely destructive of the natural and social 
environment. In particular, it had disrupted the lives of a significant 
number of landowners, for whom the Melanesian Alliance had 
assumed a special political responsibility.28 On the other hand, 
Melanesian Alliance leaders were acutely aware what a curtailment of 
25 This survey was funded by the West German government and carried out in 
1 9 8 6 .  
2 6 The share issue reduced the provincial government's holding from 5 1  per cent 
to 37 per cent (Griffin with Kawona 1989:233-34). 
2 7 The company significantly increased its estimate of the amount of 
recoverable ore remaining at Panguna in 1988.  At that time, officials 
calculated that the mine would continue operating for another 15 to 25 years 
(Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 1988). 
2 8 Furthermore, landowner dissatisfaction was becoming increasingly apparent 
from the mid 1980s (see, for example, Connell 1990). 
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mining would mean for provincial government revenues, and its ability 
to provide services for a rapidly expanding population. 
The first attempt to resolve the dilemma came in the run-up to the 
1 9 87 national elections when Father Momis announced his 
' Bougainville Initiative ' .  The initiative was couched in hostile rhetoric, 
suggesting a deep-seated aversion to mining in general and 
Bougainville Copper Limited in particular.29 Nevertheless, the 
substance of the initiative was remarkably mild. Rather than seeking to 
expel the company, or gain control of its operations, Momis demanded 
that 3 per cent of its gross income be redirected to the provincial 
government. In money terms, this was significantly less than Leo 
Hannen had sought in 1 98 1 .  
A second initiative later in 1987 indicated that the Melanesian 
Alliance government, like the Hannen government before it, recognized 
the necessity of further mining in the province.30 However, both 
Bougainville Copper Limited and the Bougainville Development 
Corporation were to be excluded from the action. The Bougainville 
Resources Joint Venture Agreement of 1 3  August 1 987 established a 
joint venture between the provincial government and Benedict Chan, a 
Rabaul-born, Sydney-based businessman, to develop ' the assets of 
North Solomons Province consistent with the interests of the people of 
North Solomons Province and the interests of the Joint Venture parties' 
(Times of PNG 1 3  March 1 990) .3 1 
On the face of it, the Bougainville Resources Joint Venture 
promised considerably more to the provincial government from further 
mining than anything that Hannett had proposed32 However, it was 
2 9 Momis's statement, headed 'The wild pig cannot now hide from the people', 
accused the company of all manner of ills, including disrupting village life, 
transfer pricing, and fostering dependency (Griffin with Kawona 1989:235). 
3 0 The existence of this initiative was kept secret until early 1990, when it was 
made public by the parliamentary opposition. 
3 1 In August 1989 cabinet apparently approved Momis's proposal that the joint 
venture be granted sole rights to any new prospecting authorities on 
Bougainville (Callick 1990:22-23 ; Dorney 1990:323). 
3 2  The provincial government was to take up a 49.9 per cent interest in the 
joint venture at no cost. Hannett had demanded 20 per cent equity in 
Bougainville Copper Limited, and had been offered less than 0.002 per cent, 
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unclear how this company, whose partners had limited capital and no 
mining experience, could 'develop the assets of the North Solomons 
Province' without involving the multinational mining companies so 
despised by Melanesian Alliance supporters. Moreover, it was unclear 
how the social and environmental problems that had proved so 
traumatic for the landowners in the vicinity of the Panguna mine were 
to be avoided at mining ventures elsewhere in Bougainville. Finally, 
there was no indication of exactly how the 'seed capital ' generated by 
the Bougainville Initiative or the Joint Venture would be used to 
generate the desired self-sustaining community development (Griffin 
with Kawona 1989:235) . 
Melanesian Alliance plans to use mining to engineer a new, more 
appropriate, fonn of development in Bougainville were never put to the 
test. But the fact that the Panguna landowners took matters into their 
own hands late in 1988, and have remained largely in control of events 
ever since, indicates that the Melanesian Alliance had not found a 
workable solution to the dilemma. 
The events of late 1988 also put paid to any possibility of a new 
approach to mining through the scheduled review of the Bougainville 
Copper Agreement. As with the 1 98 1  review, it was the mining 
company that took the initiative, indicating its readiness to start the 
process in late 1987 (Bougainville Copper Limited Annual Report 
1988). Again the national government was slow to respond, not putting 
together a negotiating team until a year later, and then only after the 
violence erupted at Panguna (Dorney 1990: 1 30) . Furthermore, the 
collaboration between the provincial government and the mining 
company that had been a feature of the earlier review was 
conspicuously absent in 1 988 .  The circumstances surrounding the 
1988 review of the Bougainville Copper Agreement were even less 
auspicious than in 198 1 ,  and there is no reason to believe that it would 
have produced more positive results. 
as well as the opportunity to purchase up to 5 .0 per cent equity in any new 
mining venture. 
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Conclusion 
The breakdown of the Bougainville Copper Agreement review process 
was more a matter of conflicting interests than of missed opportunities. 
If the interests in conflict had been those of the official parties to the 
agreement, the national government and the mining company, then they 
might well have been resolved within the review framework. However, 
the most significant conflicts were between domestic groups with 
particular interests to promote and protect. The review process was 
simply not designed to handle such disputes, and proved incapable of 
doing so. 
Mining agreements, such as the Bougainville Copper Agreement, 
are based on the assumption that the state can deliver access to the 
resources sought by mining companies. The fact that the state has had 
difficulty providing such access in Bougainville is a product of several 
factors. In the first place, state structures in Papua New . Guinea are 
fragmented along provincial lines. This is particularly significant in 
Bougainville, where central control is constantly challenged by 
provincial leaders intent on developing their own autonomous sub-state 
system. In order to operate effectively on behalf of a mining company, 
national government has to enlist the support of provincial government. 
That support may come at a price - or it may be withheld altogether. 
Secondly, state action in Papua New Guinea can be inhibited by 
tensions between the politicians who ostensibly control the levers of 
state power, and the bureaucrats who make many of the day-to-day 
decisions . Tensions of this sort within the national government 
concerning mining issues in Bougainville were insignificant for most of 
the 1980s. However, while the Department of Minerals and Energy 
effectively orchestrated events at the national level, its officials were in 
constant conflict with provincial politicians. This acute tension 
undoubtedly served to frustrate state efforts to secure additional 
resources for Bougainville Copper Limited during the 1980s. 
Thirdly, state action on mining issues in Bougainville has been 
influenced by the development ideologies of dominant political groups. 
Ideological differences were not so important at the national level, 
where the various coalition governments tended to approach mining 
issues in more-or-less the s ame way. But they were significant in 
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Bougainville itself, where organized political factions emerged in the 
1 980s to compete for control of local state structures. On one side of 
the struggle was a faction led by Leo Hannen, that was intent on using 
mining as a catalyst for a radical transformation of the provincial 
economy. On the other, were supporters of the Melanesian Alliance 
party, who were more concerned with protecting traditional institutions 
against the ravages of foreign mining capital. In general , these 
ideologies predisposed the Hannett faction to use state power to 
facilitate the operations of Bougainville Copper Limited, whereas 
Melanesian Alliance supporters were more inclined to curtail its 
activities. 
Finally, the state in Papua New Guinea is generally weak, and 
often incapable of decisive action. Many Papua New Guineans , 
particularly in the rural areas, have little contact with state agencies of 
any kind, and are only loosely connected to national and provincial 
systems of electoral politics . Even in Bougainville, where state 
structures are relatively well developed, the controllers of state power 
simply do not have the wherewithal to prevail against local groups 
determined to oppose state action. 
Much of the political manoeuvering associated with the review of 
the Bougainville Copper Agreement occurred precisely because of 
apparent landowner opposition to further resource exploitation. 
Affected landowners were only marginally involved in the discussions , 
although their interests were often invoked, and it was never clear what 
terms of access they would accept. Subsequent events have 
demonstrated dramatically that neither compensation nor coercion can 
guarantee access to Bougainville's natural resources. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE ES CALATION OF 
DISINTEGRATION AND THE 
REINVENTION OF AUTHORITY 
C olin Filer 
A question of perspective 
Let me say at the outset that my contribution to this volume is not based 
on any special knowledge of what has been happening on Bougainville 
since the bitter Christmas of 1988 ,  nor have I played any active part in 
the advocacy or design of a solution to the riddle of the Bougainville 
rebellion, nor shall I now pretend to have discovered one. In these 
respects, my point of view is somewhat different from others which are 
presented here. 
I have presumably been asked to make this contribution because 
of the interest aroused by my previous attempt to connect the origins of 
the rebellion to a process of local social disintegration which is not 
uniquely Bougainvillean, but should rather be regarded as the typical 
response of small-scale Melanesian communities to large-scale mining 
enterprise. That paper (Filer 1990) was deliberately provocative, and I 
now feel a certain obligation to defend or modify the details of its 
argument in response to the criticism which it was expected to arouse. I 
should also like to claim that the development of my original argument 
has taken account of developments in the real world to which it relates, 
but in this respect I must confess a certain feeling of unease. 
The perspective adopted in my previous paper was that of a 
social scientist whose business it is to reflect on the social impact of the 
mining industry in Papua New Guinea. For this reason perhaps, my 
argument has been most influential with those who share the same 
focus, whether they be managers or critics of the industry. In this 
paper, I might have chosen to elaborate my argument by reference to 
what has been happening in the vicinity of other large-scale mining 
projects, outside Bougainville, since the closure of the operation at 
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Panguna, because I can at least pretend to have some first-hand 
knowledge of this subject. But this line of inquiry would have taken me 
a long way from the matters being addressed by the other contributors 
to this volume, and would prevent me from considering whether and 
how m y  earlier analysis of the social origins of the Bougainville 
rebellion can contribute to an understanding of its subsequent 
development as a political phenomenon in its own right. 
The perspective adopted in my previous paper was also that of a 
consultant who sometimes feels as if he were one of the King's horses 
or King's men whose task is to restore the Humpty Dumpty state of 
Papua New Guinea to the wall from which it is forever falling. One of 
my critics has even seen fit to describe me as a 'radical nation-builder' ,  
though this i s  surely an exaggeration of  my  modest and pragmatic role. 
One of the issues which I should like to pursue in this paper is the 
relationship which has emerged between the social disintegration of 
local communities and the political disintegration of the nation or the 
state to which they are supposedly attached. But this also presents me 
with some difficulties when I consider that the rest of this volume is 
devoted to a dialogue between Australians and Bougainvilleans. 
Although I may enter this dialogue as a resident of Port Moresby, and 
from that viewpoint voice my belief that other speakers are 
misrepresenting 'Papua New Guinea' ,  there is no way that I myself can 
claim to represent that nation or that state. 
Indeed, my own perspective would lead me to doubt whether 
anyone can plausibly claim to represent 'Papua New Guinea' ,  or even 
'Bougainville ' ,  except in some purely official capacity. Like other 
anthropologists, I am inclined to see these bodies as the creatures of an 
Australian Frankenstein, half-heartedly assembled from hundreds or 
thousands of ill-assorted communities, and I have great difficulty 
believing any story which is primarily concerned with thoughts and 
deeds of these artificial monsters. This is not to imply that Papua New 
Guineans are unable to tell such stories or unwilling to believe them, 
but the sum total of their 'national discourse' appears to me like a 
curtain which is full of holes, through which one can perceive the bits 
and pieces of a more substantial communal reality, and a very different 
kind of story. This is the kind of story which I should like to tell about 
the Bougainville rebellion. 
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But this leaves me with a fresh difficulty. In my previous paper, 
I was able to tell a story about the community of Panguna landowners 
in the period leading up to the outbreak of the rebellion in November 
1988,  and I think I can reasonably claim to have done so in accordance 
with the normal rules of historical evidence, even if the evidence 
available to me was patchy and, at time, equivocal. But for the period 
which has followed the outbreak of the rebellion, I simply do not have 
the evidence which would enable me to tell this kind of story, either in 
respect of ' the landowners ' or in respect of any other Bougainvillean 
community, even if I still believe that this is where the truth of the 
conflict must lie. It is as if the smoke of battle and the clouds of 
partisan opinion had filled the space between the curtain of national 
sentiment and the substance of community politics. 
For now, I have no better access to the actualities of village life 
on Bougainville over the last couple of years than do the many Papua 
New Guineans, including many 'exiled ' Bougainvilleans, whose own 
perception of events has largely been detennincd by their understanding 
of the fate of friends and relatives caught up in the rebellion. This 
personal perspective obviously has its limitations. It is partial and it has 
been painful. But, through my own participation in this network of 
personal relationships, I have persistently been struck by the curious 
alternation of anguish and apathy, involvement and detachment, which 
seems to invade each rumour of conflict and misfortune, and while this 
impression has certainly added to the difficulties which I have 
experienced in writing this paper, it has also added to the strength of 
my conviction that 'politics ' in Papua New Guinea is a play without a 
plot, or with a sub-plot which bears no relation to the slogans which 
the actors wear like masks to hide their real identities and interests. 
With this awkward mixture of perspectives and difficulties, I am 
almost at a loss to define the general theme of this essay. Unlike my 
earlier paper, which was too simplistic and mechanical in its approach, 
though deliberately so, this one will be more defensive, discursive, and 
inconclusive. My title reflects the fact that this is primarily an exercise 
in 'political anthropology' ,  but one which takes its cue from some of 
my observations on the social impact of the mining industry. If it is true 
that this impact includes a local process of social disintegration, at the 
level of the landowning community, and if it is true that this process 
provided the spark which ignited the Bougainville rebellion, it would 
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seem that the subsequent course of the rebellion has involved an 
escalation of this process to the level of the province · and the nation, 
where it now appears as a process of political disintegration. However, 
the general truth of this observation is also a negative truth, since the 
concept of 'disintegration' ,  social or political, is too readily subsumed 
under the so-called 'breakdown of law and order' which is supposedly 
pervading life in Papua New Guinea. No social or political process can 
be adequately understood if it is only understood to be the loss of 
something, just as no social or political activity can be properly 
explained by the absence of something. Although I believe that there is 
a process of social and political disintegration running through the 
history of the Bougainville rebellion, this process cannot be understood 
without an appreciation of its roots in the positive aspects of 
Melanesian political culture and an investigation of the novelties or 
rediscoveries which spring from the articulation of indigenous and 
Western institutions. For this purpose, I have invoked the concept of 
' authority ' as the most appropriate counterpoint to the concept of 
'disintegration, ' because it has the breadth of meaning necessary to 
encompass the political transactions of a 'stateless ' social order. 
Companies, communities and bits of state 
The argument put forward in my previous paper (Filer 1 990) can 
roughly be summarized in the following six points. 
(1) The Bougainville rebellion was not simply 'caused ' by 
the longstanding grievances of Bougainvilleans against 
a variety of external oppressors. There is no denying the 
existence of such grievances, nor the contribution they 
have made to the intensity and duration of the conflict, 
but they are not sufficient to explain the manner and the 
timing of its outbreak. 
(2) The proximate cause of the rebellion was a process of 
local social disintegration which has always threatened 
the political integrity of Melanesian communities (even 
in the pre-colonial period) but which had been 
magnified to explosive proportions by the accumulated 
economic impact of a large-scale mining project over a 
period of more than two decades. 
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(3) There are several discrete but mutually reinforcing 
factors which intensify this process in the context of a 
large-scale mining project: the distortion of customary 
land rights ; arguments over the distribution of cash 
benefits; the economic stratification of the landowning 
community; and the difficulty of sustaining or adapting 
rules for the inheritance of property and for an orderly 
succession to the leadership of the community. 
(4) The original aim of the 'militant landowners ' was to 
close down the mining operation in order to put a stop 
to this accelerated process of social disintegration. The 
demand for secession was largely a consequence of 
their rebellion, or, to be more precise, of the national 
government's response to it. 
(5) The social origins of the rebellion are not 'uniquely 
Bougainvillean' ,  but should at most be regarded as an 
extreme case of a recurrent problem in the relationship 
between mining companies, landowning communities, 
and the remarkably fragmented and disorganised ' state ' 
of Papua New Guinea. 
(6) Given the political and economic constitution of the 
mining industry in Papua New Guinea, there is no 
simple or obvious political or economic solution to this 
problem. 
Reactions to this argument have been decidedly mixed, and sometimes 
quite confusing. 
For reasons which are not too difficult to fathom, my argument 
has been rejected or ignored by those who believe that Bougainville 
deserves to have its independence. But the most outlandish criticism 
has come from the pen of my former colleague, Professor Griffin 
(1990a), whose most recent writings (e.g. 1990b,c) display a singular 
lack of sympathy for the rebel cause. Griffin somehow manages to 
combine a long-held belief in the spirit of Bougainvillean nationalism 
with an outright repudiation of the BRA, and an admiration for the 
management of BCL which contrasts markedly with his assessment of 
the managerial capacity of Papua New Guinea's own politicians. Since 
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my argument featured none of these moral or political attitudes, Griffin 
suggests, within the space of a few pages,  that · I  must be an 
old-fashioned , doctrinaire Marxist and a radical nation-builder 
( 1990a: 13- 15) !  'The uncanny thing ' according to Griffin, 'is that most 
commentators probably agree with Filer' (ibid. : 1 3) .  This may be 
something of an exaggeration, but what clearly does irritate Griffin is 
that BCL itself has been the most enthusiastic of such commentators, 
which may help to explain the odd mixture of labels with which he has 
encumbered my perspective. 
Needless to say, BCL has no proven record of support for 
Marxist nation-builders. Mining companies have responded favourably 
to my argument because it squares with their experience of the 
intractability of local landowners , and BCL has responded with 
particular enthusiasm because I have located the roots of the 
Bougainville rebellion in a process over which the company had little or 
no control, and for which it therefore seems to have a rather limited 
responsibility. It is only in this last respect that Griffin and r find 
ourselves sailing in the same direction, but sailing against a strong 
head-wind of Papua New Guinea public opinion which would indeed 
like to lay some or all of the blame for what has happened at the closed 
doors of the mining company. Although my argument has also found 
favour with the most strident international critics of the mining industry 
(for example, Moody 199 1 ) ,  presumably because I have still painted a 
negative and pessimistic portrait of the local social impact of the mining 
industry, my failure to acknowledge the possibility of a 'better deal ' for 
local landowners has caused a measure of disquiet amongst those 
commentators (for example , O 'Faircheallaigh 1990) who would 
otherwise agree with my explanation of the conflict. 
I shall try to deal with some of these responses in more detail in 
what follows. But before I do so I should like to reaffirm my basic 
assumption that the only substantial collective actors on the stage called 
'Papua New Guinea ' are private companies, local communities, and a 
strange variety of creatures which I shall call 'bits of state ' .  All other 
collective entities , like 'Bougainvilleans ' ,  ' the working class ' ,  ' the 
grassroots ' or 'the national government' ,  are to be regarded as figments 
of various people's imaginations. I do not think that this is an 
especially contentious proposition, nor is it one which says that Papua 
New Guinea is a special place. 
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In their separate contributions to the conference which gave rise 
to this volume, Graeme Kemelfield complained that ' the power of the 
state ' had been brought to bear on the people of Bougainville , while 
Michael Ogio sincerely hoped the government of Papua New Guinea 
would ' learn its lesson ' from the course of the rebellion. I do not 
believe that ' the national government' is a creature which has the 
capacity to ' learn lessons ' ,  and if anything has been brought to bear on 
the people of Bougainville, it is not the 'power' but the weakness of 
'the state ' .  While dealing in platitudes , I should prefer to adopt Moses 
Havini's picture of 'the ship of state without a captain' ,  although I also 
have my doubts about the passengers and crew. Passing from platitude 
to hyperbole, I could even satisfy Griffin's anti-Marxist prejudice by 
saying that the state of Papua New Guinea has already ' withered 
away ' ,  leaving us with the world's first communist society ! 
There is no shortage of commentators, inside and outside the 
country, who would agree with Ron May's suggestion that the 
Bougainville rebellion was 'to some extent a ripple effect from the more 
general breakdown of law and order and challenge to the authority of 
the state which has characterised the recent political history of so many 
other parts of Papua New Guinea' ( 1990:57) . To some extent this may 
be true, but I query the direction of the causal relationship, since I 
believe that the process of political disintegration needs to be 
considered as an interaction of collective entities whose own internal 
problem of authority outweighs the grievances which they may bear 
against ' the state ' as such. The State is subject to a global process of 
decomposition which explains too little and too much of any actual 
political event. The paradox of politics in Papua New Guinea, it seems 
to me, is that the superstructure of the ship of state survives intact 
because it is immune to any major interference from the people in the 
little boats which sail around it. 
This metaphor will serve to underline my conviction that there is 
little practical difference between those 'bits of state ' which appear to 
be organs of government, like the Papua New Guinea Defence Force or 
the Department of Minerals and Energy, and the huge variety of other 
vessels which do not fly this flag - from the one regularly chartered by 
the World B ank to the one which has been commandeered by the BRA. 
Papua New Guinea is a very choppy stretch of water, in which all of 
these parties experience similar navigational problems, regardless of 
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their  status in the world at large or in the vagaries of academic 
discourse. The basic problem is a very simple one: to manufacture and 
maintain a set of values, aims and strategies which can command the 
loyalty of people who would rather be their own commanders. This 
same basic problem afflicts the leadership or management of mining 
companies in Papua New Guinea as much as it afflicts the leadership of 
landowning communities. The difference is in the choice of methods 
for resolving it. 
The problem of authority within the enterprise or the community 
is clearly magnified by the excessive fragmentation of the power which 
should, ideally, reside in government. And where there are so many 
claimants to 'political ' authority, no one of them can stop communities 
and companies from constantly colliding with each other. 
In another contribution to the conference which gave rise to this 
volume, Ethan Weisman suggested that the mining companies had 
learnt their lesson from the Bougainville rebellion, even if the 
government was still playing truant, and he cited the excellent 
community relations of the Kutubu petroleum project as proof of his 
point. Oddly enough, on the day preceding the conference ( 16  May 
199 1), the Times of Papua New Guinea published the following little 
story, entitled 'Chevron official denies trouble between landowners and 
company' :  
Trouble is brewing between the landowners of  Kutubu 
and oil company Chevron Niugini near the oil field in the 
Southern Highlands province . . . .  It is believed that the 
landowners are dissatisfied because certain parties have 
not been honouring the agreements they signed. In the 
latest incident a dissatisfied landowner blocked a two 
kilometre portion of the road from Sorogai village and 
took off with a motorcycle belonging to one of the 
employees of Chevron. The matter was reported and 
police arrested a man for alleged blocking the road and 
stealing the motorcycle. Last Saturday the man's relatives 
confronted field officers of Chevron and demanded that 
the man be released. A Chevron official in Mendi 
confirmed that the incident had happened but said there 
were no problems between the company and the 
landowners. The official said that Chevron had carried 
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out its part of the agreement and that it was only the 
national government that was holding out. In fact, he said 
the landowners were quarrelling among themselves and 
not with the company or government. 
A stonn in a teacup, no doubt. But here we have a perfect illustration of 
the pattern of relationships which endlessly repeats itself throughout the 
mining industry in Papua New Guinea, and which, as it develops 
through the life of any given project, becomes a vicious cycle of 
increasingly explosive confrontations. 
Those hapless individuals whose job it is to keep the lid on these 
explosions are not as confident of their capabilities as Weisman seems 
to be. Community liaison officers with the mining industry have even 
criticized my model of community disintegration because it postulates a 
fairly long-tenn process, lasting twenty years or more,  while recent 
observations indicate that it is happening more rapidly in the vicinity of 
other mining projects than it did around Panguna. There is no space 
here for me to assess the validity of this particular argument, but it 
hardly encourages an optimistic view of anyone's capacity to learn and 
then apply the lessons of the Bougainville rebellion. 
My picture of the general condition of disorder which 
encompasses the internal and external relationships of companies , 
communities and 'bits of state ' has three significant implications for my 
understanding of the progress and possible outcomes of the rebellion, 
aside from my previous analysis of its social origins: 
(1) the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the 
BRA are both 'bits of state ' which have their own internal 
problems of leadership, like all parties to the conflict, and 
neither of which has the capacity to represent or pursue 
the interests of any larger community outside itself, since 
no such community of interest exists beyond the realm of 
political imagination. 
(2) anyone who believes in the feasibility of a 'new 
deal '  which would not only serve to hannonise the 
separate interests , and solve the various internal 
problems, of all the main parties to the conflict, but 
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would also pennit the early resumption of large-scale 
mining operations at Panguna, is also suffering from a 
serious delusion 
(3) with or without the mine, an independent state 
of Bougainville would have no greater solidarity than the 
state of Papua New Guinea from which it had departed. 
Without the mine, however, Bougainvilleans would not 
need independence to escape the 'power' of central 
government, since none of its component agencies would 
take much interest in their affairs - if only the rebellion 
would fizzle out. 
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Since these conclusions may still seem to follow from my 
understanding of the origins of the rebellion, I shall now tum my 
attention to the arguments advanced against that explanation, since 
these might lead to very different conclusions. 
The economic roots of the rebel lion 
There is no doubt that my earlier account of the social origins of the 
rebellion placed a great deal of emphasis on the inability of the 
landowning community to absorb and digest the economic benefits of 
the mining operation at Panguna. I argued that the maldistribution of 
these benefits had inevitably led to a process of economic stratification 
which then formed the basis of a leadership struggle between 
successive generations of landowners , and that the victory of the 
younger generation was also a victory for the belief that there was no 
real economic solution to the problem of coexistence between 
themselves and the mining company. 
This line of argument has been attacked from two quite different 
directions. On the one hand, Griffin complains that I place far too much 
weight on the economic origins of the rebellion, to the neglect of 
political and spiritual factors , and claims that I am guilty of 
misrepresenting the early stages of the conflict as a form of class 
struggle. On the other hand, 0 'Faircheallaigh seems to agree that 
economic problems played a major part in fomenting the conflict, but 
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believes that these problems could and should have been addressed by 
raising the level of compensation paid to the landowning community. 
In Griffin's mind, my suggestion that the leaders of the new 
PLA (Panguna Landowners Association) had 'moved beyond the 
confines of Bougainvillean nationalism ' by their repudiation of an 
identifiable Bougainvillean elite, and by their profession of solidarity 
with landowners fighting mining companies in other parts of Papua 
New Guinea, is nothing but a 'Marxist fancy ' ( 1 990: 1 3). This 
particular 'fancy ' was based on nothing other than the documented 
statements of the militants themselves. Griffin may believe that 
right-thinking academics should ignore all signs of class consciousness 
amongst the wider populace in case they suffer the hideous fate of 
being labelled as old-fashioned Marxists, but it is surely possible to 
analyse the meaning of these signs without assuming that they mean 
exactly what they say. 
When, during meetings held in November 1988,  the new PLA 
leadership denounced the 'black men in top offices ' (Filer 1 990:82), I 
believe they were primarily thinking of Bougainvilleans employed 
directly by BCL, but there is little doubt that the denunciation was 
readily extended to what I described as ' that class of Bougainvilleans 
who have apparently grown fat from eating at the table of the mining 
Company' (ibid. :9 1 ) . Griffin is ' puzzled ' that I have ' imputed such 
salient resentment against North Solomonese employed by the mine to 
the BRA, when Francis Ona was himself one and when a constant 
complaint has been that BCL does not employ enough North 
Solomonese' ( 1990: 1 3). I am equally puzzled that Griffin cannot tell 
the difference between men who sat in top offices and men who drove 
trucks, nor see the similarity between men who sat in the top offices of 
BCL and those who sat in top offices nearby - especially those 
belonging to the Bougainville Development Corporation. 
I suppose it could be argued that Francis Ona occupied a ' top 
office' during the time that he worked as a B CL surveyor, although I 
rather doubt that he shared this  perception at the time. When he 
resigned this job and signed on as a truck driver, he probably did 
perceive that this meant a definite step down in the BCL job hierarchy, 
but I would hesitate to gratify Griffin's prejudice by describing such 
voluntary demotion as a demonstration of solidarity with the proletariat, 
Bougainvillean or otherwise. There is very little evidence to suggest 
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that Ona or any other of the PLA leaders were protesting against the 
failure of B CL to employ more Bougainvilleans in .any particular 
capacity. Nor is it necessary to be a champion of the proletariat before 
one can become an enemy of the bourgeoisie - Bougainvillean or 
otherwise. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the 
Bougainvillean bourgeoisie, with or without a BCL salary, have been 
increasingly unpopular with other Bougainvilleans for the past ten 
years , and Griffin knows full well that there are several such 
individuals who would have been shot on sight by the BRA if they had 
not had the good sense to remove themselves from the scene of the 
action. Of course it can be argued that their unpopularity is the result of 
a perception that they have betrayed their Bougainvillean identity to the 
hated state of Papua New Guinea - but it can also be argued (as I have 
done) that their 'original sins ' were just as much a function of their 
economic activities. 
I have never suggested for one moment that the PLA (or the 
BRA) were in the business of attacking all the Bougainvilleans 
employed by BCL. Nor has my 'fanciful Marxism ' ever led me to the 
erroneous conclusion that they were attacking anyone in the name of 
the working class - or any other 'class ' .  
Griffin i s  especially critical o f  m y  argument that the new PLA 
leadership came to think of themselves as 'the actual or potential leaders 
of a national movement of mining landowners ' (Filer 1990: 82, quoted 
by Griffin 1990: 1 3 ,  his emphasis) . But at the same time, and on the 
next page, he remarks that Francis Ona's radio broadcast against the 
' white mafiosi ' in November 1 9 89 was ' an appeal . . .  for  
pan-Melanesian, not for  national, solidarity ' .  Now i f  I had said that the 
PLA leadership thought of themselves as the actual or potential leaders 
of a Melanesian, rather than a national, movement of  mining 
landowners, I would presumably have satisfied Griffin that I was not, 
after all, a 'fanciful Marxist' ,  and yet I wholly fail to see how the 
substance of my argument would have altered. 
It is, of course, a matter of debate whether Papua New Guinea is 
more or less of a 'nation' than Melanesia. The more relevant point is 
that both of these entities comprise a large number of landowning 
communities, of which a few could reasonably be described as 'mining 
landowners ' .  There is no doubt that the leaders of the new PLA were 
actively monitoring and supporting the activities of other mining 
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landowners in Papua New Guinea during the course of 1 98 8 ,  and I 
was able to witness the nature of this interaction at first hand during a 
meeting between the new PLA and a visiting delegation of Lihir 
landowners in November of that year. For all I know, they were also in 
touch with their counterparts in the Solomon Islands, Fiji ,  and Irian 
Jaya, though I have not encountered any evidence of this.  The 
geographical extent of the 'movement' is surely less important than the 
fact that it did extend beyond Bougainville, even if only in the militant 
imagination, and I fail to see how the observation of this fact entails a 
belief that mining landowners constitute a social class in any particular 
Melanesian state or in the region as a whole. 
Within the state of Papua New Guinea (though not in Fij i or 
Indonesia) 'the landowner' is virtually synonymous with the citizen, in 
whose name nearly all political activities are conducted. The Panguna 
militants initially gained widespread sympathy throughout the country 
because they seemed to the champions of this national landowner in 
their battle with the fire-breathing foreign dragon. In a global context, 
the Melanesian landowner may be assimilated to the larger class of 
indigenous tribal peoples in the same way that BCL and CRA belong to 
the larger class of multinational corporations, but if Griffin thinks that I 
have used this rather trivial observation as an explanation of the social 
origins of the Bougainville rebellion, then I think he is mistaken. 
If Griffin were more familiar with the varieties of sociological 
thought, then he might have recognized that my explanation of the 
crisis owes rather more to Durkheim than it does to Marx. My intention 
was to show how the landowning communities in the vicinity of 
Panguna, especially those in the immediate vicinity of the mine, arrived 
at a condition of anomie, or social disorder, whose character serves to 
explain the peculiar psychology of protest which was evident in the 
period immediately preceding the outbreak of the rebellion. I certainly 
have suggested that economic factors played a crucial part in 
accelerating the relevant process of social disintegration, but this alone 
is hardly an exclusive property of Marxist argument. I also indicated 
that one of these economic factors was a process of internal 
stratification which created the appearance of class division within the 
landowning community, but immediately qualified this point by saying 
that the language of class, as used by the militant leaders themselves, 
conceals the fact that members of the same community ' are related to 
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each other by customary, and often intimate, bonds of kinship, and are 
distinguished from each other by the lines of age and seniority, as well 
as by their economic situation'  (1990:92). 
Unlike Griffin, O 'Faircheallaigh has recognized that this last 
point represents a critical difference between my own analysis of the 
rebellion and the orthodox Marxist argument advanced by Thompson 
( 1990) : 
The BRA was prepared to close the mine indefinitely not, 
as Thompson implies, because the mining workforce 
shares the characteristics of a 'classic nineteenth century 
Proletariat '  but precisely because it lacks the most 
important characteristics of such a class, separation from 
the means of production and a consequent necessity to 
sell its wage labour to survive. It was only because most 
of the BRA's supporters still had access to land for 
subsistence fanning that closure of the major source of 
wage labour could be envisaged (O 'Faircheallaigh 
1 990:33). 
It is  not the ' Marxism ' of my argument which troubles 
O 'Faircheallaigh, but my tendency to reduce questions of economic 
justice to problems of social disorder. 
His first point is that my argument tends to underestimate the real 
extent of physical environmental damage by suggesting that 'local 
people see and feel the transfonnation of their physical surroundings as 
the outward symbol of the damage done to their society ' by the 
economic process of compensation (Filer 1990:95).  From his 
assessment of case studies in other parts of the world, 0 'Faircheallaigh 
argues that ' damage to the physical environment is one of the major 
causes of adverse social impacts [because of] the resultant "shame" felt 
by people who were involved in the process (albeit reluctantly) and 
who consequently cannot pass the land on [to] future generations in the 
condition [in which] they inherited it' (personal communication 13  June 
1 990, his emphasis). This is a fair point, but not wholly inconsistent 
with my own analysis when one considers, as 0 'Faircheallaigh does, 
that ' indigenous peoples .. . tend to define their social ,  cultural and 
spiritual identities in terms of relationships with the physical 
environment' .  
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More crucially perhaps, 0 'Faircheallaigh takes issue with my 
hypothesis that 'the degree of strife within a "landowning community" 
. . .  is proportional to the size of the packages which have been delivered 
to the community by a mining company and the various agencies of 
government' (Filer 1990: 104). Following his own (1 988) comparison 
of two Australian Aboriginal communities, 0 'Faircheallaigh argues, on 
the contrary, that a low level of mining royalties has actually intensified 
social conflict and disintegration in one of these groups because :  
individuals appear to have felt that if the money was 
shared evenly the benefits would simply not be 
worthwhile, and their reaction was to try and monopolise 
benefits for their own kin groups . . . .  [But] where per 
capita payments are large relative to existing incomes and 
where indigenous people have control over their 
distribution, they can have socially cohesive rather than 
socially destructive effects (personal communication 1 3  
June 1 990, his emphasis). 
According to 0 'Faircheallaigh, the level of cash payments made to the 
Panguna landowners was indeed low by Australian and North 
American standards, especially considering the extent of the damage to 
their physical environment, and therefore does not warrant the 
pessimism implicit in my hypothesis. 
Since it was only a hypothesis ,  I must agree with 
0 'Faircheallaigh (1990:35) that the question remains open to further 
comparative study. I would certainly not wish to discourage the search 
for a more equitable and less disruptive solution to the problem of 
distributing the material benefits of mining in Papua New Guinea. On 
the other hand, I also wonder whether those solutions which seem to 
work for Aboriginal communities amidst the alien but stable political 
institutions of Australian and North American society will also be 
effective under the conditions of general political disintegration which I 
tried to describe in the previous section of this paper. 
In Papua New Guinea, ' indigenous people ' do have nominal 
control over the distribution of mining benefits, not only within their 
separate communities, but also at the level of the state, and yet the 
institutions through which this control is exercised, at all levels, are 
themselves the cause of endless conflict and the focus of persistent, but 
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inconsequential, efforts at refonn. As I tried to show in my earlier 
paper, the strictly ' economic' problem of distribution is only one of a 
number of problems whose mutual reinforcement constitutes the overall 
process of social disintegration. 
It might even be ·argued, as I did in the case of environmental 
degradation, that the endless and possibly fruitless search for a solution 
to this problem is a ' symbol' , rather than a cause, of the deeper or 
wider collective sense of social disorder. Or one might simply say that 
the 'political climate' ,  at all levels of society is an independent variable 
in the satisfaction of economic demands. The question is whether 
landowning communities possess the institutional capacity to exercise 
substantial control over the distribution of mining benefits in 
circumstances where the state itself is unable to guide, contain or 
reproduce the solutions to such economic problems. 
If we now stop to reconsider the relationship between the local 
economic roots and the national political fruits of the Bougainville 
rebellion, three additional conclusions seem to be warranted. 
(1) The progress of the rebellion has certainly 
displaced the economic conditions, and even many of the 
people, whose presence on Bougainville had previously 
justified a certain measure of class consciousness 
amongst the protagonists. This does not invalidate my 
analysis of that previous situation. 
(2) Class has continued to be relevant to the 
analysis of the rebellion in one particular respect. Despite 
the existence of a class of indigenous capitalists, whose 
ranks still contain a number of  prominent 
Bougainvilleans, this does not function as a ruling class, 
nor is there any ruling class in Papua New Guinea, 
unless it be the class of customary landowners to which 
these capitalists also belong. 
(3) In order for large-scale mining companies to 
satisfy the economic and social needs of landowning 
communities , both sides need to believe that they are 
playing the same game, with one code of rules and a 
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referee to interpret them. Without the illusions of 'class 
struggle'  and ' state control ' ,  the game becomes 
impossible. On Bougainville the game became impossible 
when the rebellion began. 
One does not have to be a Marxist, or even believe in ' economic ' 
explanations of political events, to appreciate these points. But one may 
still need to believe, as I do, that the main effect of the rebellion, apart 
from its destruction of illusions about class and state, has been the 
escalation of the process of community disintegration to the whole of 
Bougainville. Even Griffin might agree with this, if I were not to add 
one more illusion to the list of those which have been stripped away -
and that is the belief that there was once a 'Bougainvillean' community. 
Between community and nation 
Despite his lack of sympathy for the secessionists, Griffin's own 
account of the social origins of the rebellion is none too different from 
that which has progressively, and understandably, infused the 
propaganda of the BRA. Neither pays any more attention to the 
composition and dynamics of village society than it does to the uneven 
development (or underdevelopment) of local communities in different 
parts of Bougainville. Instead, we are offered the simple image of a 
single population migrating in unison from a typically Melanesian sense 
of ethnic identity to what Griffin describes as ' the terminal loyalty of an 
ethnonation' (1990a: l4) in response to periodic acts of interference or 
aggression by the state. 
It is hardly surprising that those who share this perspective have 
been unable to distinguish my suggestion that there is ' a  myth of 
Bougainvillean nationalism ' (Filer 1 990: 84) from the idea that 
Bougainvillean nationalism is a 'myth' (Griffin 1 990a: 1 4) .  The 
indignation presumably stems from a belief that myths do not exist. 
But, unlike those who now deny the existence of class consciousness 
in the minds of the Panguna landowners, I have never denied the 
existence of B ougainvillean nationalism in the minds of  
Bougainvilleans. I am only saying that the stories told about it, like 
Griffin's, simplify, distort or hide important aspects of the truth 
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because, like other myths, they serve as weapons in a conflict rather 
than as explanations for it. 
Griffin's subscription to this myth has not only distorted his own 
explanation of the rebellion, but colours his account of my account as 
well. For example, Griffin claims that I took the original PLA demand 
for K I O  billion 'too literally' ,  when I actually said (1 990:96) that the 
PLA used this astronomical demand as a substitute for their previous 
demand for closure of the mine, and, at the same time, as a way of 
indicating the nature of the economic problem which afflicted their 
community. According to Griffin, they 'were serving notice on BCL to 
quit and setting the ground for what would have to be dead-end 
negotiations with the Papua New Guinea Government' ( 1990a: 14),  
which is hardly a less ' literal ' ,  even if it is a slightly different, 
interpretation of their motives. 
More seriously, Griffin distorts my argument beyond recognition 
when he implies (1990a: 13) that I have dated the emergence of a 'non­
negotiable attitude to secession' to the period which followed the 
original presentation of that argument at a seminar in September 1990. I 
have consistently argued that secessionism became the order of the day 
during the period between January and March 1989, in response to 
specific acts of violence committed by the security forces and other 
' outsiders ' (see Filer 1990:83-4). So Griffin's statement that 'UDI was 
clearly on the agenda by April 1989' can hardly be regarded as a valid 
criticism of myself. 
But Griffin goes further than this, by suggesting that the demand 
fo r  secession was ' implicit from the beginning of the crisis, 
( 1990a: 13) .  It is not entirely clear when Griffin thinks the crisis 
'began' , but his way of interpreting the demand for K I O  billion (made 
in March 1988) can presumably be taken as an example of what he 
means by an ' implicit' demand for secession. Oddly enough, Griffin 
fails to reinforce this part of his argument by alluding to the explicit 
demand for secession in Francis Ona's radio broadcast of 25 
November 1988 (Havini 1 990:25, Connell 1990:33), at the very outset 
of the PLA 's pylon-bombing campaign. I must concede that I was not 
aware of the contents of this broadcast when I wrote my earlier paper, 
and if it really did include an explicit demand for secession, then my 
history of militant motivations would need to be modified - at least so 
far as Francis Ona is concerned. 
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On the other hand, this would not alter the v alidity or 
significance of Perpetua Serero's testament, in June 1989, that not only 
she 'feared secession' , but ' the whole crisis in the Province [had] 
developed into something totally different from the original demands of 
the landowners ' (quoted in Filer 1 990 :83). Although Griffin has 
chosen to ignore this statement, for reasons best known to himself, I 
am not the only outside observer who believes that the lady was right to 
distinguish two stages in the development of the rebellion (see Connell 
1990; Ogan 1 990) , and this view has even been repeated by those 
' insiders ' ,  like Bishop Singkai (Post-Courier 8 February 1990), who 
do not seem to share the lady's fear of secession. 
The moral of the tale which Griffin wants to substitute for this 
one is a perfect illustration of the circularity of myths which 
masquerade as history. For we finally learn that ' it is partly because of 
predispositions like Dr Filer's and those of less radical 
"nation-builders" that [Griffin's previous assessment of the strength of 
"ethnonati0nalist" sentiment] was not widely shared and that 
precautionary steps to prevent today's chaos were not taken' (Griffin 
1990a: 15). In other words, my own 'predispositions ' are a better 
explanation of the 'chaos ' than the explanation which I actually offered, 
but which he has caused to disappear beneath a multi-coloured 
nationalist cloak. 
Perhaps it is true that the national government could have done 
more than it did to prevent the explosions of 1988.  But I am sceptical 
of this, first because I do not believe that 'the national government' has 
any greater capacity to function as a collective actor than 'the people of 
Bougainville ' ,  and secondly because the disparate bands of politicians 
and public servants who seem to be the national government have 
generally tended to assume, like Griffin and the Bougainvillean 
secessionists, that the root of the problem must lie in the balance of 
wealth and power between the province (or the 'ethnonation') and the 
state of Papua New Guinea - not in the process of local social 
disintegration which was the central subject of my own historical 
account. 
Like ' the breakdown of law and order' , the spirit of nationalism 
explains everything and nothing. It may tell us that Papua New Guinea 
is undergoing the same process of political disintegration as the Soviet 
Union or Yugoslavia. It may tell us that Bougainville is unique for 
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reasons which barely distinguish Bougainville from Melanesia. It may 
tell us that the Bougainville rebellion was the result of an irreducible 
and timeless ethnic sentiment which periodically erupts, like a volcano, 
for no apparent reason beyond its prior existence. What it does not tell 
us is the way in which the histories of particular Bougainvillean 
communities have accommodated the idea of secession, the impact of 
the mine, and the course of the rebellion within their own distinct 
political traditions . 
On this score, I should acknowledge that my own explanation of 
the rebellion contained an omission or elision which subsequent events 
have only served to enlarge. My description of the process of social 
disintegration within the landowning community included the 
recognition that this was both a large and an artificial community, 
whose boundaries did not coincide with any cultural or political 
distinctions which would naturally have been made in the absence of 
the mine. Although this artificiality could be seen as a social problem in 
its own right, it was also clear to some observers, even before the 
outbreak of the rebellion, that local support for the militant cause was 
not simply a function of people's proximity to the mine or its physical 
effects, nor even the disjunction between people who did or did not 
qualify as ' landowners ' for the purpose of receiving royalties or 
compensation payments from the mining company (sec Tsinoung et al. 
1988). 
From these observations, it could perhaps be argued that the 
original impetus behind the rebellion did not come from the 
' landowners ' as such, but from those landowners who were also 
Nasioi , and those Nasioi who were not even landowners. Subsequent 
events have only served to underline the dominance which members of 
this language group appear to exercise within the rebel movement. And 
if we then ask why the leaders of the Nasioi should seem to have 
become the Bolsheviks of Bougainville, the answer may lie not in any 
generally applicable model of mining impacts, but in the longer, deeper 
streams which link the Nasioi political tradition to the history of their 
involvement with the outside world, including the fractious history of 
resistance to the mine. 
This is certainly the impression to be gained from Eugene Ogan's 
studies of Nasioi political culture, but these studies also make it quite 
clear that the Nasioi 'tradition of resistance ' is neither a function of their 
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capacity for collective action, nor evidence of the strategic vision of 
their leaders, but, if anything, derives from the singular absence of 
both these qualities. Indeed, Ogan would not even describe the 
Bougainville rebellion as a ' rebellion' ,  since words like these ' assume a 
degree of political organisation, leadership and administration which 
not only never characterised N asioi society in the past but has not 
developed up to the present time' ( 1990:35) . His own account of the 
origins of the 'rebellion' ,  if such it can be called, is therefore very 
similar to mine: ' It is the issue of compensation, especially as this 
produced disagreements among Nasioi themselves, not an attempt to 
overthrow the provincial or national government, which [was] the 
proximate cause of violence against the mine' (ibid. :36). 
It is worth noting here that Ogan does not attribute the origins of 
the rebellion to the social disintegration of the whole N asioi language 
group, but only to the problems and grievances of those Nasioi 
communities whose members held some title to the mining leases. 
Despite the generality of his other remarks about Nasioi political 
culture, one wonders whether the 20,000 members of this language 
group or 'tribe ' are really more unique, in any relevant respect, than the 
1 60,000 Bougainvilleans with whom they would rather identify 
themselves. If one does ascribe the origins of the rebellion to problems 
experienced within the leaseholding communities, one may then 
wonder whether the difference in the reaction of Nasioi and non-Nasioi 
communities was any greater than the difference in the reaction of 
neighbouring N asioi villages - like Guava and Dapera. After all, it was 
one group of individuals from Guava village, including Francis Ona 
and Perpetua Serero, who formed the nucleus of the new PLA. 
There is a general sense in which all Melanesian communities are 
likely to respond to similar problems in similar ways. It would be just 
as true to say that each community has its own unique history of 
particular problems and particular solutions . Between the local 
community which really does function as a community, and those 
larger entities called 'tribes ' or 'language groups ' or ' ethnonations ' ,  
there is  endless space for anthropologists and other people to travel 
round the circles of sameness and difference. But I doubt whether these 
journeys will yield further insight into the origins and consequences of 
the conflict which we are considering. The real problem is to grasp the 
nature of the process by which the social divisions and political 
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alliances, within and between these local communities, have been 
transformed throughout the generation and the escalation of the 
conflict. 
It is difficult to fonnulate this problem, let alone resolve it, for 
the simple reason that we have so little evidence. That is  why 
reflections on the conflict constantly resort to those communities of the 
imagination which are undivided in themselves and unrelated to each 
other by transactions which are recognizably derived from any other 
Melanesian institution. In order to redress the balance, I have little 
option but to speculate on the significance of what has happened since 
the start of the rebellion. It should be understood that these are very 
tentative additions to my argument. 
The transformations of political authority 
Despite the appearance of an 'interim republican government' , whose 
ambassadors assure the world of their capacity to exercise conventional 
political authority within an independent state, the evidence available to 
me suggests that conventional political institutions have become 
increasingly irrelevant during the course of the rebellion, and that 
Bougainville now represents an extreme case of the 'disorder' which 
afflicts these institutions throughout Papua New Guinea. On the one 
hand Ron May's 'pessimistic scenario' seems to have been realized in 
' the ascendence of a fractious coalition of militant young landowners, 
cultists and raskols presiding over . . .  a deeply divided society, and 
maintaining itself through intimidation and the threat of a further 
protracted insurgency if the national government attempts to reestablish 
its authority ' (May 1990:59). On the other hand, the forces opposed to 
the perceived threat of gangsterism have coalesced around the no less 
unconventional, and no more traditional, institution which is presently 
described as the 'council of chiefs ' .  
If  we try to  think of this ' state of disorder' as  a process of 
political disintegration, in the same manner that I previously sought to 
trace the origins of the rebellion through a process of social 
disintegration within the 'community' of Panguna landowners, we can 
distinguish several elements in this process which could again be seen 
as steps towards some final outcome or as moments in a vicious circle 
which describes the problem of authority in circumstances where 'the 
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state ' has very little of this substance. My current inclination is to 
highlight the following elements in the following order: 
1)  the ambivalence which many Bougainvilleans and other 
Papua New Guineans initially displayed towards the 
'uncompromising militancy ' of Francis Ona's public 
posture; 
2) the intensification of the leadership crisis within the 
spreading range of Bougainvillean communities caught 
in the cross-fire between the BRA and the Papua New 
Guinea ' security forces' ;  
3) the BRA's campaign of persecution against the relatives 
of ' exiled ' Bougainvilleans and other Papua New 
Guineans beyond their reach; 
4) the widespread destruction of schools and other 
buildings by the 'disenchanted youth' or ' criminal 
elements ' whose own subordination to the BRA 
leadership is open to question; 
5) the continuing disjunction between the 'millenarian' and 
'strategic' voices in the chorus of secessionist demands 
Although it is virtually impossible to establish the relative 
significance of these phenomena, or to claim that they exhaust the 
aspects of a process which is still unfinished, I suggest that they are 
partly a response to the ' evacuation' of the state, both real (from 
Bougainville) and metaphorical (by Papua New Guineans in general), 
but partly also a ' regression' to the politics of pre-colonial society and 
its ' tradition of invention' . 
The 'thoughts of Francis Ona' have been the subject of much 
debate since he first made his appearance as a latter-day war leader. The 
enormity of his demands, the refusal to compromise, and the virtual 
admission of his own insanity were amongst the ' facts'  which I tried to 
explain in my previous paper as responses to the disintegration of his 
own community. But what also needs to be explained is the admiration 
which this mentality seems to have aroused, the legitimation of his 
leadership, and his status as a ' folk hero' ,  beyond the confines of the 
community within which his attitudes were understandable - even 
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outside Bougainville. The problem here i s  not the sympathy which 
people have for David in his fight against Goliath, but their response to 
his destructive rage, which seems to have its own legitimacy as a style 
of leadership. In Papua New Guinea, the rampage has become the 
nonnal fonn of protest,. and the ' striking strongman' is a figure who 
commands, amongst his audience, a strange mixture of resignation and 
fascination, and against whom the voices of moderation and 
compromise cannot be raised until his rage has run its course. Although 
I previously described Ona's own exhibition of 'Ramboism ' as a 
feature of the 'mental wasteland' inhabited by the Panguna landowners 
( 1990:87) , I have now chosen to describe him as a ' latter-day war 
leader' because I now wish to propose that this peculiar fonn of 
authority is not simply a function of economic and cultural 
' development',  but also represents one customary method of dealing 
with the problem of political disintegration which has always afflicted 
Melanesian communities. 
But the trouble with ' strongmanship' ,  as a latter-day form of 
authority, is that there really is no method in its madness. Perhaps that 
is why the 'disciplined forces ' ,  whose lack of discipline is partly a 
function of their own subscription to this strange ideal, were unable to 
deal with Francis Ona's Bougainvillean audience except as a legitimate 
target of wholesale abuse, let alone muster the capacity to stage a 
military coup. One might then say that Bougainville became, for many 
months, the scene of two competing ' reigns of terror' , but insofar as 
these were organized around the principles of strongmanship, they 
were not really organized at all. 
B y  its very nature, this peculiar form of authority can only 
achieve a localised and temporary resolution of the problem of political 
disintegration. In the year of anned struggle which preceded the 
evacuation of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force in March 1 990, 
there is clearly some sense in which it would be true to say that the 
BRA, assisted by the actions of its enemy, contrived to enlarge the 
scope of its authority, and thus take control of a growing number of 
local communities, and finally, the entire province. But this statement 
fails to capture the problems which would have been created, within 
and between generations, within each of these communities , by tipping 
the local balance of power in the direction of an inherently unstable 
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form of authority. It does indeed appear that, with the passage of time, 
these problems have become increasingly acute. 
From my reading of the situation, I doubt whether there is any 
Bougainvillean community which has been united in support of the 
rebel movement or whole-heartedly opposed to it. Although there 
seems to be variation in the level of support, which roughly correlates 
with people's distance from the source of the rebellion, this should 
only be taken to reflect the size and influence of the ' rebel faction' 
which emerged in most of these communities. The leaders of these 
factions seem to have been drawn from the same generation as Francis 
Ona and Joe Kabui, the generation whose adolescence coincided with 
the movement for secession in the early 1970s, not the generation of 
Father Momis and Leo Hannett which participated in the leadership of 
that earlier movement. If, as I have previously suggested, Ona and his 
fellow militants had been engaged in a struggle to wrestle control of the 
'landowning community ' from members of that older generation, and if 
that struggle played an important part in fomenting the original 
conditions of the rebellion, then the subsequent spread of support for 
the rebellion beyond the mining lease areas can presumably be seen as a 
repetition or intensification of the same struggle in other parts of the 
province. 
However, as I also indicated in my earlier analysis of the 
rebellion, the problem of leadership in Melanesian communities is not 
simply a question of when and how one generation yields to another, 
but also a question of which members of each generation will be able to 
persuade the other members to pursue a certain 'road to power' . The 
power of the rebel strongmen might now spring from the barrel of a 
gun, but for many years past the principal qualifications for leadership 
had been those provided by the formal education system. While the 
'educated elite ' is a fairly small minority among the Momis/Hannett 
generation, and its influence at the level of the local community has 
been correspondingly limited, it accounts for a much more significant 
proportion of the Ona/Kabui generation, and its influence at that level 
has correspondingly increased. If Griffin would excuse the phrase, 
there is now a substantial ' middle class ' of white-collar 
Bougainvilleans, most of whom could hardly be described as 'black 
men in top offices' ,  but many, if not most, of whom have nevertheless 
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been progressively alienated from the rebel cause by the sufferings 
inflicted on themselves and their families. 
Although the 'central command ' of the rebellion still seems to 
rest with members of this class, including Ona and Kabui, there are 
good reasons why so -many other members have been eminently 
qualified for suspicion of treachery to the cause. Those who were 
employed within the province, especially the public servants, were 
almost bound to be compromised unless they could demonstrate their 
active support for the rebellion from its earliest stages,  and the 
customary mixture of resignation and fascination would not be 
sufficient for this purpose. Although some of these individuals 
remained in the province after the departure of the security forces, and 
were then subjected to various degrees of harassment in their own 
villages, others joined the ranks of those ' educated exiles ' who have 
continued to live and work in other parts of Papua New Guinea without 
being subject to any significant degree of harassment by other Papua 
New Guineans. On the contrary, the ties of friendship, and especially 
the ties of marriage, which link members of the Bougainvillean middle 
class to their national countetparts have been significantly strengthened 
during the course of the rebellion, and thus pose a major threat to its 
success, even in the absence of any overarching loyalty to the state of 
Papua New Guinea. 
We have still not heard the full story of rebel attempts to force the 
closure of such middle class connections. But perhaps there is no more 
eloquent testimony to the threat which education posed to the authority 
of local rebel leaders than the widespread destruction of school 
buildings which took place during the period of the blockade. The 
' interim government ' seems to have blamed this destruction on 
' criminal elements ' or 'disenchanted youth ' ,  whose actions were 
beyond the control of the BRA leadership, and the same excuse could 
presumably be given for many of the actions taken against suspected 
traitors. If the rebel leadership seriously believed in the creation of an 
independent state, it would hardly make sense to destroy the 
infrastructure necessary to its existence. One suspects that schools and 
other public buildings were not being attacked as symbols of Papua 
New Guinea, but as symbols of state authority. 
These actions and excuses only serve to underline the nature of 
the leadership crisis at the level of the local community. When the BRA 
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filled the space left by the departure of the security forces and the 
general collapse of government seivices, its central command faced the 
same problem which the Panguna militants would have faced if they 
had previously accepted a 'new deal' to reopen the mine. The problem 
was how to nonnalize and consolidate their authority under conditions 
which were guaranteed to provide additional momentum to the same 
process of social and political disintegration which had initially brought 
them to power. As I have previously pointed out, 'the very nature of 
the mining project . . .  seems to have progressively reduced the inteivals 
between those moments of "initiation" whereby leadership is 
transferred to successive generations' (1 990:94). The irony is that the 
rebellion itself seems to have become the moment of political initiation 
for the 'disenchanted youth' throughout the province, in the same way 
that the looting of the Panguna Supennarket in 1979 functioned as the 
moment of political initiation for Francis Ona's generation of Panguna 
landowners, and the same brand of strongmanship which was initially 
designed to save Ona from the young Turks has turned out to be the 
major obstacle to the consolidation of his role as president of 
Bougainville. 
Although the ' interim government' now presents itself to the 
world as a rational political organization which is fully capably of 
exercising the authority of the state, the current disaffection of so many 
educated Bougainvilleans makes this claim seem implausible . 
Documents and pronouncements emanating from the BRA 'central 
command ' suggest a very different solution to the problem of 
normalizing and consolidating its authority, one which appeals to the 
millenarian values represented by the so-called 'cargo cult' . In its own 
public awareness campaign of 1989, the North Solomons provincial 
government drew particular attention to the long-standing association 
between Francis Ona and Damien Damen, the leader of the 'Fifty Toea 
movement' and warned against the false promises being made to the 
' young boys ' who were engaged in the militant cause. The same 
document obseived that followers of this cult were ' against inter­
marriage with other Papua New Guinea citizens and expatriates ' and 
' do not believe in any Governments ' .  If this is something more than 
propaganda, then it not only seives to explain the link between the rebel 
leaders and the actions attributed to the ' disenchanted youth' , the 
destruction of public buildings and the persecution of Bougainvilleans 
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with affinal links to the rest of the country, but also suggests that the 
rebel leaders were seeking to consolidate their authority with those 
members of the Momis/Hannett generation, and even the older 
generation which came of age during the Second World War, who had 
been previously thwarted in their own pursuit of this particular 'road to 
power' .  
Once Francis Ona had left his status as war-leader and despot in 
the more professional hands of Sam Kauona, he was free to become 
instead the high priest of a 'new order' which was in fact an old order 
in disguise. But in those communities where this double act was still 
not sufficient to command majority support, at least in any adult 
generation, the rediscovery of 'chieftainship' provided another solution 
than the one represented by the resurrection of the 'cargo cult ' .  During 
the 1 930s ,  the anthropologist Beatrice Blackwood conducted a 
thorough ethnographic study of the northern part of the province, 
where this discovery has been most frequently reported, but while she 
observed the existence of individuals called tsunaun (as distinct from 
'commoners ') on both sides of Buka passage, she was careful not to 
translate this term as ' chief' (or even ' aristocrat ') because she was 
unable, even then, to detennine the traditional powers which attached to 
such individuals ( 1935 :48). And there was certainly no evidence that 
they combined in 'councils ' to resolve the common problems of their 
various communities. 
The origin of this particular discovery, I would suggest, is to be 
found in Fij i rather than in Bougainville, in the same way that Ona and 
Kauona regarded themselves as Bougainvillean versions of Colonel 
Rabuka. As if to confirm this point, the 'council of chiefs ' has even 
been adopted by some prominent members of the Sepik community in 
Port Moresby as the ideal solution to the problems posed by the 
suspension of the East Sepik provincial government, but the 
proponents of this novelty have yet to face the fact that there is not the 
slightest trace of customary ' chieftainship '  in most of their 
communities. 
The ethnographic portrait of Bougainville as a whole, like that of 
other provinces in Papua New Guinea, presents us with no clear 
picture of the nature of 'traditional authority' .  This blurred image of the 
past has often been interpreted,  as it was by Blackwood, as a result of 
the creation or imposition of new fonns of authority under successive 
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colonial regimes. But it can also be inteipreted to mean that there never 
was an enduring pattern or system of political authority in any given 
area, but only a series or cycle of unstable solutions to a general 
problem of political disintegration. This is the inteipretation to be found 
in Douglas Oliver's (1971 )  account of traditional fonns of authority in 
southern Bougainville, and it certainly accords with my own (1 990) 
account of the 'myth of Melanesian communism'.  
I should now like to suggest that the story of the Bougainville 
rebellion is not the story of a struggle between two forms of 
government, let alone the story of a struggle between two nations , but 
the renewal of an ancient saga which recounts the various solutions to 
the problem of authority in what Clastres (1 977) calls ' society against 
the state ' .  Although this latest chapter is constructed out of words and 
phrases which appear to come from diverse languages, like those of 
Western liberal democracy or Christianity or neo-Melanesian 'custom' ,  
the actual debate about the Bougainville rebellion, by  all the claimants 
to political authority within the province and the nation, seems at times 
to be no more, and yet no less, than some intenninable ' rite of 
passage ' ,  wherein masks and postures, accusations and denials, are 
adopted and exchanged for no apparent puipose, and with no apparent 
strategy, beyond the need to prove that leadership is possible despite 
the absence of the state. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE CURRENT SITUATION ON 
BO UGAINVILLE 
The Hon. Michael Ogio, MP 
This paper is based on my speech given to the national Parliament of 
Papua New Guinea on 1 0  May, one week prior to the conference. 
Before outlining the factual evidence of events as I witnessed them, I 
want to make it perfectly clear from the outset that I speak not as an 
intelligence officer for the government nor an agent of the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA), but as a Bougainvillean. Like my fellow 
peace-loving people, I desire to see a quick end to the conflict and a 
stop to the sufferings inflicted on innocent men, women and children of 
the North Solomons. 
After the February to March session of parliament in 1990, I 
returned to my electorate in the North Solomons at the height of the 
Bougainville crisis. Shortly before my return the crisis reached the 
stage where the conflict between the security forces, government 
officials and the BRA had widened greatly. This resulted in 
unprecedented killing and torturing of innocent people, many of whom 
were neither supporters of the BRA nor of the national government, but 
who became victims anyway. Unconfirmed reports put at close to 
1 ,500 the number of people that may have been killed during this 
period. 
The withdrawal of the security forces and the imposition of the 
economic embargo on the North Solomons created a new dimension of 
hardship for the people, as the crisis had already taken some initial toll 
on the people. Unprepared for the unexpected, the people of the North 
Solomons were virtually shut off from the outside world, when the 
embargo came into full effect on 18  May 1990. 
The first three months of the embargo were hell, and the people 
faced a most brutal kind of hardship that can only be equated with a 
war situation. B y  then the BRA had assumed total control of the 
province . Bougainville was divided into three command posts, 
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Northern, Central and Southern. Each command was headed by a high­
ranking BRA official. The people were now subjected to two forces: 
the impact of the embargo, and the interrogation of the BRA. 
Because fighting between the security forces and the BRA during 
1989 and the early part of 1990 had prevented the people from making 
food gardens, during the first three months of the embargo the food 
shortage was very acute . Trade store goods ran out and everybody had 
to survive on tapioca and coconuts. Malnutrition claimed the lives of 
infants, and it was now survival of the fittest. We all had to revert to 
the bush for food. Within these three months of hardship, everybody 
made food gardens to save themselves. At the same time, medical 
supplies on the island ran out, forcing the closure of the Arawa 
Hospital and all health centres and aid posts. 
Malaria and other diseases increased, claiming the lives of many, 
while malnutrition and the lack of immunization programmes affected 
the infants. The lack of medicine was probably the biggest threat to the 
population. Many pregnant mothers experiencing problems during 
childbirth died due to the closure of all medical facilities. I witnessed 
many such sad situations. It was either the life of the mother or the new 
born baby or both. It was indeed a terrible situation. 
The second impact on the population was the interrogation, arrest 
and hassling of people by the BRA. Supporters of the BRA were 
identified and left alone, while those of us whom they suspected to be 
pro national government were rounded up and interrogated at the three 
main command posts . I went through two such interrogations in 
Panguna, where I was taken. Many people who could not prove 
beyond any doubt to the BRA that they were neutral were placed under 
house arrest. Today, they are still under house arrest. Others simply 
went missing and are still missing. 
By then the situation on the island was intolerable, and the 
people did not know what to do but remain silent in fear for their lives. 
All the schools on the island had been closed down, as had all the 
plantations, and all other businesses were either looted or simply 
collapsed because there was no business to conduct. 
The number of deaths that occurred on Bougainville after the 
embargo was imposed may be greater than the killings that took place 
during the height of the conflict, because at that earlier stage there was 
still plenty of food and medicine around. I estimate the total number of 
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deaths during the crisis and during the seventeen months embargo to be 
close to 3000 people. It could be more and a realistic account can only 
be established when the situation on the island is brought back to 
normal. If a proper head count is made, people will come forward to 
record deaths that they are aware of or can simply report missing 
persons. 
The agony of displaced families and people is still causing 
concern today. To restore all business activities on the island, 
reconstruct the damage done to facilities such as roads, bridges, 
schools , aid posts and health centres, would cost the country more than 
KlOO million. It will be a long and very costly exercise. 
Although some medicine reached Bougainville after the 
achievement of the Honiara Accord, it was never enough. The national 
government and the BRA must accept equal blame and responsibility 
for the hardship inflicted on the population of Bougainville during the 
period of the embargo. The national government simply dumped the 
province, and the BRA took control. 
The people of North Solomons want peace, they do not want to 
see any more fighting. The BRA commanders, Francis Ona and Sam 
Kauona, also want peace and want to participate in new peace accords. 
This is a welcome sign. However, the situation is still very delicate and 
needs to be properly handled, if we are to achieve constructive and 
meaningful dialogue between all parties and create conditions for a 
lasting solution. 
The national government must now deal honestly with the BRA. 
The best approach is to allow the Bougainville Council of Chiefs to 
handle the situation on the ground. They have taken the initiative and so 
far it is working well. To avoid any more conflicts between the security 
forces and the BRA, it is advisable that the troops on the mainland be 
withdrawn and stationed on Buka. 
The only involvement of soldiers on the mainland of 
Bougainville should be by way of the Engineering Battalion to speed 
up reconstruction, or by way of the Defence Medical Unit carrying out 
work with the Red Cross to re-establish health programmes throughout 
the province. It is estimated that up to 8000 babies have been born that 
are in need of immunization. They must be attended to. The people 
support the process of the Honiara Declaration and will welcome the 
International Peace Keeping Force to come and supervise the full 
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restoration of services. The message is that the BRA do not want to 
fight any more and this is now supported by the people. 
Sooner or later the question of immunity from prosecution being 
granted to the BRA must also be addressed, in order that trust is  
established between the government and the BRA to commence 
constructive negotiations and dialogue .  All elements of 
misunderstanding must be eliminated. The sale of the Panguna Copper 
Mine must not proceed until the Bougainville crisis is resolved and 
peace is restored. 
The experience and causes of the Bougainville crisis must be a 
lesson to the Papua New Guinea government, to the national 
parliament, and to future governments and parliaments. We must now 
properly manage the development and exploitation of our natural 
resources for the benefit of landowners, Papua New Guineans and the 
country. Our people must have direct and meaningful participation as 
shareholders in all natural resource projects in the country. Legislative 
changes to the various acts governing natural resource developments 
must be made to incorporate this need. Failure on our part as a 
government, as a people and as elected leaders, can only lead to more 
Bougainville-type problems springing up throughout the country. 
I would prefer a royal commission of enquiry to be set up. This 
may not be legally possible, however. A commission of enquiry of 
some kind on the Bougainville conflict is absolutely necessary, because 
it is the first time in the country that we have had such a conflict that 
has developed into a full-scale war between the security forces and a 
group of militants. This commission of enquiry must have wide terms 
of reference and must be headed by a judge from outside the country, 
perhaps from the International Commission of Jurists or a neutral 
country, to avoid any accusation of bias later. The people of Papua 
New Guinea have the right to know why the Bougainville conflict 
developed into a crisis of such magnitude and why so many lives have 
been lost. The truth must be uncovered and revealed to the people and 
the country. 
I would like to thank the people of Papua New Guinea for the 
patience they have shown and the protection they have accorded our 
sons and daughters in their villages and provinces during this difficult 
period. I also take this opportunity to thank the Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid and other NGOs for their efforts to assist us in basic 
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health services for our  province. Finally, the churches should be 
thanked for the prayers and the support they have. given for the 
Bougainville crisis to end. Without these, we would not be witnessing 
the willingness of both the BRA and the government to now get 
together and discuss a solution to the problem. 
CHAPTER 1 1  
THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS TWO 
YEARS ON: AUSTRALIAN POLICY 
Michael Thawley 
Two years ago, on 15 May 1989, a shotgun ambush of workers 
travelling to the Panguna mine by bus - one of a long line of violent 
attacks - prompted the closure of the mine. A year ago, the BRA 
leadership made a unilateral declaration of independence. Conditions on 
Bougainville make it very plain that neither approach has led to any sort 
of answer to the problems there. 
This conference is timely. It would be unwise after the 
experience of the past two years to be optimistic that a solution will be 
quickly or easily found to the crisis in Bougainville. But for the first 
time in months we are hearing Bougainvilleans from different parts of 
the province speaking their  minds freely. The BRA seems to be 
reviewing its previous rejection of the Honiara Declaration. The Papua 
New Guinea government is responding to pleas to deliver goods and 
services. So there are new opportunities to work towards a settlement. 
The historical and cultural factors at work are difficult, and 
Australia - or any other outsider - is not well placed to be at the 
centre of such a process. Rather this is a challenge for Bougainvilleans 
and for Papua New Guinea as a whole. But there is a readiness on 
Australia's part to make a substantial contribution to a settlement. I will 
outline three basic elements of Australian policy. 
Papua New Guinea's independence and sovereignty 
The first principle is that the Bougainville problem is in the first place 
one for Papua New Guinea. It is a measure of regional respect for 
Papua New Guinea's sovereignty and independence that external 
parties have riot sought to involve themselves. In particular, Papua 
New Guinea has not sought Australian intervention, and Papua New 
Guinea leaders have made very clear they want to settle the problem 
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themselves.  While providing continuing support for the Papua New 
Guinea government under our aid and defence cooperation 
arrangements , we have made clear that we would not intervene directly. 
The Australian government's position is also a matter of common 
sense. All of us present here today should understand that Australia 
cannot construct a solution for Bougainville, much less impose one. 
The solution to the Bougainville problem must be a Papua New 
Guinean one if it is to take full account of local views and knowledge. 
More importantly, a settlement will need strong local support - and 
informed support - if it is to be carried out and transformed into a 
lasting solution. We need to recognize that all that might take time. 
Papua New Guinea national unity 
The second principle is support for Papua New Guinea's territorial 
integrity. Just before Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975 , 
when some in Bougainville were seeking secession, the then Australian 
prime minister reaffirmed to the Papua New Guinea chief minister 
Australian policy that Papua New Guinea should come to independence 
as one country in accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming 
majority of Papua New Guinea's elected representatives. Australia 
would give no sympathy, aid or support in any form to any group in 
Papua New Guinea working to undermine their country's unity. The 
Papua New Guinea government has made clear that it is not 
contemplating Bougainville's secession. Our policy remains as it has 
been since Papua New Guinea's independence. 
In this context, it is worth registering that Bougainville has been 
electing throughout the 1970s and 1980s people to represent it in the 
Papua. • New Guinea national parliament and in its provincial 
government. These have been people who have been willing to work 
for Bougainville's interests within Papua New Guinea. The 
Bougainvilleans who negotiated the Honiara Declaration put the 
question of Bougainville's status to one side and agreed to work 
towards a settlement within the Papua New Guinea constitution. One is 
bound to ask, are these people less representative than those who 
refused to accept services being restored to Bougainville unless their 
UDI was recognized? As for the outside world, no government has 
acknowledged the unilateral declaration of independence. 
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Australia' s willingness to be engaged 
The third principle of Australian policy is  our willingness to be 
engaged. Australia has not been indifferent to Bougainville as a 
regional political problem. As I will mention, we have important 
interests in a settlement. Neither have we been indifferent to the 
humanitarian dimension. 
We have been and are prepared to help in any practical way that 
might usefully contribute towards a solution, to provide emergency 
relief, and to help Papua New Guinea and Bougainvilleans rebuild 
Bougainville once a settlement has been reached. We agree with the 
Papua New Guinea government that a lasting settlement cannot simply 
be imposed by force. We welcomed the Endeavour Accord and the 
Honiara Declaration, and we have consistently encouraged all parties 
involved towards a political settlement. 
Australia's humanitarian concern for the hardship being faced by 
the people on Bougainville is one element of our approach. That 
concern led Senator Evans personally to take the initiative last 
November to raise with Papua New Guinea and the Australian Council 
for  Overseas Aid (ACFOA) the possibility of Australi an 
non-government organizations delivering medical supplies. The Papua 
New Guinea government delivered medical supplies donated by 
ACFOA shortly after the Honiara Declaration was signed in January 
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The Australian government has just approved a contribution of 
$ 100,000 for an International Red Cross medical programme which 
focuses on child immunization and supplies of drugs. We have funded 
a second visit by NGO representatives to prepare proposals for 
rehabilitating health services, and NGOs have_ had discussions in Port 
Moresby and Bougainville. We hope that we can help the Papua New 
Guinea government improve medical services for those areas on 
Bougainville where it has been asked to return, and also provide some 
medical relief for those under BRA control in central Bougainville. 
I want to mention here that it was also our humanitarian concern 
which led in 1 989 and 1990 to our taking up with the Papua New 
Guinea government reports of abuses committed by members of the 
Papua New Guinea security forces. We recognized that the Papua New 
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Guinea government had no option but to respond militarily to a 
campaign of violence and the refusal of the BRA to respond to Papua 
New Guinea government offers of talks . We also recognized the 
pressures the security forces were under and the bitterness which fed 
on incidents committed by both sides. But the abuses were not 
excusable, and of course only worsened the situation. It is vital that all 
parties involved ensure such abuses do not begin again as the security 
forces help restore seivices on Bougainville. 
Willingness to help on Bougainville also reflects our interest in 
the future of Bougainville. There were around 2,000 Australians in 
Bougainville before the present crisis. They were involved with the 
Panguna mine, associated companies , the plantation sector and, of 
course, missions . They represented a substantial commercial and 
personal commitment in Bougainville. I venture to suggest they -
along with Papua New Guineans from other provinces - were making 
a contribution to the development of the province. 
As well, our approach reflects our view that a settlement on 
Bougainville is important to the future of Papua New Guinea. Papua 
New Guinea has coped well with the economic consequences of the 
closure of the Bougainville mine and the collapse of Bougainville's 
plantation economy. I would note in parenthesis the international 
goodwill on which Papua New Guinea was able to draw in getting 
economic support from donor countries. The goodwill that Papua New 
Guinea enjoys is something Bougainville itself can look forward to 
drawing on as the Papua New Guinea government restores seivices 
and when a settlement is reached. 
But the resolution of the crisis and the nature of that resolution 
are important for the political and economic future of Papua New 
Guinea, and the confidence of the international community in it. 
Australia has a big stake in that. 
For reasons I have already mentioned, we have not sought to 
intervene directly. In any case, we have a weight of historical baggage 
which militates against the utility of too direct an engagement in the 
actual fashioning of a settlement. But our support for a settlement can 
be a useful factor. And we have made clear that we could be counted 
on. Immediately after the signing of the Honiara Declaration, the prime 
minister and Senator Evans said Australia was ready to help facilitate 
dialogue by restoring telecommunications between the main island of 
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Bougainville and Port Moresby, deliver medical supplies, and identify 
rehabilitation needs on Bougainville. 
The Australian government also said it was prepared in principle 
to contribute to a multinational supervisory team provided that all sides 
were committed to the settlement process and accepted our 
participation. We made clear that our participation had to be on the 
basis that the team was supervising a settlement and not imposing one. 
The BRA made very clear very soon after that it did not accept 
the Honiara Declaration or Australian help. Subsequently, the situation 
on the ground further changed with the Papua New Guinea government 
sending in the Papua New Guinea Defence Force in response to 
appeals from the northern part of the main island of Bougainville to 
restore services. But we still remain ready to help. 
The year-long closure of the modem sector of the island's 
economy - the mine, the plantations and the commercial, transport 
and communications facilities that support Bougainville's productive 
smallholders - will make rehabilitation difficult. It will be some time 
before services and economic activity on Bougainville can be restored 
to previous levels. The sooner a settlement can be reached the faster 
progress will be made. And obviously an arrangement which allowed 
the Panguna mine to reopen would help Bougainville recover sooner 
economically and improve the prospects for Papua New Guinea as a 
whole. 
Conclusion 
Finally, our approach to Bougainville has to take account of the fact 
that the issue cannot be separated from the wider context of the 
developmental problems affecting Papua New Guinea as a whole. In 
this regard, one could make a range of points, but I will mention two 
which are particularly relevant. 
The first is that other parts of Papua New Guinea also face very 
great social and economic difficulties. I do not want to diminish in any 
way Bougainville's particular problems, which have seen conditions 
much reduced in what was Papua New Guinea's second richest and 
second most healthy province. But it is, I think, important for us to 
remember that some conditions - infant mortality for example - may 
even now be worse in some other parts of Papua New Guinea, such as 
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the Southern Highlands Province and, to take a province very close to 
Australia, in Western Province. That demonstrates the breadth of the 
problems Papua New Guinea needs to tackle and its requirement for 
outside support. 
The second point is that the enhancement of the capability of key 
national institutions - such as the various government agencies 
engaged in formulating policies and carrying them out, the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force, and the police - will be as vital for a lasting 
solution on Bougainville as in finding remedies for other of Papua New 
Guinea ' s  problems. Our aid program will continue to have this 
institutional development as one of its main aims. 
CHAPTER 12 
REFLECTIONS ON THE B OUGAINVILLE 
C ONFLICT :  UNDERLYING CAUSES AND 
CONDITIONS FOR A RESOLUTION 
Graeme Kemelfield 
In April 1990 I presented a paper on the efforts of the Bougainville 
'think-tank' to resolve the crisis, which led to the ceasefire of March 
1990 (Kemelfield 1 990). I had just left Bougainville, on the same plane 
as the team of international observers (drawn from the diplomatic corps 
in Canberra and the Commonwealth Secretariat) . They had monitored 
the handing-in of arms by the BRA, and were supposed to have 
monitored the withdrawal of the Papua New Guinea security forces -
whose commanders, however, were following a different timetable and 
agenda. It was the end of an intensive and ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to facilitate a negotiated settlement. 
. This paper reflects on that attempt at conflict resolution through 
consultation, redefinition of the relationship between the state of Papua 
New Guinea and the people of Bougainville, and reconciliation - and 
seeks to distil a year's reflections on the underlying causes of the 
conflict and see how they can help us to understand what is still needed 
for a resolution. For, many deaths and much suffering later, we still 
await a resolution of the substantive issues. 
The ceasefire initiative of March 1990 
There were the three main planks of the plan for a resolution at the time 
of the ceasefire. 
The first was that neutral international assistance should be 
sought in drawing up options for the future political status of 
Bougainville and its relationship with the state of Papua New Guinea. 
An initial step was to invite Professor Peter Wallensteen, of the 
Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of 
Uppsala in Sweden, to act as a consultant to the North Solomons 
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provincial government. However, what was intended as a lengthy visit 
was undennined and shortened by bureaucratic delays, .and was marred 
by suspicion. More significantly, the pressure felt on all sides to obtain 
a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the security forces overrode the 
primary putpose of the visit , which was to address the substantive 
political issues which underlay the crisis. An initial proposal was 
developed in embryonic fonn, based on the League of Nations 
settlement for the Scandinavian Aland Islands before World War II. 
This latter followed consideration by an international Commission of 
Jurists and a League Commission of Enquiry and eventuated in a 
constitutional change which granted Aland Islanders the maximum 
degree of autonomy consistent with the maintenance of the (Finnish) 
state, amounting to a fonn of semi-independence. The brevity of 
Wallensteen's visit, and increasing tunnoil following the ceasefire, 
discouraged consideration of such an idea. 
The second plank was that there should be a uniformed 
multinational peace-keeping contingent invited to create conditions on 
Bougainville and Buka, in which the people of the islands could 
consider the options and their implications, free from harassment and 
intimidation. Strenuous efforts were made to get agreement on that 
initiative but there was equally strenuous opposition in some quarters in 
Port Moresby, particularly from the police commissioner and controller 
of the state of emergency, while BRA leaders were unwilling to accept 
representation in such a contingent from countries in the region which 
might have been most willing to respond. The nearest the proposal 
came to realization was the invitation to international observers to 
monitor the observance of the ceasefire agreement. 
The third and most vital plank was that there should be 
consultation with the Bougainville people, in the fonn of a non-binding 
referendum, through which they could express their preferences to the 
national government and parliament. That provided no easy solution, 
but a process through which to begin addressing the underlying issues. 
In the event, the government opted for direct negotiations at the end of 
the ceasefire period. This was not properly planned within the tenns of 
the ceasefire, and the departure of the international observer team 
removed the neutral presence vital to facilitate talks. The delay, which 
initially occurred at the request of the BRA (to curb undisciplined 
elements within their ranks) and subsequent disagreement over the 
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venue and timing for talks, led to a series of manoeuvres and events 
which resulted in deepening mistrust, bloodshed and suffering in the 
population at large. 
In many respects the Honiara Declaration and what followed in 
January 1 991  brought matters around full circle to the point where 
these initiatives had been broken off in March 1990 - demonstrating 
the continuing need for what became known as a multinational 
supeIVisory team and for finding the means to address and negotiate 
over substantive issues in such a way that the people of Bougainville 
could freely express their political will. All this took place in the context 
of an intricate national government power game of withdrawing and 
restoring seIVices, linked to a strategy of reasserting military control, 
and with the BRA leadership unable or unwilling to curb the violent 
and unpredictable elements within its ranks, or to transfer genuine 
power or political expression to a civilian leadership. 
Long-term resolution of the conflict 
I suggest that, to achieve any solid long-term resolution, we still need 
four things. 
a) Substantive negotiations over the political status of  
Bougainville. This i s  critical i f  the conflict, with its 
horror and hardship, is not to erupt again and again. 
b) A form of consultation with the people to legitimate any 
agreed outcome. It is arguable that, following the first 
declaration of Bougainvillean independence in 1975, the 
resolution contrived in 1976 through the institution of 
provincial government was never fully legitimated in the 
minds of many people, and left lingering frustration 
which erupted in 1988-89. An indelible first impression 
which I retain from arriving in Bougainville in 1978 is 
the force of grievance which I heard -expressed in rural 
areas of central and south Bougainville concerning 
leaders who were perceived to have ' sold out' in 1976, 
particularly those who had not explained the reversal of 
the i r  stance,  after preaching secessi on, in  
enthusiastically embracing the option of  provincial 
government. 
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c) A peaceful environment to ensure that consultation can 
occur. This  may only be possible through an 
international peace-keeping and supeivisory presence. 
d) Effective mediation in any negotiations by a neutral third 
party, as well as mechanisms for the monitoring and 
arbitration of any disputes which subsequently arise. 
Lack of such a mechanism contributed to the breakdown 
of whatever commiunents were agreed at the conclusion 
of the Endeavour and Honiara agreements. 
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Some Australian media tend to promulgate analysis in tenns of 
immediate strategies of winning or losing a struggle - so we read 
headlines such as ' How Papua New Guinea won Bougainville by 
Sanctions ' (Rowan Callick, Australian Financial Review 25 January 
199 1 ) . This is short-sighted. There is an imperative need to look at 
deeper underlying social realities and explanations of events if we are to 
see what is at stake. What follows might be described as preliminary 
obseivations towards a thesis which might reward more intensive 
study. 
Underlying causes 
As a starting point, I propose that we look in more depth at the impact 
of large-scale mining, and suggest three key aspects of that impact. 
(1) Mining largely created the significance of Bougainville 
for Papua New Guinea. Listening to the reminiscences of those who 
remember Bougainville before the coming of BCL, it is extraordinary 
to hear the extent to which Bougainville was seen as part of the 
Solomon Islands , in tenns of geography, people, and trading links 
which extended well beyond the Western Solomons. Such evidence 
needs to be weighed apart from any ideological fiction for secessionist 
propaganda. The anthropologist Douglas Oliver called his study of the 
Siwai of Bougainville (the result of fieldwork in 1938-39) A Solomon 
Island Society (Oliver 1955). It is also instructive to look at maps of 
what is now Papua New Guinea in the frontispiece of books published 
earlier, and to obseive how frequently Bougainville is omitted. The 
Australian War Memorial in Canberra commemorates the Bougainville 
Campaign in World War II separately from, and alongside, those of 
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Papua and New Guinea. The origins and organization of the Catholic 
Marist mission, as well as the Methodist and SDA missions, reinforced 
that perception, coming as they did from the Solomon Islands, and 
recognizing Bougainville as an integral part of their Solomon Island 
missionary endeavours. For the Australian administration, Bougainville 
seems to have been a backwater of the Territory of New Guinea until 
the coming of CRA. 
With the advent of the copper mine, however, Bougainville 
became suddenly an essential part of the Territory, and then of the 
independent state of Papua New Guinea, and the foundation of its 
economy. There was a fundamental change in perception; the influx of 
migrants brought home the reality of that change. However, it might be 
argued, there was no corresponding sudden change in the 
consciousness of much of the population. In fact, for many people the 
effect was to sharpen their sense of distinct ethnicity. 
(2) Mining has had a significant impact in heightening 
ethnonationalism. Anthropologists such as Oliver and Eugene Ogan 
(who worked among the Nasioi of Kieta) have tried to reconstruct the 
development of layers of consciousness and identification in the people 
of Bougainville. Beginning from an awareness of belonging to small 
local groupings, through a new consciousness of belonging to larger 
named groupings (Siwais, Kietas , Bukas, Buins) , people moved to a 
wider recognition of being Southerners or Northerners, and finally to a 
sense of a pan-Bougainville identity, as a result of plantation and school 
experience and colonial administration. In the process of ' constructed ' 
ethnicity, through the extension of social and territorial boundaries , 
individuals are able to maintain various layers of identification 
simultaneously, one or another being dominant according to context 
and circumstances. Yet anyone familiar with life in Bougainville could 
hardly doubt that there is today a persistent sense of being a distinct 
people in contrast to other Papua New Guineans. This sense has been 
heightened by the impact of mining: what Nash and Ogan ( 1 990:9) 
characterize as 'burgeoning ethnic identity in direct response to a new 
colonial experience, that of dealing with multinational mining interests ' .  
All the conditions analysed in studies of ethnic identity are 
present in Bougainville. Among the most prominent are the folllowing. 
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The central role of lan d. As Sack has written, land 
'plays an emotional key role . . .  a traditional group is a 
union of people with land ' ( 1974 :200) . The loss of land 
through the intrusion of mining, environmental damage and 
the fear of future land shortages, are recurrent themes of 
Francis Ona and the Panguna landowners, with prophecies 
of wider dispossession if mining were to be extended. A 
deeper vein is  that of the landowners'  sense of inherent 
ownership of, and rights to, natural resources,  in 
opposition to the state's claim to ownership of minerals 
below the surface. 
Lar ge-scale i n mi grat ion .  Migration resulted in 
Bougainvillean feelings of being swamped by thousands of 
'outsiders ' drawn from throughout Papua New Guinea, 
through the construction phase and subsequent operations 
of the mine ,  and the economic opportunities which 
followed. Bougainvilleans were outnumbered in the new 
mining towns of Arawa and Panguna. The growth of 
squatter settlements focused attention on the issue and the 
resentments which it fostered. It heightened the process of 
ethnic differentiation and opposition, whereby ' they' ,  the 
outsiders , came to constitute in Bougainvillean 
consciousness a threat to the whole society and way of life. 
The stereotypes of others ' character and behaviour, and the 
specialized vocabulary (' blackskin'/' redskin')  typical of 
ethnic opposition, are all present. 
Perce ived economi c exploi tation.  It has been 
observed that a region which contributes more than it 
receives to the income of the undivided state is typically 
prone to ethnic-based opposition and secessionist militancy, 
compounded of 'collective anxiety' and a desire to end 
perceived exploitation. Bougainville's preindependence 
district commissioner (and later provincial premier) Alexis 
Sarei asked ' are we a fat cow to be milked for the rest of the 
country? ' .  He echoed the Basques who likened Spain to a 
cow being fed by the Basques but milked in Madrid; and the 
slogan of another mining-based ethnic conflict, 'Katanga -
milk cow for the whole Congo ' .  The issue of adequate 
compensation has recurred constantly since the mine was 
imposed on B ougai nvilleans by the Austral ian 
administration, through to Ona's demands which 
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precipitated the present crisis. The foreign ownership of the 
mining company adds a further element to ethnic 
opposition. 
Repressive pol ice/mil i tary act ion.  Studies  of 
ethnicity note that repressive action also plays a part in 
strengthening ethnic identity systems. The marked sense of 
ethnic discrimination often displayed by the Papua New 
Guinea security forces in dealing with black-skinned 
Bougainvilleans, in language and in action, have 
strengthened perceptions of ' Bougainvilleans ' and 'Papua 
New Guineans ' constituting separate peoples. 
(3) Mining has brought awareness to much of the 
population, of the reality of the power of the nation-state. Richard 
Jackson observes that for the most part central government rule and 
intrusion into rural communities in Papua New Guinea is indirect and 
light, so that conflict is for the most part avoided. Contention over the 
'legitimate ' ownership of mineral resources and the coming of riot 
police and soldiers to protect the mine, made overt what was previously 
hidden, and suggested an unequal relationship. In Jackson's words: 
Unfortunately, the development of mining projects in Papua 
New Guinea cannot take place indirectly or in a discreet 
fashion, but must necessarily raise direct questions 
concerning the ownership of resources and the locus of 
political control; it must inevitably lead to confrontation 
between the government extending its control and local 
people and their resources which were previously, at best, 
on the margins of the state's control system (Jackson 
1 992) . 
Jackson addresses the role of the state as 'protector' . At the heart of the 
immediate conflict has been a new perception of the state as a powerful 
and threatening force intruding from outside, rather than a generally 
benign source of welfare and 'development' .  The attempt to project the 
military as both the armed instrument for imposing the will of the state, 
and at the same time the protector of the people and distributor of goods 
and seivices, has left a massive confusion which has been compounded 
by comparable ambiguity in the role of the BRA. 
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The relevance of self-determination 
To discern the roots of an impulse to secession in the soil which fosters 
a powerful group consciousness may be the beginning of a deeper 
understanding of the Bougainville conflict. It enables that conflict to be 
placed within the context of numerous assertions of ethnicity and 
ethnonationalism in the contemporary world calling out for the 
development of international regulatory mechanisms to facilitate just 
and non-violent forms of resolution. We live in a world which 
emphasizes concepts of 'national unity ' and 'territorial integrity ' rather 
than consciousness of ethnicity among formerly colonized peoples. Yet 
this can readily create a gap between the social reality and the idealized 
fiction of the unified nationstate as ' one country, one people' .  Papua 
New Guinea is clearly a highly diverse multi-ethnic state, and the earlier 
post-independence slogan of 'unity in diversity' might still serve it 
better. It would recognize the new kinds of political relationships which 
the country will need, where an ethnic group becomes an unwilling 
partner in the state. 
In seeking the terms of a just resolution, the critical concept 
should be self-determination. The concept is appropriate, first, because 
it embodies a fundamental human right, which some consider 
underpins all human rights. It is also appropriate because it embraces 
both the notion of internal self-determination, involving the choice of 
forms of autonomy within the state, and the notion of external 
self-determination, involving wider freedom to choose new and more 
independent relations with the parent state and other states. The concept 
can thus provide a negotiating framework in which the interests of all 
the parties to the dispute can be addressed. An article in The Times of 
Papua New Guinea earlier in the crisis challenged the concept by 
asking ' Which Self; What Determination? ' (Jim Griffin, 4 October 
1990). It raised the valid issue of how the people of Bougainville could 
be adequately represented in any determination of their future and the 
expression of their political will. The question is not easily answered in 
present circumstances, and it underlines the need for conditions to be 
restored in which options can be fairly considered and some form of 
referendum conducted. What needs to be restated is the importance of 
the population being allowed to express its political will and to 
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determine freely its future relations with the state of Papua New 
Guinea. This requires greater trust in the people than either the Papua 
New Guinea government or the BRA has hitherto granted them. But 
equally essential is recognition that there is a ' self' , a recognizable 
people able to determine their future. To arguments concerning 
deep-seated internal divisions in Bougainville and Buka islands, one 
might cite the evidence of recent archaeological discoveries concerning 
the Mayan people of South America: the research suggests that the 
Mayan people - hitherto regarded as embodying all the signs of 
peaceful and cultivated life - in fact destroyed themselves in fratricidal 
strife; yet nobody doubts that they were a people. 
It is the existence of the people which must be acknowledged in 
Bougainville, for it is they who have rights, must find their own voice, 
and ultimately be willing members of the state to which they belong. 
Only with their consent can the conflict be resolved. It is difficult to see 
how else a healing process and a lasting resolution is to be achieved. 
CHAPTER 1 3  
A B OUGAINVILLEAN PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE CRISIS 
Moses Havini 
I am speaking on behalf of my people, who at the time of writing, are 
suffering one of the most brutal and inhuman situations in the Pacific 
since the carnage and pillage of World War II, as a result of the total 
sea, land and air blockade of the island and people of Bougainville , 
enforced by the Papua New Guinea Government and carried out by its 
military since April 1990. 
The Bougainville crisis is only one of the many catastrophes 
taking place within our Pacific region which are being brushed aside as 
not commanding any serious attention. The political questions of East 
Timor, West Papua and now Bougainville are serious issues. 
Continuous nuclear testing in the Pacific could easily become another 
Chernobyl, yet we the peoples of this region and our governments are 
not forceful enough in addressing these deteriorating issues. People are 
suffering as a result of fighting, deprivation of life-saving medical 
supplies and services and political strangulation from aggressive 
governments. Repressive and aggressive governments in the region 
must become the concern of stable democracies such as Australia. 
The crisis which started in mid 1988  is now three years old and 
to date there still seem to be no positive signs on the horizon of a 
solution. Whether or not this is indicative of the 'Melanesian Way' of 
dispute settlement (which often takes days , weeks and months to 
achieve consensus, but in this case years) it raises serious questions as 
to whether Papua New Guinea is intellectually capable of taking part in 
conflict resolution. There are in fact no encouraging signs that Papua 
New Guinea has any serious intention of peacefully resolving the 
issue. Coupled with this is the fact that the leaders of the government 
are apparently not capable of honouring any contractual obligations. 
This is evidenced by Papua New Guinea's gross violations of the last 
two Peace Accords. 
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The Endeavour Peace Accord, August 1990 
Our first attempt at arriving at a peace settlement took place under the 
Endeavour Peace Accord signed by the two parties on board the New 
Zealand supply ship Endeavour in August 1990. While the process of 
trying to implement its instruments was ongoing on Bougainville, the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) which was still on the 
Bougainvillean island of Nissan 60 kms north of Buka (when they 
withdrew from Bougainville in February-March 1990, it was supposed 
to be a complete withdrawal), responded, independently of the Papua 
New Guinea government to a request by the so-called 1 50 signatories 
from Buka Island, who selfishly wanted them for personal protection 
from roving rascal gangs. 
The PNGDF re-invaded Bougainville through Buka in late 
September, thus violating all the instruments of this first peace accord. 
This re-invasion, called 'Operation Cleric ' ,  has been responsible for a 
new escalation of deaths on Bougainville, with the torture and extra­
judicial execution of Buka people by PNGDF soldiers. Villagers have 
also lost homes burned by the soldiers in pursuit of the Bougainville 
Republican Army (BRA). 
The Honiara Peace Declaration, January 1991 
During the period between the invasion and January 199 1  a second 
peace attempt was made through the involvement of the government of 
the Solomon Islands and their emissary, Bishop Leslie Boseto. A vital 
part of this new instrument was the reintroduction of services onto 
Bougainville through a Bougainville Task Force. This second peace 
attempt also resulted in the technical lifting of the blockade - technical 
in the sense that not all services were immediately allowed to 
Bougainville and that the meagre trickle of essential items such as 
medicine were still heavily regulated by the Papua New Guinea 
authorities. Vital items such as nails and petrol were still prohibited lest 
they be used by the BRA for their own purposes. 
While the Honiara Accord was still in the process of 
implementation, on 13  April 199 1 the PNGDF, supposedly without the 
knowledge of cabinet, staged their second invasion across Buka 
Passage and into the north of Bougainville. This operation was called 
A Bougainvillean Perspective on the Crisis 1 63 
'Operation Bung Waintaim' .  There was no aggression from the BRA 
and the invasion was unprovoked and uncalled for. During this period 
the BRA was strongly advised by its leaders to honour the Honiara 
Peace Declaration and to cooperate in its implementation. 
Bougainvi l le  a vict im of Papua New Guinea' s  gross 
violat ions 
There seems to be no clear direction from the Papua New Guinea 
government, and with such indecision the armed forces no longer wish 
to take their orders from the government of the day. The government 
does not wish to rock the boat as it would not like to be faced with 
another attempted coup from the Defence Force. The scenario is one of 
a ship captained by all on board, with no charted course and heading 
only in one direction, down under. While one would like to maintain 
some degree of optimism for Papua New Guinea, one cannot help but 
see a society heading towards total chaos. The fear in Bougainville is 
that our people could be dragged along the same path to inevitable 
disharmony. 
B ougainvilleans have been enraged by the grave human 
consequences of the situation created by a supposedly educated 
leadership. The brutal and barbaric atrocities suffered at the hands of 
the Papua New Guinea troops on the ground on Bougainville have 
resulted in deaths unprecedented since the Second World War. 
Thousands and thousands of our people have died as a direct result of 
the economic blockade of the island, which prevented supplies of 
medicines vital to life. Thousands also died from the deployment of the 
army on the island. More than 3000 Bougainvilleans have died from 
preventable diseases as a result of the blockading of medicine from the 
island, and more than 8000 to 10,000 children aged one to four years 
have been deprived of immunization. The prevention of  medical 
treatment to children is another crime that Papua New Guinea must be 
accused of. 
Those responsible for these barbaric acts should be condemned 
by the international community. They are in violation of both their 
national and international responsibilities,  under the Universal 
Declarations of Human Rights and Obligations, and must certainly 
stand accused before the eyes of the world for such gross violations of 
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the right of a people to life, liberty, security and the right not to be 
subjected to torture,  extra-judicial execution and other forms of 
inhuman treatment. 
It seems that tribal culture has now been transferred to the Papua 
New Guinea military when let loose on Bougainville, this time not with 
bows and arrows but with machine guns and helicopter gunships. This 
has been responsible for endless misery. Yet our neighbours have 
chosen to overlook this horror. Certainly no one likes to hear gory 
details of a conflict but in this case they must be pointed out. 
Bougainville has been one big graveyard since 1989, stretching from 
Buka to the southern end of the main island: people dying in the 
fighting, mothers dying in childbirth, men and women dying from 
preventable diseases and people 'disappearing ' while in the hands of 
the Defence Force, the BRA, or the Btika Liberation Front. 
I visited Bougainville during January 1991 and saw for myself 
the misery suffered by the people. Papua New Guinea's preference to 
mount a blockade rather than pursue a consultative process has resulted 
in a slow fonn of genocide. While international assistance was readily 
available in similar situations overseas, our neighbours, though very 
much aware of the gravity of the Bougainville issue, were and are still 
very slow to react to this catastrophe close at hand. 
Bougainvi lle national ism 
Much has been written about the sociopolitical situation on 
Bougainville and on its people : favourable, not so favourable, critical 
and also damning. B ut no one really knows the lot of the 
Bougainvilleans better than they do themselves. Dr Colin Filer of the 
University of Papua New Guinea argues that Bougainvilleans are no 
different from the rest of Papua New Guinea and that the only thing 
that makes a difference historically , politically, socially and 
economically is the massive hole in the middle of the island (Filer 
1990). But if the same thing that is happening on Bougainville had 
happened in the province of New Ireland, would Papua New Guinea 
have instituted a blockade? I think not; they would not do this to their 
own people. 
Today's political problem on Bougainville is the result of 
political bungling by the imperialist governments of Germany and 
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Great Britain in the 1 800s, during their rush for colonies in the Pacific. 
During this period the Pacific region was carved up between Britain, 
Germany, France and Holland, with no regard whatsoever for the 
wishes of the indigenous people of this region. 
Real estate and political horse-trading then went on between 
these governments , exchanging properties and peoples to suit 
themselves. It was during one of these exchanges that the people of 
Bougainville became wrongly lumped with a people not of their 
choosing when, by the Anglo-Gennan Treaty of 1 899: 
Germany renounced and recognized as falling to Great 
B ritain those of the Solomon Islands,  at present 
belonging to Gennany, which are situated to the east and 
southeast of the island of Bougainville, which latter will 
continue to belong to Germany, together with the island 
of Buka which fonns part of it. 
The above treaty was executed so that certain territories in Samoa 
and others which were in the hands of Germany could be released to 
Britain in exchange for agreed title to Bougainville and Buka. Thus 
began our political nightmare. Our people have always held that they 
have never fonnally ceded their sovereignty to anyone, including to the 
government of Papua New Guinea. 
Despite the colonial boundary the people of Bougainville have 
not lost their kinship with the people of the Solomons. They have 
continued to maintain this kinship through links of marriage, culture 
and race. Our people have never felt any kinship with the people of 
Papua New Guinea who are very different to them in terms of their 
race. Our people too have always objected to outside interference,  
going back to the days of blackbirding. 
I disagree with Dr Filer that there is no Bougainvillean 
nationalism and argue that there is a prima f acie case for Bougainville 
being separate from Papua New Guinea. The infrastructure necessary 
for running a democratic entity on Bougainville is  in place. Given the 
chance, Bougainvilleans would in no time be able to run a properly 
instituted democratic system; we have the manpower available to do it. 
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Prospects for peace 
We desire peace and we are not altogether and completely bent on war. 
We want peace to be established between us, Papua New Guinea and 
our other neighbours. In spite of Papua New Guinea propaganda that 
our people have never honoured the peace accords, it must be stated 
that we have never been the first to violate them. Neither Francis Ona 
nor Sam Kauona has ever refused to negotiate. The two told me, when 
I met with them in January 199 1 ,  that they uphold the instruments of 
the peace accords. Both men also said that they would be prepared to 
be part of a team to renegotiate the Honiara Declaration, as long as the 
venue is on Bougainville. 
Unless Papua New Guinea also follows closely the directions of 
the Honiara Agreement, the problem on Bougainville will go 
unresolved for a long time. Critical to the Honiara Declaration is the use 
of a multinational supervisory team, to which (and only to which) the 
BRA would surrender their arms. This is where our neighbours such 
as Australia, New Zealand, the Solomons and Vanuatu could come in 
and take a positive role. 
Our people have been very suspicious of Australia because of the 
way in which it indirectly contributed to the worsening and lengthening 
of the war on Bougainville. But our people would like to see Australia 
play an active and much more positive role in the resolution of the 
conflict on Bougainville. I do not want to completely damn Australia 
and so would thank the Australian government for the way it has been 
able to help indirectly in meeting the humanitarian needs of 
Bougainville through assistance to the NGOs. 
For some time the BRA has been in a position to re-equip itself, 
and from my own observations when last on Bougainville, I believe 
that with the BRA strengthened the fight could go on indefinitely. 
Unless the Honiara Declaration is implemented, the Papua New 
Guinea-Bougainville theatre of war will not change from what it was in 
1 989-90. When the guerilla war was in full swing at that time, the 
entire area of Bougainville remained fully serviced. The people had 
hospitals, they had medicine, they had food, they had everything. It is 
not the case today, and my insistent call has been that all parties get to 
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the negotiating table so that a genuine resolution of the conflict can be 
found without delay. 
At present Papua New Guinea is trying to use the 'band-aid ' 
method to solve the crisis. In other words, the prime minister is saying, 
'We are capable of solving the problem ourselves, we have been able to 
get the consent of chiefs from point A and point B ,  and so on' . I would 
like to dispute this, because chiefs from point A and point B are part 
and parcel of the current crisis and they are in no position to come 
forward and contribute towards settling it. All they want is restoration 
of normal seivices such as medicines , clothing, etc . which have been 
barred from them , not by the BRA, but by the Papua New Guinea 
government. 
The Interim Government and the BRA leadership must be 
involved in resolving this issue. Unless they are made part of the 
process the picture is unlikely to change for a long time. This needs to 
be pointed out because Papua New Guinea's prime minister is trying 
his very best not to include the Interim Government and the BRA in the 
resolution of the conflict. It should be remembered, too, in future 
discussions that the future of the Panguna copper mine is in the hands 
of the landowners on Bougainville and not necessarily in the hands of 
CRA or the Papua New Guinea government. 
Our political direction 
There is not a shade of doubt that the people of Bougainville stand firm 
and together to eventually achieve their political independence. Never 
before has the people's solidarity been so firm as in the last three years, 
fighting with the government of Papua New Guinea. 
As espoused in the Universal Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, all indigenous peoples and individuals are born 
free and are equal to all other peoples and individuals in dignity and 
rights, in accordance with international standards. Indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-detennination, by virtue of which they may freely 
determine their political status, pursue their own economic, social, 
religious and cultural development, and determine their own political 
institutions. 
Claims to independence within states are increasing at an 
alarming rate. Great powers are now crumbling all over the world as 
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they can no longer withhold the legitimate rights of individual nation­
states and peoples . Small nation states have been increasing in 
numbers, and countries such as Papua New Guinea who are faced with 
this problem must quickly come to grips with it. Self-determination 
struggles by some seceding states have already received recognition on 
the world stage. While it may be a concept that frightens governments, 
it could also seive as a stabilizing factor in relations between states and 
peoples. 
The desire of the people of Bougainville to have their 
independence has been expressed for several decades. The Papua New 
Guinea government in trying to hang onto the status quo as a necessary 
prescription for peace is now living in a fantasy, similar to that 
indulged in by the government of Indonesia. Together they have 
become modem-day imperialists within the Pacific, claiming territories 
that clearly do not belong to them geographically, socially or politically. 
Self-determination has now been accepted by some modem-day 
states as not necessarily a ' threat' but as an opportunity. In Europe and 
in Africa, some affected governments have preferred to talk rather than 
to continue with anned conflict. The European and African experiences 
have shown clearly that use of the military has not succeeded in 
breaking down the determination of people fighting for their political 
independence. 
Bougainvilleans in pursuing their independence are also directly 
questioning the legitimacy of the political system of Papua New Guinea 
and its ability to provide a conducive framework for social and political 
change in the country. As Papua New Guinea has clearly not been able 
to provide a happy social framework for its own people (in view of the 
rise in law and order problems),  the chance of it providing an 
acceptable political atmosphere for the people of Bougainville is very 
remote. It is therefore an open-ended question which should be 
approached by Papua New Guinea in an innovative way as the people 
of Bougainville pursue political change. 
Conclusion 
The Bougainville situation is unique and will continue to be so. 
That must be appreciated in efforts to reach a satisfactory solution to the 
crisis.  The people of Bougainville are clearly not going to return to the 
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old status quo. The government of Papua New Guinea indirectly aided 
our bid for  independence by fighting a war against Bougainville in 
1 989, by imposing of an economic embargo against Bougainville, by 
re-invading and by subjecting our people to inhuman treatment. 
The independence of Bougainville which was first proclaimed on 
the l st of September 1975 and again on the 1 7  May 1990, is not illegal 
under international law, and neither international law nor the United 
Nations Charter forbid independence gained through anned rebellion. 
Although our independence is yet to be accepted on the world stage, the 
people of Bougainville have recognized and given this political 
independence to themselves. 
CHAPTER 1 4  
THE NEED FOR A MULTINATIO NAL 
SUPERVISORY TEAM ON BOUGAINVILLE 
AND B UKA* 
Matthew Spriggs 
The Multinational Supeivisory Team (MST), an international peace­
keeping force by any other name, was one of the tenns of the much­
maligned Honiara Declaration of 23 January 1 99 1 .  This agreement was 
soon declared dead and buried by a number of distinguished 
commentators, from Bernard Narokobi , who was one of the Papua 
New Guinea signatories , to most journalists with an interest in the 
region. 1 But like a punch-drunk phoenix the Honiara Declaration keeps 
* This paper was delivered at the Bougainville 1991 Update Conference as the last 
paper of the day. It benefited from points made by the earlier speakers but was 
given substantially as written immediately prior to the conference. Subsequently I 
have the benefit of hindsight not shared by most of the other contributors who 
submitted their papers for this volume either on the day of the conference or 
within a month of it taking place. In deference to them and the moment, I have 
decided to present the paper almost exactly as originally written. It addressed the 
issues as they appeared to me on 17 May 1991 ,  at a particular moment of the 
Bougainville crisis. One of the benefits of being an editor, however, is having 
the last word before a volume goes to press. In a postscript I consider how much 
the situation has or has not changed since May. 
1 
Pertinent statements include those of Rowan Callick: 'The sinking of the 
Sankamap initiative' (Pacific Islands Business, March 1991 )  and 'Many 
losers in Bougainville debacle ' (Australian Financial Review 12 March 
199 1 ); Mary Louise O'Callaghan: 'Relief shortlived as Bougainville rebels 
rewrite settlement script' (Sydney Morning Herald 21 February 199 1 )  and 
'Bougainville' s  thorny peace' (Melbourne Age 4 March 1 991) ;  Greg Austin: 
'Bougainville peace treaty is facing a rocky future' (Sydney Morning Herald 
16 February 1991 ); Roy Eccleston: ' PNG peace deal looks to be sunk' 
(Weekend Australian 23-24 February 1991); and Sir John Guise: 'What are 
the implications of the Honiara Declaration? ' (Times of PNG 7 February 
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rising from the ashes. Why? Because it is the only agreement there is, 
and if it is not in large part implemented there is unlikely to be another 
without terrible bloodshed. 
The MST is one of the key provisions of the Declaration. Among 
the 'Principles ' accepted by both sides was that: 
We agree to accept external assistance including a 
Multinational Supeivisory Team (MST) to contribute to 
the implementation of this Programme under the 
framework detennined in this Declaration. 
The national government undertook to 'organize a Multinational 
Supeivisory Team to participate in this Programme' of restoration of 
seivices. The Bougainville side 'disarms the BRA, BLF and its 
associated militant activities, including the surrender2 of anns under the 
supeivision of the Multinational Supeivisory Team' and also agreed to 
' guarantee the safety and welfare of members of the Multinational 
Supeivisory Team ' .  
The mention of  the BLF (Buka Liberation Front) i s  interesting as 
elsewhere in the Declaration it is stated that the document 'does not for 
the time being include the programme of restoration of seivices 
undertaken by the National Government on Buka and adjacent islands ' ,  
but also that ' the National Minister for Provincial Affairs shall 
determine and reconcile the relationships between these two 
programmes on advice from the Legal Authority in Bougainville ' .  This 
would seem to give considerable powers of discretion to the designated 
minister. 
The coalition of disparate forces called the 'national government 
of Papua New Guinea' includes as current minister for Provincial 
Affairs, Father John Momis, who is also designated as being in charge 
of the Bougainville Task Force overseeing the restoration of seivices to 
2 
199 1 .  See also 'Narokobi says peace plans will not work ' (Wally 
Hiambohn, Post-Courier 15 February 1991)  and 'Bougainville pact worthless 
says Namaliu' (Canberra Times 27 February 1991). 
The actual text as signed reads 'surrender and destruction' .  Two days after the 
signing Joseph Kabui, Leader of the Bougainville Delegation, wrote to Sir 
Michael Somare pointing out that this wording did not reflect agreed changes 
to the draft text and had been left in the final document in error. The Papua 
New Guinea government has never contradicted Kabui 's assertion. 
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the island. Father Momis strongly believes in the necessity of getting 
the MST on the ground, particularly since the landing of Papua New 
Guinea troops on North Bougainville in April 1 99 1  and the consequent 
potential for further armed conflict. 
Defence Minister Benais Sabumei , on the other hand, buoyed by 
the so-far unopposed landing of the troops in the north, considers that 
the MST is no longer necessary. This view is perhaps shared by Prime 
Minister Rabbie N amaliu who gave a joint press conference with 
Sabumei on 28 April 1 99 1  where he stated that, 'There may be no need 
if this rate of progress continues, and if on both sides we demonstrate 
that we are both committed to achieving a peaceful solution' (quoted in 
the Melbourne Age, 29 April 199 1 ) .  A few days after the press 
conference, however, a representative of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, who had been asked by the Papua New Guinea government 
to advise on the MST, flew to Arawa to meet with rebel leaders Francis 
Ona and Sam Kauona. They both expressed support for the MST, as 
have various regional BRA commanders since. A change of heart on 
both sides. The phoenix has risen again. 
Some of the comments made recently by Sabumei and Prime 
Minister Namaliu give the idea that the 'battle ' for Bougainville i s  
almost 'won ' ,  with BRA support dwindling, ground being regained, 
and so on. Graeme Kemelfield (in this volume) has commented on this 
short-term mentality, the delusion that things will be ' won' or 'lost ' on 
Bougainville in some easy and decisive manner. The problem involved 
is overconfidence, a di sease that has affected both sides during 
particular stages of the conflict. The overconfidence of BRA leaders 
started when the PNGDF withdrew in March 1990 and lasted through 
to about February 1991 .  Too hard a line on conditions for peace, pitiful 
diplomatic skills, and a too-clever 'swagger' for the media by figures 
such as Sam Kauona led to widespread dissatisfaction on Bougainville, 
and encouraged hardliners in the Papua New Guinea cabinet to try to 
scuttle the peace attempts. 
Following the redeployment of PNGDF troops on northern 
Bougainville, the overconfidence shifted to the Papua New Guinea 
government. It ought to be remembered that the 300 or so soldiers in 
the north are facing an estimated 1200 armed rebels of the Northern 
BRA Command. Their unmolested presence so far is through the 
choice of the BRA, sensitive to local village feeling, to allow in 
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supplies and seivices unmolested. One fanatical BRA, one drunk or 
bitter soldier, a shot fired and open warfare could be on again. While a 
peaceful PNGDF presence in the north and even the southern part of 
Bougainville might be tolerated in the short term, any attempt to enter 
the more committed and heavily-armed BRA heartlands round the 
Panguna mine at this stage will inevitably bring the entire island back 
into the war theatre. That there is no military solution possible to end 
the crisis is a view stated many times, but it seems that the apparent 
'victory' in northern Bougainville may have made some sections of the 
Papua New Guinea government forget this fact. 
There are two main versions of why Papua New Guinea agreed 
to a ceasefire and withdrew troops and police from the province in 
March 1 990. The BRA version is that they had won. They were 
carrying the war from the countryside into the towns and were about to 
overrun the PNGDF base camps. The Papua New Guinea version is 
that the government was responding to mounting national and 
international pressure over human rights abuses by the PNGDF and so 
reined in 'the dogs of war' (Bernard Narokobi's phrase) . 
Whichever version is true, no-one can deny the extremely 
effective guerilla tactics the BRA used during the 1 989- 1990 fighting. 
It would be most unwise to write them off now as a spent force. If the 
government version is true, we have to ask what has changed since? Is 
the PNGDF capable of such human rights abuses again? Despite recent 
talk of a 'hearts and minds ' campaign, there is little evidence that if 
faced with a combat situation the army will not revert to its previous 
behaviour towards the civilian population. Continuing problems of 
discipline can be seen in incidents such as the recent trashing of an Air 
Niugini plane at Rabaul by drunken soldiers returning from Buka 
(Post-Courier 1 5  April 1 99 1 ) .  The full story of the PNGDF's 
campaign on Buka from September 1 990 onwards will doubtless 
eventually come out. Already there are claims that human rights 
violations by the security forces at least equalled and may have 
exceeded what had happened previously on Bougainville. Such claims 
appear to be supported by televised eyewitness accounts of summary 
executions of BRA supporters on Buka (ABC Television Programme, 
'Blood on the Bougainvillea ' ,  26 June 1 99 1 ). The soldiers who took 
part in the 1989- 1990 human rights abuses have not, with one possible 
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exception, been disciplined. They are still presumably in the Defence 
Force and quite possibly stationed on Buka or Bougainville. 
Let us remember Aloysius Minitong, a Bougainville farmer 
accused of BRA membership (Plate 1). In this and subsequent pictures 
he is shown being humiliated by Papua New Guinea troops, forced to 
hold captured shotguns and a label saying 'Rambo ' (Plate 2). The 
PNGDF referred to the BRA as 'Rambos ' ,  after initial BRA demands 
had been signed by groups with names such as 'Rambo 1 '  and 'Rambo 
2 ' . The pictures were taken by a soldier at Panguna, possibly at Camp 
10, soon after Minitong's arrest on 7 December 1 989 and prior to his 
death in police custody on 28 December of that year, apparently from 
pneumonia. The Amnesty International report of November 1 990 
includes some details of Minitong's treatment at the hands of the 
PNGDF: 
According to reports , Aloysius Minitong, was held 
briefly at Boku Police Station, where he reportedly 
received injuries as a result of beatings by members of the 
PNGDF. After being transferred to Army Camp 10 at 
Panguna, he was said to have been beaten and kicked 
· until he lost consciousness . He was taken to Arawa 
General Hospital on the same day where he received 
treatment for minor lacerations to the forehead, right 
eyebrow, lips , right hand and left foot. According to a 
hospital official, he was "subsequently withdrawn from 
the hospital by the PNGDF without medical clearance and 
against medical advice." From the hospital, he was taken 
to the Joint Forces Headquarters in Arawa where he 
received further beatings and then to the Arawa Police 
Station. Though seriously ill , he received no medical 
attention there and was made to sleep without bedding on 
a concrete floor (Amnesty International 1990:25). 
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Amnesty International did not have access to these pictures when they 
produced their report. The facial injuries visible on the photographs are 
consistent with Minitong's reported condition on admission to Arawa 
hospital, and thus they form important corroborating evidence. Also 
important, however, are the soldiers who are visible on the 
photographs . In Plate 2 who are the men to right and left of Minitong, 
posing with the victim? In the Plate 3 closeup who is the soldier just 
behind him? In Plate 4 who is the soldier standing guard in the 
courtyard? The PNGDF is not a large organization. These people are 
recognizable and should be identified with a view to court action. 
One reason the MST is urgently needed is to protect 
Bougainvilleans from such incidents recurring in a situation where 
further PNGDF intervention is an ever-present threat. Another reason 
is to prevent intimidation of witnesses in the necessary investigations of 
human rights abuses in the province. 
But the PNGDF is clearly not the only force the people of 
Bougainville need to be protected from. No similar pictures are 
available as yet of BRA human rights abuses, but they have certainly 
occurred (cf. Amnesty International 1 990 : 3 6 -40) . Many 
Bougainvilleans may be equally if not more afraid of a BRA presence 
in their area. The BRA and BLF must be disarmed for the same reasons 
that the PNGDF must be totally withdrawn from the province. 
Only with the MST in place will Bougainvilleans be able freely to 
rebuild their lives without fear and to express their wishes for the future 
status of the Province. At various times both the BRA and Papua New 
Guinea government have claimed 90 per cent support from the 
Bougainvillean population. At some stage someone is going to have to 
ask the population what it wants. When that moment comes, the people 
must be able to express their opinions without fear of intimidation by 
either side. Only the presence of a neutral force will allow that. The 
Australian government should respond positively to the efforts being 
made by Father Momis and some other members of the Papua New 
Guinea government, and the plea of Michael Ogio and other 
Bougainvillean MPs to get the MST organized and in place . As the 
Australian Government shapes its policies towards Bougainville and 
the role of the MST, it should remember Aloysius Minitong, and all the 
others who did not leave a trace of their ordeal. 
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Postscript :  five months of l ittle progress 
Optimism in Papua New Guinea about an early settlement of the crisis 
has now evaporated , and a hardening of attitudes by both sides is 
evident at time of writing. The question of the MST remains unresolved 
and planned peace talks were aborted upon the demand by the 
Bougainville Interim Government that the MST be put in place prior to 
peace talks and that the PNGDF be removed from the Province and 
from their forward base at Rabaul (Pacnews 21 August 199 1 ). 
There is some logic but little diplomatic acumen in the 
Bougainville position. As the MST was an agreed part of the Honiara 
Declaration (indeed it was meant to be in place within 30 days of its 
signing) they feel that no further talks are necessary prior to its 
deployment. This is logical but unhelpful. The demand for withdrawal 
of troops even from Rabaul is in frustration at PNGDF detention there 
of urgently needed medical supplies and personnel provided by the Red 
Cross,  and a feeling that the Defence Force continues to act 
independently and at times in defiance of the civilian powers. Recent 
reports of a helicopter and patrol boat attack on the north Bougainville 
village of Iaun do nothing to alleviate such concerns (Pacnews 23 
August 1 99 1  ). Again, the Bougainville position is perhaps 
understandable but unlikely to assist progress towards peace. 
There was a detectable hardening of Papua New Guinea's 
position when late in June and in July PNGDF soldiers came under 
attack in northern Bougainville. In the June incident one soldier was 
slightly wounded but in the first of the July attacks two soldiers were 
killed and a third wounded. Two soldiers were wounded in a further 
shooting a few days later. It was claimed that the attacks were carried 
out by BRA soldiers from the Central Command based in Kieta (Times 
of P NG 8 August 1 99 1  ), perhaps angered at the seemingly good 
relations between Peter Barik, BRA Northern Commander, and 
PNGDF troops restoring seivices at the northern tip of the island. The 
Bougainville Interim Government had claimed at the beginning of July 
that the PNGDF were about to launch further military incursions and so 
the attacks might also be interpreted as warnings to forestall these 
supposed plans. 
The visit to Geneva in July and August of Bougainville Interim 
Government Chairman Joseph Kabui and prominent secessionist 
supporters , to address the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
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Populations and other international bodies, further angered the Papua 
New Guinea government. Because of this trip peace talks originally 
scheduled for July had to be rescheduled to late August and were 
eventually cancelled. The August talks had been scheduled to take place 
on New Zealand naval vessels off the Bougainville coast, to be chaired 
by former New Zealand governor-general, Sir Paul Reeves, and 
attended by Commonwealth secretary-general, Chief Emeka Anyaoku. 
Commonwealth involvement is seen as crucial if the previously 
agreed MST, to be made up of troops and police from Commonwealth 
member nations, is to be deployed successfully and the BRA and BLF 
disarmed. The apparent success of the Bougainville delegation in 
Geneva in attracting international support may have emboldened them 
to take a strong position on the removal of PNGDF troops prior to 
further talks. Alternatively, the absence of Joseph Kabui in Geneva 
may have removed a moderating influence on BRA hardliners in the 
crucial weeks leading up to the talks. The commitment of the Papua 
New Guinea government to the idea of the MST has never been- very 
strong and it too may have been looking for excuses to abort the talks. 
Whatever the reasons, the best chance for progress on the MST issue 
since the signing of the Honiara Declaration in January 199 1  has been 
lost. 
All is not lost, however, as seemingly successful talks have 
taken place at a lower level to get the peace process back on track and to 
work out agreed conditions for higher-level negotiations (Post-Courier 
1 1  September 1991) . It is still the case that the Honiara Declaration is 
the only agreement there is, and that negotiation is the only way to 
settle the ongoing crisis. One can only hope that common sense will 
prevail and that the Honiara phoenix will arise once again. 
CHAPTER 1 5  
BOUGAINVILLE UPDATE : MAY TO 
OC TOBER 1991 
Matthew Spriggs 
As I write (November 1991 ) ,  a peaceful resolution of the Bougainville 
crisis appears as elusive as ever: the two main sides in the conflict 
perhaps further apart, the medical situation on Bougainville worse, 
Papua New Guinea's international standing lower, and its relations 
with the Solomon Islands still strained. The Interim government on 
Bougainville remains unable to provide effective administration, the 
BRA leaders still unable (or unwilling) to maintain discipline among 
those who profess allegiance to it. On Buka the rhetoric of loyalty to 
Papua New Guinea and rehabilitation is ,  if anything, more strident, 
while in reality many live in fear. This is not to say that nothing 
happened during the past five months. The military and political 
situations remain fluid, the players by turns optimistic, pessimistic, 
over-confident, frustrated or angry. 
The timing of the Update Conference from which this book 
derives was selected to mark - but not celebrate - the first anniversary 
of the UDI of the Republic of Bougainville on 17 May 1 990. It formed 
a useful break in constructing this political chronicle, marking the point 
to which most contributors had up-to-date knowledge of events in the 
North Solomons. 
Days of hope 
Until late June there seemed to be signs that tensions were easing. 
Medical seivices were reaching all accessible parts of Bougainville, and 
the planned six-monthly review of the Honiara Declaration seemed 
likely to proceed. All was not rosy, of course. The dispute between the 
PNGDF and the civilian Task Force came to a head. In the end Colonel 
Nuia of the PNGDF and the two leading members of Father John 
Momis 's  Task Force became the casualties (or sacrificial victims) 
n�cessary to resolve this dispute. 
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When Radio North Solomons returned to air in May 1 99 1 ,  
Bernard Simiha of the Task Force is alleged to have broadcast remarks 
critical of PNGDF involvement in restoring services, calling on local 
chiefs not to heed Colonel Nuia, nor to cooperate with his restoration 
efforts (Post-Courier 21 May 1991) .  On 25 May Nuia flew to Rabaul, 
called Simiha to his office, bashed him severely, and threatened worse 
if his criticism continued. Nuia was later quoted as casting doubt on 
Simiha's allegiance during earlier phases of the conflict (Times of PNG 
30 May 1 99 1). Cabinet's failure to investigate is  symptomatic of the 
isolation of Momis at this time, rather than of Nuia  being beyond 
government control. Some weeks later Simiha fled to the Solomons, 
being charged with membership of the BRA and fearing arrest. 
Not so lucky was another important Task Force figure, Patrick 
Itta, arrested on 25 June and charged with sedition. Quoting an 
intelligence source in Rabaul, the Post-Courier (26 June 199 1) reported 
'Patrick and a number of Bougainvilleans now working for the 
government have been under close surveillance for a long time since 
they joined the Task Force' .  The remarkable coincidence of ltta's arrest 
and Nuia's sacking (see below) is a hint that political chess was being 
played. The Itta story ended happily however. Released on bail to carry 
on Task Force work, Itta was later acquitted by Justice Ellis (Post­
Courier 30 August 1991 ). The judge commented that ' it seemed bizarre 
that the State was on the one hand using Itta to try and achieve a 
peaceful resolution of the Bougainville crisis while on the other it was 
charging him for associating himself with BRA. Obviously the 
government selected to have a middle man such as ltta who was able to 
make contact with BRA at the same time. In these circumstances, this 
outcome represents a victory for commonsense' .  By the end of August, 
of course, the dust had settled after the sacking of Colonel Nuia. 
Before Itta's arrest and Simiha's flight, Momis's Task Force had 
continued to be quiet achievers. It was claimed at the beginning of June 
that most schools on Bougainville had reopened as well as many aid 
posts and Arawa Hospital's dental clinic,  out-patients and maternity 
wards (Post-Courier 3 June 199 1 ). By mid-June a move of the Task 
Force headquarters from Rabaul to Kieta was said to be imminent, with 
six coordinating centres to be linked by two-way radio (Post-Courier 
14  and 1 9  June 1991).  The Task Force met the Interim government to 
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discuss the return of PTC, Eleam and Water Board personnel, to 
restore urban services to Kieta and Arawa (Times of PNG, 20 June). 
This was perhaps the high point of Task Force efforts. In the 
following weeks things fell apart. On the same day as the report of the 
meeting there was also a report of another meeting at Panguna where 
400 'chiefs '  from throughout Bougainville reiterated their support for 
secession and called for a multinational supervisory team (MST) to be 
sent to Bougainville (Sydney Morning Herald 20 June 1991 ) .  Francis 
Ona had previously called for the MST to be in place prior to the next 
round of peace talks (Times of PNG 30 May 1 99 1).  The chiefs ' 
support for secession clearly worried the Buka leaders and the national 
government (Times of PNG 20 June 199 1 ;  Canberra Times 25 June 
1 99 1 ). 
A dispute arose over three people, one from Buka, being forcibly 
removed from the MV Sankamap which docked at Kieta en route to 
Buka and Rabaul, supposedly because they had no BRA clearance to 
leave (Post-Courier 25 June 199 1) .  This clear breach of the Honiara 
Accord led Administrator Sam Tula on Buka to threaten not to allow 
the vessel to proceed to Rabaul. Patrick Itta was in fact arrested while 
on Buka trying to sort out this dispute. A similar incident in July, when 
crew members were threatened at gun point, ended direct shipping 
links to Kieta, and a protest note was sent to the BRA by the shipping 
company (Post-Courier 19  July 199 1) . At that time there were still 
shipping services to Tinputz, Wakunai , Buin and the west coast, 
although my last record of shipping was when the MV Beaumaris 
carried supplies to flood victims in Buin in early August (Times of 
PNG 1 August 199 1). It returned to Rabaul carrying 2 1  people needing 
medical attention, 397 bags of cocoa and 23 1 of copra. 
One reason for the ending of shipping services may have been 
the accusation by Prime Minister N amaliu that the proceeds of cocoa 
and copra sales were being used to buy arms which were then 
smuggled in through the Solomons (AAP 25 July 1 99 1 ).  This was 
denied by B ougainville Council of Chiefs spokesman Thomas 
Koronaru (Pacnews 6 August 1 99 1 ), but at least some arms were 
entering by that route, as shown by the arrest of Bougainvilleans in the 
Solomons on their way home with a rifle and over 1 500 rounds of 
ammunition (Post-Courier 19, 20 August 1 99 1). 
Bougainville Update: May to October 1991 1 8 5 
Nuia:  fall or push ? 
The discrediting of Task Force members and the sacking of Colonel 
Nuia are coincidental and perhaps related events. The screening of the 
AB C Television ' Four Corners ' documentary, ' Blood on the 
Bougainvillea' on 24 June precipitated Nuia's dismissal, specifically an 
interview in which he confirmed the oft-denied ' St Valentine's Day 
Massacre' of early 1990 (in this incident Pastor Benito Raumo and four 
of five parishioners were shot by PNGDF soldiers, and their bodies 
dumped at sea from an Australian-supplied helicopter) . Nuia also 
confinned the use of the Australian helicopters as firing platforms for 
machine guns, in contravention of the agreement limiting them to non­
offensive operations . The Papua New Guinea government cried foul, 
claiming that he had earlier denied any such massacre. The sacking was 
also said to have averted a diplomatic row with Australia over the use 
of the helicopters. 
The mock horror of politicians and pundits in both countries, at 
the revelation, was less than convincing. Full details of the massacre 
were available to both governments within days of its occurrence and 
had been reported extensively, while the Australian pilot who flew the 
body-dumping mission lives in Sydney and could easily have been 
(and presumably was) interviewed by Australian Intelligence and 
Defence officers. Blaming Nuia let a lot of others off the hook, and his 
' loose cannon' reputation allowed both governments to distance 
themselves from the actions of troops under his command. Seasoned 
non-AB C journalists in Australia felt that the ' Four Comers ' 
documentary team had been taken for a ride and their programme 
manipulated by those who wanted Nuia to take responsibility for 
actions which could have embarrassed both governments. One 
journalist told me that champagne corks were popping (one assumes 
figuratively) in the Department of Defence in Canberra after the 
programme went to air. 
Why did Nuia cooperate in the destruction of his career? Those 
who believe that he acted independently, and had defied the 
government for months, read the interview as symptomatic of a man 
who believed himself beyond the law. That view could be supported by 
leading questions about his possible involvement in a coup, and John 
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Momis 's statement on the program that 'we may not need a military 
coup. They are probably running the country now' . 
This is not a wholly convincing scenario. The Papua New 
Guinea government is  partly shielded from criticism if it can be 
suggested that the Defence Force has acted independently. Nuia's 
flamboyant style would mark him out as an excellent scapegoat. The 
Post-Courier quoted an unnamed senior Defence Force intelligence 
officer who claimed that Australian Defence Intelligence was 
responsible for Nuia's sacking. This report is  not wholly convincing 
either, but is worth quoting for the different interpretation it presents. 
In fact the television program [Four Corners] which 
finally led to Col. Nuia's sacking was set up specifically 
to have the Colonel talk about the atrocities in 
Bougainville and the soldiers ' behaviour during the 
crisis. 
Col. Nuia knew what he was saying on the program and 
he knew the Australian Intelligence was behind the 
programming of the TV interview on human rights 
abuses on Bougainville and the use of Australian­
supplied Iroquois helicopters and other Defence Force 
assistance. 
It was out of frustration that Col. Nuia said what he said 
because of the number of misleading intelligence reports 
which the Australians were sending to the government on 
his behaviour in the force (Post-Courier 1 1  July 1991) .  
The report suggested that he had been targeted because some 
Papua New Guinea politicians ' feel they cannot have young nationals 
telling them what to do in the running of the country ' .  While that does 
not seem a credible explanation, it is still possible that Australian 
pressure had the effect (or intention) of strengthening the position of 
the 'doves ' in the Papua New Guinea cabinet. 
Coming to grips with human rights i ssues? 
Nuia's revelations were not the only reference to PNGDF abuses on 
the Four Comers documentary. In the earlier update chapter I 
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mentioned the eye-witness accounts by John Kolan and Julian Nogos, 
of atrocities on Buka. In the furore over Nuia, these .passed without 
comment in the media. 
The sacking certainly helped to blunt attacks on Papua New 
Guinea's human rights record, and defused any criticism which might 
have been voiced at the annual Australian Labor Party Conference, 
including criticism of Australian military aid to Papua New Guinea. A 
motion sponsored by Senator Gareth Evans was thus more ' even­
handed ' than it might have been, condemning equally BRA and 
PNGDF abuses and calling for an investigation. Prime Minister 
Namaliu had doubtless been briefed about this motion. As soon as it 
passed, he announced an independent commission of enquiry 'when 
the circumstances allow' (Canberra Times 21 June 199 1 ;  Sydney 
Morning Herald 21 June 199 1).  
The Papua New Guinea government has had real problems in 
knowing what to do about human rights abuses. International and 
domestic credibility require some interim investigation before the 
promised enquiry - which may be years away. In early July it was 
announced that some human rights abuse cases already before the 
courts would be heard, starting with 2 1  cases of alleged abuses by 
security forces at the Hahela Evacuation Camp on Buka in late 1990 or 
early 199 1 .  The hearing was set for 5 August, but was then delayed 
until 1 October and shifted from Buka to Rabaul (Post-Courier 7 
August 199 1  ). I have seen no further reports on these hearings. 
In August Attorney-General N arokobi announced a coronial 
inquest on the deaths during the Bougainville crisis (Post-Courier 14 
August 199 1 ) .  In September a senior magistrate was appointed to 
conduct an inquest into the deaths of John Bika, Matthew Kove, James 
lroro, Joel Naisy, Peter Kaipas (actually Kuypers), Peter Sisio, 
Clement Gesi , Aloysius Minitong, Patrick Pere, Michael Tunkana and 
Paulus Harepa (Post-Courier 10 September 199 1). The first six named 
(and perhaps the seventh) were allegedly killed or mistreated by the 
BRA. Peter Kuypers, a white resident of Bougainville, had been badly 
beaten by the PNGDF and later by the BRA as well, but may have died 
of natural causes. The fate of Bika, Iroro and Naisy is discussed in the 
November 1 990 Amnesty International report. Only Aloysius 
Minitong, whose case featured in the Amnesty report and on SBS 
television in Australia, has been identified as a PNGDF victim. No 
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details are available to me on who was involved in the deaths of the last 
three victims. Presumably the selection of cases was intended to 
counter Interim government claims of Papua New Guinea government 
abuses of human rights. 
Apart from eye-witness accounts of abuses on Buka in the Four 
Comers programme, there are persistent rumours of large-scale killing 
of BRA suspects at the hands of the Buka Liberation Front and 
PNGDF 'death squads ' .  A document recently acquired lists 49 people 
said to have been killed on Buka by the BLF and/or security forces. 
Some allegations are gruesome in the extreme, describing people cut to 
pieces, buried or burned alive, disembowelled or dismembered before 
death. For most alleged victims, the village of origin is listed : seven 
from Eltupan, six from Tohatsi. Twelve victims were said to have been 
taken from one of the care centres and burned to death by members of 
the Papua New Guinea security forces at the United Church plantation 
at Tulaen. The deaths of eleven people in this incident have been 
independently verified : they were beaten to death and thei r bodies 
partly cremated. While other allegations in this report cannot be verified 
at present, the report certainly warrants serious investigation, since the 
area i s  entirely under PNGDF control and names could readily be 
checked. A further report from Buka relating to one of the care centres 
for displaced people also raises human rights concerns. 
Bernard N arokobi has recently expressed concern over 
institutionalized human rights abuses throughout Papua New Guinea, 
proposing a general commission of enquiry and a ten-year awareness 
campaign with UN assistance. He referred to ' continuous abuses ' of 
human rights on Bougainville, but the report (' Call for UN help on 
human rights ' ,  Sydney Morning Herald 3 1  October 1 99 1 )  does not 
make clear whether he meant abuses by the government, or the BRA, 
or both. 
'Germ warfare' :  the denial of medical aid 
The Australian Labor Party resolution also asserted 'the government's 
determination that food, medicine and essential services continue to be 
supplied to the people of Bougainville ' (Sydney Morning Herald 21 
June 1 99 1) .  The first shipment of Red Cross supplies arrived on 
Bougainville on 3 June, the result of a world-wide appeal which raised 
Bougainville Update: May to October 1991 1 8 9 
nearly K200,000 by July. With the end of direct shipping services to 
Kieta in July, and the severe restriction of services to other ports, the 
medical situation began to worsen. 
The Papua New Guinea Red Cross sought exclusive rights under 
the Geneva Convention to enter Bougainville on humanitarian grounds, 
and to be allowed to ship in much-needed medical supplies stored in 
Rabaul (Pacnews 22 August 1 99 1 ) .  A vaccination program was 
urgently needed for the estimated 8000 to 10,000 babies born since the 
blockade, to prevent outbreaks of measles and polio. Russell Rollasson 
of ACFOA complained at the end of August that Papua New Guinea 
was thwarting the vaccination programme by hampering access. 
ACFOA had managed to get only two emergency medical shipments 
through to Bougainville since the signing of the Honiara Declaration 
(The Times (London) 30 August 199 1 ). 
In August Bishop John Zale, Health minister in the Interim 
government, presented incomplete statistics for the first seven months 
of 199 1 , from 1 8  out of 23 health centres on Bougainville. 2�032 
deaths were reported, 600 from malaria, 252 from respiratory diseases 
such as pneumonia, 43 from tuberculosis, 1 1  from yaws or ulcers, 25 
from gastroenteritis, 9 from diabetes, 28 from asthma, 19 from cancer, 
5 1 6  still-births, 427 neo-natal deaths and 102 mothers dying in child­
birth. 
Twice in October measles vaccination kits destined for 
Bougainville were removed from Red Cross chartered aeroplanes at 
Buka and destroyed by the PNGDF (Sydney Morning Herald 14  
October 1 99 1 ). In  September, despite an agreement between the Red 
Cross and the Papua New Guinea government, supplies and medical 
personnel were ordered off a ship in Rabaul after they had been loaded 
fo r  Bougainville. The Red Cross threatened to pull out of the 
programme.  The Sydney Morning Herald article reported that the 
cabinet had approved - but had not yet announced - a new policy on 
NGOs,  banning them from any part of the country not under 
government control. The policy was made explicit a few days later by 
Namaliu, in response to Red Cross concern and adverse publicity. 
Namaliu said that all supplies must be routed through Buka and 'aid 
organisations providing supplies and medicine should, when they go 
from Buka, fly the PNG flag on their ships, and they were free to go 
anywhere except to Arawa, a rebel strong-hold ' (Post-Courier 1 7  
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October 1 99 1 ) The new policy surprised the Red Cross: ' Our 
understanding reached six months ago was that we should base 
ourselves in Rabaul and work from there ' (Xiaohua Wang, the Red 
Cross Pacific delegate, quoted in the Melbourne Age 11 October 199 1).  
The Red Cross had been attempting to place its doctors and vaccination 
programme for six months, so confusion over procedures could hardly 
be the real reason for the delay. The prime minister's statement seemed 
designed to pre-empt criticism of Papua New Guinea at the CHOGM 
meeting in Harare. It was already known that the rebels would send a 
spokesman to lobby for the Bougainville side. 
Administrator Tulo defended the indefensible by claiming that the 
Red Cross was being used overseas to promote the secessionist idea 
and that 'medical supplies intended for the whole of Bougainville had 
been misused, stolen, or sold to the people who needed them more than 
anything else ' .  He also used the old line (used by Ted Diro in denying 
medical supplies in January 1 991 )  that Papua New Guinea's actions 
were to ensure the security of international organizations such as the 
Red Cross (Post-Courier 1 8  October 199 1 ) . Even more absurd claims 
were attributed to Romeo Tohiana, a Buka Council of Chiefs official, 
who called on charity groups to withhold aid from Bougainville : he 
was quoted as claiming that it was the BRA who were refusing to allow 
international organizations and churches to bring help and services to 
Bougainville (Post-Courier 25 October 1991 ). 
On 19  October the ALP's  Victoria State Branch Conference 
passed a resolution noting that 'by barring the Red Cross, the Papua 
New Guinea government is effectively ignoring international 
obligations to which it  is a signatory. We call on the Australian 
government to suspend all military aid to Papua New Guinea until a 
satisfactory arrangement is made to ensure the health and safety of all 
Bougainville citizens ' .  
At the time of writing, Red Cross programmes have not been 
allowed to proceed. The Papua New Guinea government's actions may 
well be remembered as the most serious breach of human rights during 
the crisis : they certainly provide the best ammunition for the rebels in 
their international campaign for recognition. No factor has done more 
to bring the Papua New Guinea government into international 
disrepute. There have been suggestions that this contributed to the 
failure of Sir Michael Somare's campaign to become president of the 
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UN. I t  is unclear why the government clings to the policy, and 
apologists are forced to reiterate Jim Griffin's rather stale argument that 
there are many parts of Papua New Guinea with few doctors and scant 
medical supplies (see, for example , Rowan Callick, Australian 
Financial Review 24 Oc_tober 1991). On the other hand, no other Papua 
New Guinea community of 1 50,000 people has only two doctors, no 
childhood immunization programme, no operating hospital facilities 
and virtually no medical supplies of any kind. Russell Rollasson's 
comparison is with Mozambique (The Times (London) 30 August 
1 99 1  ), but even there three doctors can be found for every 1 50,000 
people . 
Moving offshore: Bougainville takes its case abroad 
The Bougainville side finally got its diplomatic act together with trips 
by delegations to UN meetings in Geneva, the Pacific Council of 
Churches Assembly in Vanuatu, and the Commonwealth Heads of 
government Meeting (CHOGM) in Harare. 
The Geneva trip by Interim government Chainnan Joe Kabui, the 
' Special Representative in Australia ' ,  Moses Havini , and 'Trade 
Spokesman' Mike Forster, caught the Papua New Guinea government 
unawares. (A shorter visit to Geneva was also made by Martin Miriori 
and Reuben Siara.) Hearing about the trip while he attended the South 
Pacific Forum meeting in Micronesia, Namaliu urged Gareth Evans to 
' crack down' on secessionist sympathizers in Australia whom he said 
had organized it. He named Havini and Forster fairly enough, but 
added Graeme Kemelfield who had nothing to do with the trip and has 
strongly denied any association with the BRA. 
Kabui addressed the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations , giving the background to Bougainville's claim to 
independence, and drawing attention to human rights abuses by Papua 
New Guinea government forces. The case was ref erred to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights who decided to investigate further 
(Times of PNG 12  September 1991) .  To counter these submissions, 
Papua New Guinea dispatched its ambassador to the European 
Economic Community, Charles Lepani. Although Somare expressed 
satisfaction with Lepani's perfonnance, he was putting a brave face on 
a situation in which the government was embarrassed while Somare 
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was running for the UN presidency. During the European trip, 
Bougainville was admitted as a full member of the Unrepresented 
Peoples ' Organisation (UNPO) based in the Hague , thus gaining 
further credibility and publicity. 
On the way home, Kabui called in at Sydney (his Australian visa 
was given on condition that he refrain from speaking to the press) , 
Vanuatu , and the Solomons. In Vanuatu he met then-Prime Minister 
Walter Lini and delegates to the Pacific Council of Churches Assembly. 
Also attending the Assembly was Bishop John Zale, who received a 
sympathetic hearing. The PCC passed several resolutions highly critical 
of the Papua New Guinea government's actions in Bougainville. They 
recognized Bougainville's right to self-determination and urged the 
Papua New Guinea government to agree to a referendum on 
Bougainville's relations with Papua New Guinea; they proposed that 
both sides lay down their arms in accordance with the Honiara 
Declaration; they recommended that Papua New Guinea lift its blockade 
and facilitate the deployment of a MST; and they urged that NGOs such 
as the Red Cross be allowed access to the island (Times of PNG 12  
September 1991) .  Namaliu rejected the call for  a referendum , adding 
that the constitution did not provide for one. His response to the other 
resolutions was not recorded (Post-Courier 23 September 199 1 ). 
Moses Havini flew to Harare in October to lobby CHOGM for 
an end to Papua New Guinea's blockade of goods and medicines 
(Post-Courier 18 October 199 1 ). Reports of his trip were not available 
at the time of writing. 
The Solomons factor 
Kabui and others were able to travel overseas only through the tacit 
support of the Solomon Islands government, which has allowed them 
to transit on several occasions. Strained relations between Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands have continued and even worsened. 
Buka leaders ' calls for the Solomons to keep out of what is a strictly 
internal Papua New Guinea affair must seem strange to the people of 
Western and Choiseul provinces who have close kin across the 
international border. It is inevitable that Solomon Islands politicians are 
sensitive to an increasingly widespread feeling that Papua New Guinea 
is waging war on ' our' people in Bougainville. Idle talk in Honiara of 
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raising an ' International Brigade ' is ,  for the moment, mere talk; but 
resentment is likely to grow unless the conflict is quickly and 
peacefully resolved. Relations with Papua New Guinea became so poor 
that there was serious talk at the highest levels in Honiara of 
recognizing Bougainville's independence. Chiefs from the Western 
Solomons, and former prime minister Ezekiel Alebua,  sent 
congratulatory messages on the 17 May anniversary of Bougainville's 
UDI (Times of PNG 23 May 199 1) .  
In June the chairman of the Buka Interim Authority, Joseph 
Hapisiria, called on Papua New Guinea to protest against the Solomon 
Islands allowing secessionist leaders to travel freely there (Post-Courier 
25 June 199 1 ) . Papua New Guinea did so a few days later, perhaps 
angry that Bernard Simiha (whose wife is a Solomons citizen) had 
escaped the net which caught Patrick Itta. It was alleged that 'well 
known BRA officials ' Simiha, Reuben Siara and Martin Miriori had set 
up a BRA liaison office in Honiara and had close links with individuals 
in the government. Papua New Guinea recalled its newly-appointed 
high commissioner from Honiara for a briefing, and asked that the 
Solomons 'remove all BRA facilities and personnel and bar the entry or 
re-entry of Papua New Guinea citizens from Bougainville identified as 
having BRA connections ' (Post-Courier 27 June 1991 ). 
The official Solomon Islands response came on 23 July, 
dismissing Papua New Guinea's protest. The reply noted that all three 
men mentioned had entered the country through legal channels, and 
further noted that Siara and Miriori had since returned to Bougainville 
(Post-Courier 26 July 1 99 1 ) . In the same week the parliamentary 
opposition leader, Andrew Nori, proposed a six-phase peace plan 
leading to Bougainville's independence in five years. In it, Solomon 
Islands, Australia and New Zealand would help in restoring seIVices 
and rehabilitating Bougainville. Namaliu not surprisingly rejected 
Nori's plan, and AAP quoted him as saying that he knew it would also 
be rejected by the Solomon Islands government: 'They have a similar 
problem in the Western Solomons, and some of the people they have in 
Parliament come from that area. They obviously have sympathies with 
the [secessionist] people of Bougainville out of self-interest. If we 
allow Bougainville to go, that will strengthen their case to do the same ' 
(AAP 26 July 199 1) .  However, Andrew Nori is from Malaita, not 
from the Western Province. Papua New Guinea  may have 
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underestimated a very general feeling of kinship with Bougainvilleans 
among Solomon Island citizens , and a common view of Papua New 
Guinea as an arrogant and dangerous neighbour. As a Solomon Island 
acquaintance put it: 'We see Papua New Guinea in the same way as 
you [Papua New Guineans] see Indonesia. ' 
Further tension was generated when it was reported that two 
(later reports mentioned three) BRA soldiers wounded in a fight with 
the PNGDF were being treated for bullet wounds in a Honiara hospital. 
Doctors reported that they had treated 'many ' Bougainvilleans at the 
hospital over the previous six months, who had then returned to 
Bougainville (Post-Courier 8 August 1 99 1 ) .  Papua New Guinea 
dispatched a delegation to Honiara in mid August in the wake of the 
Geneva trip, to seek restrictions on Bougainville leaders travelling 
through the Solomons. The delegation comprised members of the 
Prime Minister's Department, the National Intelligence Organisation, 
police and PNGDF (Pacnews 1 3, 15 August 1991 ) .  
Members of this delegation caused a diplomatic incident by 
demanding to see the three BRA soldiers in the hospital. Solomon 
Islands Health Minister Nathaniel Su pa prevented them from entering 
the ward ' in view of the war situation between Bougainville and Papua 
New Guinea . . .  and because he did not know their intentions. ' He and 
the minister for Police and Justice , Albert Laore, refused to see the two 
Papua New Guinea officials, saying that they had not followed 
protocol in the Solomon Islands (Pacnews 23 August 1 99 1 ) .  Papua 
New Guinea issued another protest over the provision of medical 
treatment to BRA soldiers, and said that the use of the country as a 
haven could have adverse effects on relations between the two 
countries. Papua New Guinea also expressed concern over a ' rampant 
and massive propaganda campaign' being waged on behalf of the BRA 
(Pacnews 26 August 1 99 1). 
Papua New Guinea proposed an extradition treaty as a means of 
controlling secessionist activity. Minister Laore was quoted as saying 
that the proposed treaty was 'untimely in the light of the Bougainville 
Crisis'  (Pacnews 30 August 1 991) . It was later reported that a proposal 
had been put forward in the first week of September, and (according to 
Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs Secretary Gabriel Dusava) ' the 
initial reaction from the Solomons was good ' (Post-Courier 1 1  
September 1991 ) . No further development has been reported , but in 
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late October Romeo Tohiana, adviser to the Buka Council of Chiefs, 
renewed the call for extradition treaties with the Solomons, Australia 
and New 7.ealand, to curb the activities of Havini , Forster, and Moana 
Jackson (Post-Courier 28 October 199 1).  
Reference to New 7.ealand lawyer Moana Jackson is interesting. 
He had advised the Bougainvillean delegation during the September 
'talks about talks ' on the MV Kris (see below) . Papua New Guinea 
officials in Honiara had been instructed not to issue a visa allowing him 
to take part in the talks. He had gone anyway, entering Bougainville 
illegally from the Solomons, a move seen as 'likely to create another 
diplomatic row between the Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands government' (Post-Courier 1 1  September 199 1 ). Incidentally, 
this attempt to exclude Jackson was one reason why the Bougainville 
side sought to have the next talks outside Papua New Guinea territory. 
Peace talks: on again , off again 
An obstacle to resuming talks (originally scheduled for July) was the 
Interim government's insistence that the MST must be in place before 
the talks. As Michael Ogio revealed at the Update Conference in 
Canberra in May 199 1 ,  Francis Ona and Sam Kauona had intended to 
attend. This was confirmed and a date of 26 July proposed (Post­
Courier 5 July 199 1) .  A letter from Ona to Namaliu on 1 1  July 
criticised the government's refusal to recognise the Interim government 
as the interim legal authority, demanded that the MST be in place two 
weeks before the talks and Papua New Guinea troops be withdrawn, 
and requested that Namaliu attend the talks himself. The Bougainville 
side also requested a one-month postponement to 26 August. Ona 
offered to send a group to Honiara on 26 July to set up the talks (Times 
of PNG 25 July 199 1 ;  Post-Courier 26 July 1991 ). A few days later a 
Papua New Guinea government team flew to Buka to make the 
arrangements. One reason for the month's postponement was to allow 
the Bougainville delegates to travel to Geneva, an expedition which 
poisoned the atmosphere fo r  talks as the Papua New Guinea 
government was angered at not being informed and dismayed by Joe 
Kabui's presentation. 
A hopeful sign was a statement by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat that its secretary-general, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, would 
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attend the opening of the talks and that Sir Paul Reeves , fonner 
governor-general of New Zealand, would be the neutral chairman. 
Commonwealth involvement would be crucial if  a MST was to be 
deployed. While Kabui was in Geneva, momentum was lost on the 
Bougainville side and unrealistic demands were repeated and extended -
Papua New Guinea troops should be withdrawn not only from North 
Bougainville and Buka, but even from their main supply base in 
Rabaul, and the MST must be in place before talks commenced (Post­
Courier 2 1  August 199 1 ). On 23 August it was reported that the talks, 
due to take place on New Zealand ships anchored off Kieta, would be 
delayed for two days to allow time for Kabui and his delegation to 
return. A New Zealand team making final arrangements for the talks 
was on Bougainville on 21  and 22 August (Post-Courier 23 August 
1 991 ) .  On 26 August it was announced that Chief Anyaoku would not 
attend as arrangements were still not finalized (Pacnews 26 August 
199 1 ), and next day Papua New Guinea cancelled the talks citing 
unreasonable rebel demands. Officials from both sides would meet to 
set the agenda before new talks were held (Post-Courier 28 August 
1 99 1 ).  
These talks about talks were eventually held aboard MV Kris in 
Kieta harbour on 7 September: the Papua New Guinea team was led by 
Brown Bai ,  secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, while the 
Bougainville side was led by Martin Miriori, described in the minutes 
as 'Secretary for Foreign Affairs ' of the Interim government. He was 
assisted by Moses Havini ('Ambassador to Australia ') who had been a 
member of the delegation to Geneva. The meeting agreed that the next 
fonnal round of talks should take place on 8 October and would review 
the Honiara Agreement with particular attention to the MST. The Papua 
New Guinea team suggested the venue to be 'one of those islands like 
Mortlocks or on land somewhere in Papua New Guinea. Your team can 
be assured that you will not be arrested and you will be free to express 
yourself freely ' (Minutes kept by the Bougainville delegation) .  The 
Bougainville side said that it had no mandate to decide on the venue, 
and would consult the Papua New Guinea authorities when a decision 
had been made. 
On 15 September Francis Ona wrote to Namaliu requesting that 
the talks be held in Auckland, New Zealand, to consider the 
Bougainville proposal to set up a joint working group to examine the 
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MST and related issues. The letter seems to have reached Port Moresby 
on about 25 September, and the Papua New Guinea government 
immediately rejected the proposed venue, suggesting instead the 
Trobriand Islands or an atoll off Bougainville. The Post-Courier (21 
September 1991)  'believed ' that the letter reiterated earlier demands that 
the MST be sent to Bougainville before the talks, but this was not in 
fact mentioned in the letter. A subsequent Bougainville suggestion that 
the talks be held in Honiara or Gizo was also rejected; on 7 October the 
talks were again postponed. 
It is not surprising that the Bougainville side wanted the talks to 
be held outside Papua New Guinea. The arrest of Interim Government 
minister Joe Pais on Buka where he was negotiating with Sam Tulo, 
and the suspicion that Buka BRA leader Linus Kabutoa had been shot 
in cold blood rather than in a gun battle with the PNGDF, had created 
doubts about Papua New Guinea's intentions in insisting on talks on 
Papua New Guinea territory (Pacnews 8 October 1991). It was also felt 
that Papua New Guinea would not admit foreign advisers such as 
Moana Jackson. 
Bernard Narokobi attributed the delay to disagreements among 
BRA leaders : 'they are unlikely to agree among themselves on what to 
talk about ' (Post-Courier 9 October 199 1 ). Joseph Hapisiria echoed 
N arokobi 's argument that the BRA leaders 'do not know what to talk 
about at the negotiating table. As a result, they are deliberately trying to 
prolong and delay the next round of talks by coming up with all sorts 
of demands ' (Post-Courier 14 October 1 99 1) .  This appraisal seems 
unfair. Several past delays in getting peace talks going had been due to 
the security concerns of the Bougainville delegation, concerns which 
had some foundation. 
Interim legal authorities 
In May Father Momis had proposed an Interim Legal Authority (ILA) 
to administer Bougainville , consisting of four districts (South, Central, 
North, Buka and the Atolls) .  Such an Authority was opposed by 
Joseph Hapisiria, chainnan of the Buka Interim Authority, who saw it 
as subsuming the Honiara and Kavieng accords prematurely. He 
suggested that the proposal could lead to political infighting when the 
emphasis should rather be on the restoration of seivices (Post-Courier 
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2 1  May 199 1 ). It would also , of course, end Buka's special position 
in, and partial control over, the rehabilitation process. Momis defended 
his plan, pointing out that the ILA 'will in no way interfere with the 
current operational functions of district authorities such as that 
established on Buka Island already. The legal interim authority will be 
responsible for negotiations with the National government on major 
issues such as the current restoration of services and the future of 
Bougainville ' (Post-Courier 1 1  June 1991 ) . 
Two months later Momis announced that interim authorities 
would be established to serve the north, centre and south of 
Bougainville , and 'probably ' the atolls , noting that one already 
operated in Buka (Post-Courier 14  August 1 99 1 ). A week later people 
in northwest Bougainville were reported as wanting an interim 
authority (Post-Courier 22 August 199 1 ). By the end of the month the 
Council of Chiefs in Buin (southern Bougainville) set up an interim 
commission to coordinate restoration of services in conjunction with 
Administrator Sam Tulo, a move interpreted by N arokobi as a rejection 
of secession (Post-Courier 29, 30 August 199 1 ) .  Narokobi suggested 
that the establishment of interim authorities meant that the BRA and 
Interim government had no legitimate right to speak for all 
Bougainvilleans and could only speak for the Panguna and Kieta areas. 
This suggested that the interim authorities were an overt attempt to 
divide and rule, and helps explain the rebels ' lukewarm response to 
them. 
Momis seems to have adopted the idea of several authorities 
rather than a single ILA because of concerns voiced by Buka leaders 
and because of the dispute which followed hard on the heels of the 
Honiara Declaration, as to whether the Interim government could 
legitimately be considered as the ILA. This was not acceptable to Papua 
New Guinea, while the rebels would accept nothing less. On several 
occasions Namaliu pointed out that an agreed ILA was necessary 
before the deployment of the promised MST (Post-Courier 5 July, 2 1 ,  
23 August 1 99 1 ;  AAP 25 July 1 991 ). 
On the ground 
The events leading to Nuia's dismissal and Itta's arrest have already 
been mentioned. Nuia's replacement, Colonel Joseph Maras , was 
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ordered not to speak to the media. He has not, and virtually nothing has 
been heard from him. Defence Minister B en .Sabumei had 
recommended that Nuia be replaced by Colonel Lima Dataona, who 
had previously served on Bougainville, but this proposal was rejected 
by the National Executive Council for reasons which were not publicly 
stated. The soldiers were said to be dissatisfied by Nuia's dismissal, 
but this does not seern to have affected discipline. 
In late June the first PNGDF casualty for several months 
occurred. A soldier was wounded in an ambush near Siara on north 
Bougainville. In late July in two separate incidents, two soldiers were 
killed and three security force personnel seriously wounded in further 
BRA ambushes in the north. A PNGDF source attributed the first 
incident to BRA anger at criticism of their activities in the Solomon 
Islands and the arrest of Itta, and he thought they were taking 
advantage of the lack of a PNGDF commander on Buka immediately 
after Nuia's sacking (Post-Courier 28 June 199 1). Administrator Tulo 
closed Buka Passage to the movement of people from north 
Bougainville until an explanation was given for attacks on soldiers 
engaged in restoration of services in a non-combat zone. 
The BRA explanation for this incident and later ambushes was 
their determination to pre-empt further PNGDF offensives in north 
Bougainville, of which they claimed intelligence, supposedly planned 
for 1 ,  12 ,  1 7  and 3 1  July and called ' Operation Trust No-One ' 
(Pacnews 1 July 1 99 1 ). While there is no independent evidence for any 
such operations, deep suspicion on the Bougainville side and therefore 
the potential of overreaction should not be underestimated. For these 
ambushes the BRA moved troops north from Central Command, to the 
dismay of at least some people in the area (Times of PNG 8 August 
199 1 ) .  After the two later attacks Tulo closed the Passage again, 
preventing the movement of Bougainville mainland people to Buka for 
shopping and medical attention; imposed a 4 p.m. to 8 a.m .  curfew; 
stopped all commercial air and sea travel to Buka saying that only relief 
supplies would be admitted, and called for security forces to be 
withdrawn from north Bougainville to Buka (Post-Courier 24 July 
1 99 1) .  
If this reaction seems paranoid, we  should recall the earlier 
attempt on Tulo's life and the continuing tension on Buka. Despite 
government insistence that everything was again 'normal ' on Buka, 
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successful BRA action on the mainland could have spilled over onto the 
smaller island. There were still armed BRA groups in the bush, 
although they had been quiet for some time. Tulo soon lifted many of 
the restrictions although the curfew remained in force in mid-October. 
Allowing travel to Buka by mainland Bougainvilleans was a cause of 
tension between Tulo and the Buka Council of Chiefs (Post-Courier 26 
July 199 1 ). The chiefs wanted the Passage closed, partly for their own 
security, partly to punish mainlanders whom they blamed for the crisis 
and the destruction of property during the period of BRA rule. They 
lodged a compensation claim against mainland chiefs in mid July, and 
wanted mainlanders barred from Buka until this was paid (Post-Courier 
1 6  July 1 99 1) .  
Another part of their frustration was that funds for restoring 
services were drying up by mid July. The PNGDF restoration effort 
had come to a halt through lack of money, and security force numbers 
on Buka and Bougainville were cut back because of the funding 
squeeze (Post-Courier 1 1  July 199 1 ). The civilian effort was also 
hampered, and Momis submitted a budget request for K30 million for 
the restoration effort. Despite the opinion that the government was 
' almost certain to approve ' the request (Post-Courier 17 July 199 1 ), 
cabinet was not impressed. In an eleven-page ministerial statement, Sir 
Michael Somare outlined yet another 'new deal'  for Bougainville, to be 
put before the next peace talks. As reported, it seemed to be a direct 
slap in the face for Momis. Somare explained: 
It would be criminal for a handful of fanatical 
Bougainvilleans and national government leaders to 
expect our people to have an objective frame of mind in 
dealing with the political issues . . . .  In my view neither the 
essential ingredients nor the preconditions for the people 
of Bougainville to determine their future political destiny 
are yet in place. 
The national government has to date spent more than K.25 
million since the crisis. 
We have now been asked for another K 30 million. The 
question is ,  do we have resources to continue funding 
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this exercise along the lines as dictated by a handful of 
Bougainvilleans? (Times of PNG 25 July 1991 )  
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The funds had not been released a month later. In September the 
Buka chiefs were calling for funds to be released and for additional 
funds. In a statement in early October Namaliu said that further money 
would not be expended on Bougainville until there was an Interim 
Legal Authority on the island (Post-Courier 9 October 1991 ). 
Trials of BRA suspects continued throughout the period. In 
May, 73 men were convicted on Buka but released for lack of gaol 
facilities. In June five others were charged, two of whom were found 
guilty and given six month sentences;  and at the end of the month a 
further six were convicted including some from the atolls. Francis 
Hopping, fonnerly second-in-command to Buka BRA leader Linus 
Kabutoa was sentenced to six years jail (Post-Courier 9, 12 August 
1 99 1 ) .  
Shortly afterwards Joe Pais, Defence and Police minister of the 
Interim government, was arrested on Buka, where he had come to 
discuss cooperation over the peaceful restoration of services in north 
Bougainville with Sam Tulo. He had been involved in discussions for 
some time, and had visited Buka on several occasions. He was arrested 
'because his activities were becoming very suspicious ' according to a 
PNGDF source (Post-Courier 1 3  August 1 99 1 ) .  He must have 
previously been given assurances of safe passage, but these were 
presumably part of a trap. 
The Pais case is one reason why other Bougainville leaders 
decline to hold negotiations on Papua New Guinea territory. When Pais 
was fonnally charged, a national court judge, Justice Jalina, suggested 
sentencing guidelines for convicted BRA members: ordinary members 
4 to 5 years, those with some authority 5 to 6 years , higher command 
(such as Francis Hopping) 6 to 8 years, overall commander or head of 
an interim government 8 to 10 years (Post-Courier 16 August 1 991 ) . 
This schema adds to Bougainville negotiators ' reluctance to put 
themselves in Papua New Guinea hands. At the end of August six 
BRA members were sentenced to 1 0  to 20 years for shooting Philip 
Mihen in front of his wife on 23 November 1990 at Ketskets in Buka. 
No reason has been given for this premeditated execution. 
Later in August a peace ceremony was held in north Bougainville 
where several BRA units handed in their anns. The northern 
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Bougainville commander, Peter Barik, had been involved in the 
negotiations and was said to be helping to set up an ILA in the north 
(Post-Courier 22 August 199 1 ). BRA members who surrendered were 
assured that they would not be arrested . There have since been 
rumours, unconfirmed but widely believed on Bougainville, that Barik 
was later arrested. 
At about the same time as the peace ceremony, there were reports 
of PNGDF troop movements on north Bougainville and that the village 
of Iaun had been attacked by helicopters carrying machine guns. A 
patrol boat was said to have come inshore and mortared the village 
(Pacnews 23 August 199 1 ) .  PNGDF harassment of coastal villages 
had never entirely ceased after the April landing on north Bougainville. 
There were reports of an exchange of fire between the BRA and 
soldiers on a patrol boat at or near Kieta on 7 June (Times of PNG 20 
June 199 1 ), and a letter from Bougainville referred to shelling of the 
Kieta airport site from a patrol boat on 1 8  July. 
On 1 1  September the Buka BRA commander, Linus Kabutoa, 
was shot dead at Tatarei village on Buka, together with ' senior BRA 
officer' Hugo Gonu and one other. The official version was that 
soldiers, alerted to his presence by villagers , had come to talk to him; 
but on seeing them he drew a gun and was shot dead (Times of PNG 
12 September 1991) .  There were rumours that he was not armed, and 
was shot in cold blood during discussions. After the shooting, tension 
ran high on Buka and a PNGDF spokesman condemned Defence 
Minister Sabumei for 'boasting ' of the death and exacerbating the 
situation (Post-Courier 13 ,  1 7  September 1991 ). Narokobi described 
the deaths as tragic, expressed condolences to the families of the 
victims, and hoped that peace talks would not be affected (Post-Courier 
1 8  September 199 1 ) .  Although Sabumei reckoned that there were only 
about twenty BRA supporters and two leaders (including Lieutenant 
Tiger) at large in Buka, the reaction of Narokobi and the PNGDF 
suggested some fear of trouble erupting again, between security forces 
and Buka villagers whose support for the national government was 
uncertain. 
Buka leaders continually pressed for funds and special projects, 
ahead of any general settlement when funds would be more widely 
dispersed : sealing of roads,  a University Centre, and even the 
relocation of the provincial capital from Arawa to tiny Sohano island 
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(which had been the administrative centre before the copper mine came 
into production) . Criticism by mainland chiefs of the Buka chiefs and 
of the government for heeding their claims,  suggest that the Buka 
Interim Authority and chiefs may not have it all their own way in future 
(Post-Courier 20 September 199 1). 
The PNGDF has been slowly extending its control south along 
the main east coast road on Bougainville. By early October troops were 
encamped at Ton, near the southern end of Selau; by the middle of 
October they had shifted to Tsunpets school in Baniu Bay. A second 
unit is said to have taken up position on Mount Takaniat in Tinputz, the 
main PTC transmitter station on Bougainville. The Tsunpets group 
were said to be planning to move south to Tinputz station itself. All this 
had occurred without incident. 
The apparent acceptance of a PNGDF presence followed a 
request from the Tinputz Council of Chiefs in August, that troops be 
deployed if the planned peace talks yielded no result (Times of PNG 8 
August 199 1) .  Rascal problems had been growing in the Teop-Tinputz 
area since the mid 1980s, and at some point in the crisis the rascal 
groups had professed allegiance to the BRA. Their crimes remained 
unchecked and in a letter to Sam Tulo in late July the Tinputz chiefs 
complained that the rascals had demanded money and goods from trade 
store owners at gun-point, pack-raped a teacher, stolen K4600 from the 
chairman of the Teop Island Fish Project, attempted to rape a nursing 
sister, destroyed school property and robbed villagers (Times of PNG, 
8 August). More recently two women in the Teop area were abducted at 
gun-point by a rascal leader, but luckily were released unharmed two 
days later. The failure of BRA leaders to control such activity cost it 
support in the Tinputz area. People wanted someone - anyone - to come 
and control the problem. 
One positive sign of change on Buka is the apparent winding 
down of Buka Liberation Front (BLF) activity. Buka chiefs called for 
the BLF to be disarmed and disbanded, and its members enrolled as 
police reservists (Post-Courier 23 October 1991). Two days later it was 
announced that normal police operations would be resumed on Buka in 
November, if suitable accommodation could be found for police 
officers. 
Tensions between the security forces and Buka villagers were 
said to have eased, particularly after Port Moresby-based troops were 
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replaced, between March and May, by a detachment from Wewak who 
were said to be more ' reasonable ' .  Two active BRA units remained on 
Buka: one in the mountains of Solos formerly led by Linus Kabutoa 
and more recently by Simon Kerek or Kererek, and another near 
Eltupan led by the notorious 'Lieutenant Tiger' . Although money is 
continually promised by the national government, finances, supplies 
and medicines remain in short supply, hampering restoration efforts. 
Some teachers and nurses have apparently had to travel to Rabaul to be 
paid, leading to low morale. This does not bode well for the restoration 
program elsewhere. 
The South Bougainville Initiative 
On 23 October a Joint Communique was released in Honiara by Momis 
and Anthony Anugu, chairman of a South Bougainville delegation of 
seventeen, after five days of talks . It announced the formation of the 
South Bougainville Interim Constituent Assembly (SBICA) . The 
communique is given in full: 
In a joint communique issued in Honiara today, the PNG 
Minister for Provincial Affairs and the Co-ordinator for 
the restoration of services to Bougainville, Father John 
Momis, and the Leader of the South Bougainville 
Delegation, Mr Anthony Anugu , announced the 
formation of the government for South Bougainville to be 
known as the South Bougainville Interim Constituent 
Assembly (SBICA). 
The two Leaders said the formation of the government is 
a big step forward in  the efforts towards the 
normalisation of life and the restoration of services and is 
completely in line with the Honiara declaration signed in 
Honiara on the 23rd of January, 199 1 .  
Father John Momis and Mr Anthony Anugu further stated 
that the people of South Bougainville now stand totally 
united in fully implementing the Honiara Declaration. 
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The two Leaders said that full financial assistance for  the 
new South Bougainville authority will be required and a 
Budget of over ten million Kina (K 10 million) for the 
1 992 fiscal year, as being the first stage of the 
restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction process had 
been submitted. 
Mr Anugu has given assurances that the new government 
will maintain total political stability in South Bougainville 
to allow a smooth and speedier progress to nonnalcy. 
The government accepts total responsibility for the 
maintenance of law and order in South Bougainville. 
The South Bougainville leaders have also announced that 
they would like to see the next round of peace talks 
between the Bougainville Leaders and the Papua New 
Guinea National government held as soon as possible. 
The South Bougainville Leaders have also called for a 
broader representation of Bougainvilleans at the Talks. 
Father Momis in thanking the South Bougainville Leaders 
for their initiative and goodwill assured that the 
understanding reached between the two parties will be 
honoured. 
The two Leaders then thanked the People and government 
of Solomon Islands for their continuing auspices and 
understanding towards finding a lasting solution to the 
Bougainville issue. 
Signed this 23rd day of October 1 99 1 .  
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It was surely deliberate that SBICA was not referred to as an 
Interim Legal Authority. Anugu is a former national MP for South 
Bougainville and had been held under 'village arrest ' for some time by 
the local BRA. Interviewed in Honiara after the signing of the 
communique, he was careful to point out that the people of South 
Bougainville were not rejecting secession, nor did it represent a split 
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with the BRA or the Interim government. He claimed that more than 60 
per cent of the delegation were members of the BRA Southern 
Command, and that Francis Ona had authorized the talks (Mary Louise 
O ' Callaghan, 'PNG agrees to South Bougainville Self-Rule ' ,  
Melbourne Age 24 October 199 1 ). 
These points were seemingly lost on the Times of PNG whose 
front page headline the same day was 'South Bougainville Rejects 
BRA' .  A map purporting to show the area covered by the agreement 
was absurd, covering half of the Nasioi heart-land to within a few 
kilometres of the Panguna mine and all of Nagovisi territory, as well as 
the Buin and Siwai areas which the agreement presumably did cover. 
However, Konio Seneka's article under that headline made no mention 
of any rejection of the BRA. She quoted a government spokesman as 
saying that interim authorities similar to that on Buka would be 
established in central, northeast, northwest and atolls 'at a later stage' .  
A t  a press conference on his return to Port Moresby, Father 
Momis said that the agreement had 'concretized ' the Honiara 
Declaration and emphasized that Papua New Guinea security forces 
would be kept out: ' if security forces are deployed then the same 
number of casualties may result as on Buka' .  He added that if the Buka 
authority so desired, the security forces could also be moved off Buka. 
He also stated that aid organizations would have access through South 
Bougainville, thereby circumventing PNGDF interference with medical 
supplies, and that Anugu's delegation had suggested Buin as the venue 
for the next round of peace talks. Communication between the 
government and South Bougainville was expected to give a ' friendly 
nudge ' (Momis's phrase) to leaders in Central Bougainville (Post­
Courier 28 October 1991) .  SBICA was to present a formal constitution 
to Momis , and then elections would be held . Earlier, Anugu had 
suggested a 25-member assembly including eight appointed traditional 
chiefs. 
The agreement called for a budget of K 10 million for 1 992, and 
its pmpose according to Momis was to facilitate a return to normalcy on 
the island. He did not expect the Papua New Guinea cabinet to reject it 
- but it must be remembered that in July he had been confident of 
Cabinet approval for a K30 million budget for Bougainville, and had 
been disappointed. It is not certain that he can sell the agreement to the 
cabinet, especially in view of the explicit exclusion of the PNGDF, and 
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with Defence Minister Sabumei leading the hardline faction in the 
cabinet. 
Conclusion 
There were reports in later October of splits in the BRA and a coup by 
hardliners. The accuracy of these reports is doubtful (see Post-Courier 
23, 25 October1991) .  The Buka leaders were again insisting on being 
heard (Post-Courier 30 October 1991), but amid the propaganda they 
were making a serious point about the need for a pan-Bougainville 
congress to sort out a common negotiating position. 
This view echoed the views of an editorial in the Times of PNG 
(24 October 1991)  and views I reported in August (Canberra Times 22 
August 1991 ). The Times noted: 
Times are changing. The BRA is no longer the sole actor 
on the stage. There are many actors. It is a fact that the 
BRA has accomplished in a remarkable manner its aims, 
i .e. to close the mine and evict the ' red-skins ' .  But, 
having closed the door on the past, it is completely unable 
to open the door to a meaningful future for the people of 
Bougainville. 
The moves in south (and apparently in north) Bougainville, to 
establish structures separate from the BRA and the Interim government, 
the strong stand of some Buka leaders, and the fact that much of 
Bougainville 's administrative and political talent is in exile, make it 
clear that the Interim government and BRA cannot be considered the 
sole players in any future negotiations with the Papua New Guinea 
government. It is unclear, however, how an all-party congress could be 
held unless participants' security could be guaranteed by a MST. 
Only in such a meeting could ordinary people's views be 
expressed without fear. These views are seldom heard, so I close with 
one which is not unique: 
Samting [the fight for independence] i orait, tasol wei ol lain i 
bagarapim pies na kilim planti man - em samting i no orait. Sapos ol i 
plenim gut, em bai orait (Fighting for independence is a good thing but 
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the way they destroyed property and killed people - that was no good. 
If they had planned the thing properly, then it would have been OK). 
Postscript:  seven days in November 
Events continued to move fast during the writing of this Update , and 
inevitably vision is clouded and the story loses the thread provided by 
hindsight and reflection. It does seem clear, however, that events took 
a sharp tum for the worse in the first week of November. 
Doubts were cast on the effectiveness of the South Bougainville 
agreement, a BRA attack on the army camp at Tsunpets left fifteen 
BRA dead and six security force members injured, and Momis seemed 
further isolated in cabinet when he was excluded from a National 
Security Council meeting to discuss the crisis. 
On 1 November it was reported that Francis Ona had cast doubt 
on the South Bougainville agreement, claiming that he had information 
that Defence Minister Sabumei was intending to deploy troops in South 
Bougainville despite Momis's assurances to the contrary. Ona 
suggested that the government and PNGDF have different and opposed 
plans for Bougainville (Post-Courier 1 November 199 1 ).  It seems 
unlikely, however, that there is much difference of opinion between 
some ministers (led by Sabumei) and the PNGDF. This is supported 
by the claim , aired on AB C TV's 'Seven Thirty Report ' on 5 
November, that Momis, a member of the National Security Council, 
had been excluded from a recent Council meeting when the issue would 
have been discussed. There have been no government statements 
endorsing the South Bougainville agreement or the proposed K 10 
million budget. 
In the most serious military engagement since the landing of 
PNGDF troops on Buka in September 1 990 and the subsequent BRA 
attack on Defence Force vessels at Buka Passage, a BRA unit attacked 
the security force camp at Tsunpets early on the morning of 3 
November. Fifteen BRA soldiers (in a force of about 40) died in the 
attack, nine from Central Bougainville and six from Tinputz, including 
one non-Bougainvillean. Five Papua New Guinea soldiers and one 
policeman were injured and taken to Rabaul for treatment. The Sydney 
Morning Herald (5 November 1 99 1 )  report erroneously placed 
Tsunpets between Tinputz and W akunai . In fact Tsunpets is  the 
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northernmost major Tinputz-language speaking village, and is  several 
kilometres north of Tinputz station. It forms the border between the 
Selau area, whose language (a dialect of Halia) is also spoken in parts 
of Buka and whose chiefs had already accepted restoration of seivices 
by the Papua New Guinea government, and the Tinputz district which 
appears more divided in its attitude to the government. 
Pressure continued on Papua New Guinea to allow medical 
supplies to reach Arawa and Kieta. An ABC TV ' Seven Thirty Report' 
castigated the Papua New Guinea government over the policy of denial. 
In a statement issued in Honiara, Francis Ona reiterated his stand that 
an international peacekeeping force was needed on the island before 
peace talks, and attacked Australian Prime Minister Hawke (Melbourne 
Age 2 November 1991 ) .  On a more positive note, however, it was 
reported that a Red Cross shipment of medical supplies had been 
cleared to proceed to South Bougainville. 
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The crisis in Bougainville has become the most serious issue in the affairs 
of the Western Pacific. Separatist sentiment has always been significant, 
fuelled by perceived ethnic traits distinguishing Bougainvi lleans from 
other Papua New Guineans, exacerbated by neglect of the region during 
most of the colonial period (unti l the development of the m ming complex 
in the 1 960s) and promoted by the remoteness of the islands from the rest 
of Papua New G u inea. The crisis has Austral ian d i mensions: the 
Commonwealth government cannot be neutral since it provides a decl ining 
but sti l l  sign ificant proportion of Papua New G uinea revenue and logistic 
support for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force. Many of the relevant 
aid agencies are also based in Australia or organise their efforts there. It 
is cri tical ly important therefore that A ustral ians be accurately informed 
of events and condi tions in Bougainvi l le. Media coverage is at best 
uneven . The blockade of the is land has made in formation scarce, erratic 
and unrel iable. Clari ty is also obscured by the fact that different pol icies 
are pursued by competing sections of the Papua New Guinea cabinet, and 
d ifferent stances have been adopted by the Bougainvi l le Revol utionary 
Army,  the Interim Government, and an im:reasing n um ber of smal ler 
organ isations in Bougainvil le. It  is this dearth of acc urate information 
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